LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF 
CALfrORNIA 

SAN  DIEGO 


vK    Dvei 


M     <v  -..-»-- 


Tc 


DEMOCRACY. 


'  A.  new  science  of  politics  is  indispensable  to  a  new  world ' 
Dk  Tocquevillk. 


BY    GEORGE    SIDNEY   CAMP. 


NEAV   YORK: 
HARPER.  &  BROTHERS,  PUBLISHERS, 

329   &   331    PEARL    STREET, 
FBANKLIN   SQUARE. 

1859. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  tlie  year  1841,  by 

Uaeper   &   Brothers, 
In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  Southern  District  of  New  York 


PUBLISHERS      ADVERTISEMENT. 


The  publishers  of  the  Family  Library  offer  the 
following  work  to  the  public  as  a  treatise  on  "  De- 
mocracy"  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  word — gov- 
ernment by  the  People.  Such  a  treatise  may,  they 
think,  not  improperly  lay  claim  to  novelty  ;  no 
work,  to  their  knowledge,  having  ever  yet  been 
published,  the  express  design  of  which  is  to  eluci- 
date the  democratic  theory.  That  some  such  work 
ought  to  be  in  the  hands  of  every  American  citi- 
zen it  is  needless  to  urge.  To  claim  the  right  of 
political  self-government,  without  being  able  to  tell 
why — to  declaim  about  liberty,  without  being  able 
to  define  what  that  liberty  is — are  what,  in  this 
country,  no  one  should  be  guilty  of;  and  yet  how 
few  among  us  really  understand  the  fundamental 
principles  of  institutions  which  all  are  ready  to  eu- 
logize, in  the  rights  and  benefits  of  which  all  equal- 
ly participate,  and  the  practical  operation  of  which 
all  unite  to  direct. 


IV  ADVERTISEMENT. 

A  work  on  the  theory  of  democratic  government 
has  long  been  a  desideratum  in  our  literature. 
How  far  the  present  volume  will  supply  the  de- 
ficiency must  be  left  to  the  American  public  to 
decide. 

The  Democracy  treated  of  in  the  following 
pages,  it  will  be  seen,  is  not  the  democracy  of  one 
party,  but  of  all  parties.  Had  anything  like  a  par- 
tizan  character  appeared  in  it,  the  volume  would 
never  have  found  a  place  in  the  Family  Library  ; 
but  it  is  believed  that  the  author  has  studiously,  as 
he  has  to  our  view  successfully,  avoided  a  tenden- 
cy which,  without  serving  the  cause  of  any  party, 
would  have  seriously  impaired  the  general  useful- 
ness of  his  work.  Still,  the  publishers  do  not  take 
it  upon  themselves  to  assert  tliat  all  his  doctrines 
will  alike  command  the  assent  of  all.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  think  without  being  independent ;  or  to 
be  at  all  original  without  occasional  pecuharity. 
They  have  thus  thought  themselves  bound  fairly  to 
allow  for  liberty  of  opinion.  So  often,  however,  as 
the  reader  shall  discover  himself  to  be  at  variance 
with  the  author,  he  will  find  such  differences  to  be 


ADVERTISEMENT.  V 

differences  between  individual  and  individual,  and 
not  comprised  in  any  of  those  political  disputes  in 
which  party  has  been  arrayed  against  party.  No- 
where has  allusion  been  made  to  such  disputes,  as, 
it  is  believed,  the  subject  itself  steers  above  them. 
The  object  which  the  author  has  proposed  to 
himself  is  an  elevated  one — no  less  than  to  por- 
tray the  true  nature,  and  demonstrate  the  intrinsic 
and  universal  propriety,  of  republican  government. 
It  will  accordingly  be  found  that,  in  pursuit  of  it, 
the  minor  differences  of  domestic  parties  have  been 
lost  sight  of,  while  his  aim  has  been  to  vindicate 
that  grand  national  party,  composed  of  all  repub- 
lican  America,  against  the  aspersions  of  foreign 
commentators,  and  the  enmity  of  European  mon- 
archists. 

H.  &B. 

New-York,  September,  1841. 


CONTENTS. 


PART   I. 
Introduction Page  9 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  Nature  of  Political  Science  .....    22 

CHAPTER  II. 

Self-Govemment  by  the  People  the  only  legitimate  Form  of 
Government. — The  universal  Right  of  Mankind  to  Democratic 
Government,  and  their  Competency  to  administer  it       .    39 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  same  Subjects  continued 88 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Origin  and  Supports  of  Monarchical  Government       .  107 

CHAPTER  V. 

Common  Objections  to  Democracy  considered.— The  Character 
and  Spirit  of  Monarchical  Government  still  farther  illus- 
trated         129 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Permanency  of  Democratic  Government,  and  the  eventual 
Prevalence  of  Democratic  Principles       ....  159 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

PART    II. 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  alleged  "Tyranny  of  the  Majority"  in  America     Page  183 

CHAPTER  11. 

The  so-called  "  Right  of  Instruction"  ....  206 

CHAPTER  III. 

Aristocratic  Society  in  America 220 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Immigration .       .  239 


DEMOCRACY 


PART   I 


INTRODUCTION. 

There  is  this  remarkable  difference  between 
monarchical  and  aristocratical  systems  of  gov- 
ernment on  the  one  hand,  and  the  democratic 
system  on  the  other,  that,  while  the  former  are 
based  upon  prescription,  the  latter  is  based  upon 
the  right  of  the  people  to  govern  themselves. 
The  former  are  founded  on  custom,  and  the  ac- 
tual, prevalent  order  of  things ;  the  latter  on  the 
moral  relations  of  men. 

Of  course,  there  ought  to  be  found  correspond- 
ing differences  in  the  political  theories  by  which 
these  two  descriptions  of  government  are  sus- 
tained. On  the  one  hand,  we  ought  to  receive 
from  monarchical  and  aristocratical  writers  an 
extended  consideration  of  those  various  views 
of  expediency  on  which  their  systems  are  pro- 
fessedly maintained,  and  an  attempted  vindication 
of  them,  as  imbodying  great  practical  skill  and 
B 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

wisdom,  however  little  of  speculative  accuracy  ; 
and,  on  the  other,  we  may  well  look  to  demo- 
cratic writers  for  a  full  development  of  the  right 
of  man  to  self-government,  and  from  them  re- 
quire, at  least,  a  portraiture  of  the  abstract  per- 
fection of  the  democratic  system. 

In  a  democratic  country,  where  self-govern- 
ment has  been  successfully  exercised  by  the  peo- 
ple for  nearly  three  quarters  of  a  century,  it  might 
naturally  have  been  expected  that  such  demo- 
cratic writers  would  not  have  been  rare,  and  that 
a  democratic  nation  would  not  have  been  so  long 
without  a  democratic  literature.  Yet  to  what 
book  or  to  what  author  shall  we  look  for  a 
demonstration  of  the  right  of  the  people  to  man- 
age their  own  government?  To  what  source 
shall  we  refer  the  young  democratic  disciple  for 
proof  of  what  he  has  always  understood  to  be 
the  fundamental  principles  of  our  government? 
for  a  theory  of  politics,  I  will  not  say,  that  does 
not  violate  every  popular  conviction,  but  that 
does  not  indirectly  assail  popular  institutions  ? 
Eloquent  vindications  of  popular  rights,  eloquent 
assaults  upon  hereditary  prerogative,  may  oc- 
casionally be  found  scattered,  at  very  rare  points 
and  very  distant  intervals,  in  the  world  of  litera- 
ture j  but  no  work  digesting  such  views  in  a 


INTRODUCTION.  11 

philosophical  system,  and  giving  us  a  clear,  con- 
sistent, and  harmonious  theory. 

Hence  the  following  brief  essay.  It  will  doubt- 
less appear  presumptuous,  in  an  inexperienced 
writer,  thus  to  have  attempted  a  subject  the  dis- 
cussion of  which  might  well  challenge  the  exer- 
cise of  the  greatest  abilities.  My  apology  must 
be,  that  a  field  where  nothing  seems  as  yet  to 
have  been  even  attempted,  may  well  be  entered 
upon  by  the  most  enterprising  without  waiting 
for  the  most  able ;  and,  however  much  I  may 
fall  short  of  my  theme,  it  will  be  my  consola- 
tion, that  to  agitate  just  principles  is  to  advance 
them,  and  that  first,  feeble,  and  failing  essays  to 
grasp  the  truth  are  always  the  earnest  of  its  final 
and  triumpliant  establishment. 

It  is  our  common  belief  that  our  government 
is  distinguished  in  principle  from  other  govern- 
ments, is  radically  different.  If  a  man  were  se- 
riously to  propose  for  our  adoption  monarchical 
or  aristocratical  institutions,  he  would  be  over- 
whelmed with  public  obloquy.  We  should  feel, 
not  as  if  he  were  indulging  a  mere  harmless 
error  of  the  understanding,  not  as  if  he  had 
erred  simply  on  a  question  of  expediency,  but 
as  if  he  had  been  guilty  of  a  moral  delinquen- 
cy on  a  moral  question ;  and,  should  he  actual- 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

ly  attempt  to  carry  his  plans  into  execution,  he 
would  be  execrated  as  a  public  traitor  having 
designs  upon  our  liberties  ;  no  party,  and  no  in- 
dividual, but  would  shun  the  contamination  of 
his  alliance.  Now,  if  this  public  sentiment  be 
correct,  the  books  we  at  present  have  that  treat 
of  politics  must  be  radically  wrong,  for  they  dis- 
tinctly recognise  three  systems  of  government  as 
equally  legitimate,  reducing  the  difference  be- 
tween them  to  a  mere  question  of  convenience 
and  expediency,  and,  if  the  truth  must  be  allow- 
ed, making  republican  government  the  most  un- 
wise and  inexpedient  of  the  three.  They  admit 
that,  perhaps,  as  to  its  mere  theory,  none  offers 
so  fair;  but  insist  that  this  abstract  perfection 
is  its  practical  defect ;  that  it  is  found  to  be 
weak,  if  not  impracticable,  upon  experiment, 
and  stationed  the  next  door  to  anarchy;  in 
other  words,  that  it  is  like  a  very  good-natured, 
well-intentioned,  but  harmful  imbecile,  whose 
chief  tendency  is  towards  self-destruction  !  Yet 
it  is  a  fact  that  Paley  and  Blackstone,  Burke, 
Burlamaqui,  and  Montesquieu,  firmly  maintain- 
ing such  doctrines,  and  esteemed,  with,  perhaps, 
the  exception  of  the  last,  the  greatest  favourers 
of  arbitrary  power,  are  the  most  constantly  read, 
the  most  universally  adopted  in  colleges,  and  the 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

most  frequently  quoted  of  all  political  authorities 
in  republican  America;  while  it  may  be  confi- 
dently asserted  that  a  connected  and 'philosophical 
exposition  of  the  peculiar  theory  of  democratic 
government  has  never  yet  been  written.  Thus  we 
journey  on,  living  in  the  rich  experience  and 
practical  enjoyment  of  democratic  freedom,  but 
in  entire  and  reckless  indifference  to  its  abstract 
principles. 

Even  foreigners  hardly  seem  so  indifferent  to 
our  political  system  as  we  ourselves.  Many  in- 
telligent men  among  them  have  professed  to  re- 
gard its  operation,  on  so  grand  a  scale,  as  a  great 
and  wonderful  political  phenomenon,  and  have 
thought  it  worth  their  while  to  come  here  to 
examine  more  narrowly  into  its  practical  nature, 
and  speculate  upon  its  probable  results.  Its  suc- 
cesses have  often  furnished  an  embarrassing  ar- 
gument in  the  hands  of  the  popular  partisan  of 
the  Old  World,  and,  doubtless,  not  unfrequently 
appeared  awfully  portentous  to  crowned  heads. 
We  alone  appear  to  be  indifferent  to  its  real 
nature  and  fundamental  principles.  Nay,  our 
men  of  education  are  dwelling  in  rapture  over 
the  flowery  pages  of  Burke,  or  carefully  treasu- 
ring up  the  artificial  systems  of  a  Paley  or  a 
Blackstonej  while  our  men  of  wealth  and  lei- 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

sure  are  learning  abroad  to  admire  the  external 
splendour  that  surrounds  the  favoured  classes  of 
aristocratic  Europe,  and  acquiring  a  distaste  for 
the  plainness  and  simplicity  of  our  social  and 
political  systems. 

If  we  search,  therefore,  for  just  political  sen- 
timent, there  seems  more  of  it  to  be  found  with 
the  humbler  classes,  whence  it  was  originally 
ushered  among  nations,  than  in  our  favoured 
ranks,  where  there  are  too  many  who  have  been 
foreign  tributaries  for  knowledge,  or  formed 
tastes  for  the  excesses  of  European  refinement. 
Popular  prejudices  on  this  subject  seem  to  be 
just ;  and  the  American  labourer,  who  looks  upon 
his  own  as  the  only  free  country,  seems  to  me  to 
be  much  nearer  the  truth  than  the  man  of  educr 
tion,  who  too  often  regards  freedom  as  pretty 
nearly  synonymous  with  well-regulated  govern- 
ment. It  is  singular,  yet  it  is,  I  think,  true,  that 
among  educated  men,  a  majority  would  willingly 
establish  a  property  qualification  as  requisite  for 
every  voter — a  demand  vitally  at  war  with  de- 
mocracy ;  and  a  very  large  proportion  would  be 
found  not  to  understand,  or  absolutely  to  assail, 
the  maxim  of  the  natural  equality  of  mankind, 
the  fundamental  principle  of  our  government. 

Our  political  opinions  seem  to  have  retro- 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

graded  since  the  Revolution.  The  national  ani- 
mosities of  that  period  anticipated  some  of  the 
truths  of  philosophy.  Those  laid  aside,  we  were 
immediately  immersed  in  the  active  concerns  of 
life ;  and  from  that  time  to  the  present,  contented 
with  the  practical  results  of  our  system,  we  have 
paid  but  little  attention  to  the  patient  study  of 
its  abstract  nature.  We  have  been,  from  cir- 
circumstances,  a  nation  of  practical  rather  than 
speculative  habits.  We  have  had  the  forest  to 
subdue,  a  new  continent  to  occupy,  a  new  gov- 
ernment to  establish ;  and,  hitherto,  our  republic 
has  been  engaged  in  the  acquisition  of  its  inde- 
pendence, in  the  settlement  of  its  constitution,  in 
the  vindication  of  its  rank  and  honour,  and  in 
the  hurried,  enterprising,  and  laborious  industry 
incident  to  the  difficulties  of  a  new  country,  and 
the  embarrassments  of  a  recent  nation.  We  have 
been  all  action.  A  bustling  and  enterprising  ac- 
tivity has  been  our  national  characteristic.  As 
individuals,  we  have  had  everything  to  do. 
Early  thrown  upon  our  own  resources,  a  vast 
practical  career  has  continually  been  spread  out 
before  us.  There  has  been  no  room  for  the 
thinker ;  he  has  been  jostled  one  side.  The  chief 
speculators  we  have  had  have  been  those  in 
merchandise  and  real  estate.     Instead  of  de- 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

veloping  our  theories  from  our  practice,  we 
have  taken  up  with  systems  which  we  have 
found  already  digested  to  our  hand.  Deriving 
our  origin  and  our  language  from  Great  Britain, 
having  one  common  literature,  one  common  re- 
ligion, and,  to  a  great  extent,  common  habits  and 
common  laws ;  deriving  a  great  many  of  our  po- 
litical principles,  more  of  our  political  institutions, 
and  all  our  love  of  liberty,  from  the  old  country, 
we  have  been  slow  to  discover  where  our  pupil- 
age should  have  ended,  and  what  bounds  the 
stern  dictates  of  principle  should  have  placed  to 
our  filial  reverence.  We  have  thus  adopted,  to 
a  great  extent,  British  politics,  with  British  laws 
and  literature.  Thus  it  has  come  to  pass  that, 
in  our  politics,  we  are  yet  tributary  to  the  Old 
World ;  that,  while  we  have  been  so  original  in 
action,  we  have  been  so  strangely  servile  in  the- 
ory. Hence,  the  strange  inconsistency  of  a  na- 
tion of  republicans  suffering  themselves  to  be 
instructed  in  the  elements  of  political  knowledge 
by  monarchists.  Look  to  monarchists  for  cor- 
rect theories  of  politics  on  which  to  base  cur  in- 
stitutions— the  world  might  as  well  have  expect- 
ed a  reformation  from  the  pope,  or  Christianity 
itself  from  the  Scribes  and  Pharisees. 
We  have  altogether  failed  to  appreciate  our 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

position.  We  have  been  guilty  of  a  great  prac- 
tical error  in  supposing  that  our  Revolution  is  to 
be  regarded  simply  as  an  historical  event,  of  no 
consequence  in  its  results  to  anybody  but  our- 
selves. On  the  contrary,  it  was  of  a  twofold 
character.  It  not  only  made  us  independent  as  a 
nation,  it  made  us  free  as  men ;  and  this  freedom, 
still  subsisting,  is  a  standing,  permanent  fact,  in- 
dicative of  the  political  capabihties  of  mankind, 
that  renders  the  period  from  which  it  takes  date 
an  era  in  the  moral  history  of  the  species.  Yet 
while,  as  a  national  event,  it  has  found  its  im- 
perishable record  in  our  national  annals,  though 
it  has  furnished  an  example  to  all  nations,  and  is 
opening  the  eyes  of  mankind  to  errors  which 
have  for  centuries  caused  the  past  to  tyrannize 
over  the  present,  it  has  made  no  alteration,  and 
found  no  place,  in  the  systems  of  political  sci- 
ence :  as  if  Philosophy  were  blind  to  practical 
achievements,  and  cared  not  to  celebrate  the  tri- 
umph of  her  most  exalted  principles. 

Our  government  was  not  the  result  of  an  ac- 
cident. Neither  blind  casualty,  nor  force,  nor 
fraud,  had  anything  whatever  to  do  with  its  in- 
stitution. It  was  the  product  of  the  voluntary 
mind  of  man.  It  was  not  less  the  choice  than 
the  irabodied  wisdom  of  the  people.     In  its  in- 


18  INTRODUCTION. 

stitution  was  presented  the  sublime  spectacle  of 
a  whole  nation  deliberating  and  acting  upon  the 
highest  and  most  comprehensive  of  terrestrial 
interests.  They  provided  for  their  common  wants 
out  of  their  common  experience.  The  united 
aim  of  the  people  was  to  provide,  in  the  choice 
of  a  government,  for  the  good  of  the  governed. 
"  The  eye"  of  the  body  social  was  "  single,"  and 
"  the  whole  body  was  full  of  light."  No  exist- 
ing government  controlled  the  choice  or  subsi- 
dized the  votes  of  the  American  people.  They 
were  not  awed  by  the  fear  or  seduced  by  the 
favour  of  a  feudal  and  vicious  aristocracy.  No 
military  power  mocked  at  their  deliberations. 
No  hierarchy  subdued  their  souls  with  supersti- 
tious terrors.  Corrupt  and  unnatural  prejudices 
and  factious  interests,  never  found  concurrent  ex- 
cept among  the  few,  were  necessarily  unheeded, 
when  the  appeal  was  made  alike  to  all.  No 
class  could  have  had  an  undue  influence,  or  se- 
cured to  itself  singular  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties, when  none  was  distinguishable  from  the 
multitude,  or  when  those  who  owed  to  temporary 
circumstances  a  transient  distinction  were  to  re- 
lapse immediately  into  the  common  mass.  All 
stood  in  those  equal  relations,  as  respected  their 
choice  of  the  principles  of  a  government,  which 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

mankind  at  large,  were  they  once  unshackled, 
would  universally  and  reciprocally  sustain  to 
each  other.  Our  present  system,  thus  commend- 
ed to  a  vast  and  unorganized  people,  comprising 
almost  every  description  of  character,  habits,  po- 
sition, and  interest,  that,  independently  of  politi- 
cal institutions,  diversifies  the  condition  of  our 
race,  it  would  seem  that  the  only  ground  of  its 
acceptation  must  have  been  those  original  senti- 
ments common  to  all  men,  that  constitute  the 
very  laws  of  nature. 

The  abstract  character  of  this  system,  and  its 
fundamental  principles,  ought  to  have  attracted 
the  earliest  attentions  of  the  American  scholar. 
Its  speculative  perfection  alone  ought  to  have 
won  for  it  numerous  disciples. 

But,  independently  of  its  abstract  beauty,  an 
understanding  of  its  nature  has  for  us  a  great 
practical  value.  What  is  our  Constitution  but 
the  mere  creature  of  the  public  will,  and  how 
can  we  be  sure  of  its  integrity  and  preservation 
if  the  public  mind  be  misinformed  or  perverted  ? 
We  are  all  sovereigns :  ought  we  not  all  to  be 
statesmen  ?  Should  not  an  American  be  always 
ready  to  show  by  what  title  he  claims  to  be  a 
free  citizen  ?  to  vindicate  the  system  by  virtue 
of  which  he  exercises  such  peculiar  and  such  ex- 
alted prerogatives  ? 


20  INTRODUCTION. 

Faith  is  as  necessary  to  the  repubhcan  as  to 
the  Christian,  and  the  fundamental  characteristic 
of  both.  We  must  beUeve  in  the  capacity  of 
man  for  self-government,  or  the  framework  of 
our  Constitution  will  be  altered.  On  what  basis 
does  that  conviction  now  rest  1  We  may  guard 
ourselves  from  foreign  enemies  by  physical  force; 
soldiers,  arras,  artillery,  and  fortifications  may 
render  us  safe  from  foreign  aggression ;  but  the 
sacred  ark  of  our  liberties  is  kept  in  the  temple 
of  the  human  mind,  and  can  only  be  preserved 
inviolate  by  gathering  around  it  the  forces  of 
.Truth,  and  intrenching  it  behind  the  deep  and 
enlightened  convictions  of  the  moral  sense.  Men 
will  not  risk  much  for  what  they  believe  to  be 
but  a  transient  blessing.  The  permanency  and 
the  excellence  of  self-government  are  our  only 
motives  to  be  loyal  to  our  sovereign,  the  people, 
our  only  motives  to  patriotic  and  self-sacrificing 
devotion ;  it  behooves  us,  therefore,  to  be  fully 
assured,  not  only  of  its  immediate  and  practical 
value,  but  of  its  high  moral  rectitude  and  intrin- 
sic propriety,  its  ennobling  qualities,  and  its  ab- 
solute capability  of  duration. 

Any  citizen  who  merely  professes  to  love  his 
country  and  to  honour  her  institutions,  may  well 
be  justified  in  attempting  to  assert  some  better 


IJfTRODUCTION.  21 

argument  in  their  favour  than  mere  national  prej- 
udice. They  are  inquiries  worthy  to  be  agitated, 
whether  all  nations  are  capable  of  self-govern- 
ment ?  whether  the  invariable  laws  of  justice  im- 
peratively demand  its  universal  institution,  inde- 
pendently of  the  particular  circumstances  of  each 
separate  nation  1  and  what  are  the  prospects  of 
its  permanency  and  universal  prevalence  1  Ques- 
tions to  which,  strange  to  tell,  American  litera- 
ture yet  furnishes  no  answer. 

1  cannot  believe  that  our  government  is  to  be 
a  perpetual  "experiment;"  that  its  practica- 
bility can  never  be  demonstrated.  Nor  am  1 
among  those  who  hold  that  it  is  simply  the  best 
government  for  us,  and  that  we  are,  by  means 
of  any  fancied  intellectual  or  moral  superiority, 
or  by  the  particular  favour  of  Providence,  alone, 
of  all  the  human  family,  blessed  with  a  monopoly 
of  good  government. 

When  the  question  of  republic  or  no  republic 
is  agitating  the  elements  of  society  in  the  most 
enlightened  nations  of  Europe,  it  is  believed  that 
it  cannot  be  uninteresting  to  a  people  who,  in  the 
solution  of  this  question,  are  looked  upon  as  an 
example,  and  should  be  able,  from  their  uncon- 
strained position,  to  anticipate  the  future  judg- 
ment of  the  world 


22  NATURE    OF   POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Nature  of  Political  Science. 

I  AM  well  aware  how  unsafe  and  unprofitable 
abstract  political  speculations  are  usually  held  to 
be ;  that  they  are  peremptorily  set  down  as  nev- 
er justified  by  experience,  liable  to  a  thousand 
qualifications  from  actual  circumstances,  and  ut- 
terly incapable,  to  a  great  extent,  of  any  prac- 
tical application. 

Hence  the  man  who  relies  much  upon  gener- 
al principles  in  politics  is  looked  upon  as  little 
better  than  a  visionary.  He  is  continually  told 
that  his  notions  are  well  enough  upon  paper; 
that  they  may  do  very  well  for  the  closet,  but 
that  he  is  guilty  of  a  great  absurdity  in  attempt- 
ing to  apply  them  to  the  actual  management  of 
affairs.  That  he  theorizes  too  much,  is  not 
enough  of  a  practical  man,  that  he  regards  men 
too  much  as  they  ought  to  be,  and  too  little  as 
they  are. 

Thus  political  speculations  are  usually  turned 
over  to  men  of  leisure,  as  a  sufficiently  appro- 
priate entertainment  for  fine,  subtle  intellects, 


NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  23 

not  engaged  in  the  active  duties  of  life,  and  de- 
nounced as  an  idle  occupation  for,  and  to  be  es- 
chewed by,  practical  and  politic  statesme 

Let  us  understand  the  difference  between  prac- 
tical and  abstract  notions,  and  see  how  far  the 
reproach  of  being  too  theoretical  and  refined  is 
just  in  general ;  how  far  it  is  just  in  its  applica- 
tion to  this  particular  subject  of  politics. 

A  man,  viewing  a  multitude  of  facts,  deduces 
general  conclusions  from  them.  Every  man  of 
business  does  this.  The  most  practical  man  has 
his  theories,  and  a  great  multitude  of  theories, 
on  which  he  conducts  his  business.  Every  busi- 
ness rule  is  a  theory.  Experience  furnishes  no 
lesson  but  what  amounts  to  a  theory.  When 
one  not  immediately  engaged  in  business  deduces 
general  principles  from  a  multitude  of  facts,  he 
differs  from  the  business  man,  not  in  framing 
theories,  nor  in  his  mode  of  framing  them,  but 
in  taking  more  prominent  and  more  numerous 
facts  as  his  basis,  and  forming  rules  of  a  more 
extensive  application.  No  theory  is  bad  as  a 
theory,  but  only  bad  when  not  sustained  by  the 
facts  from  which  it  professes  to  be  a  deduction. 
The  question  is  thus,  in  all  cases,  whether  a  the- 
ory is  sustained  by  its  facts  ?  If  it  be,  it  will  not 
be  enough  to  overthrow  it  to  say  that  it  is  ah- 


24  NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

sfrad,  as  every  theory  is  an  abstract  theory,  and 
the  process  of  mind  by  which  individual  facts 
are  separated  from  their  particular  circumstan- 
ces and  reduced  to  a  general  proposition  is  al- 
ways an  abstraction.  Thus  the  practical  rules 
of  the  business  man  are,  in  reality,  abstract  the- 
ories. 

But  there  is  a  particular  class  of  general  rules 
and  principles  which  are  abstract  in  a  different, 
and,  perhaps,  more  appropriate  sense.  These  are 
the  laws  of  morals.  They  are  derived  from  con- 
science alone,  and  are  thus  formed,  not  by  ab- 
stracting an  aggregation  of  facts  from  their  ac- 
cidental circumstances,  but  by  withdrawing  the 
mind  entirely  from  the  contemplation  of  exter- 
nal facts  as  facts,  to  the  contemplation  of  moral 
relations,  of  which  it  informs  itself.  In  this 
sense  all  moral  rules  are  abstract  principles. 
They  are  moral  rules  for  the  very  reason  that 
they  treat  of  the  world  not  as  it  is,  but  as  it 
ought  to  be.  Facts  and  circumstances  may  vary 
their  application  to  particular  cases,  but  can  in 
no  manner  alter  or  modify  the  rules  themselves, 
or  their  intrinsic  obligation.  To  be  correct,  we 
have  only  to  attend  to  the  inspirations  of  con- 
science.* The  imperfections  of  man  cannot  im- 
*  In  saying  this,  I  do  not,  of  course,  mean  to  deny  the  inesti 


NATURE    OF    roLITICAL    SCIENCE.  25 

pair  the  perfection  of  morals.  His  accidental  cir- 
cumstances and  condition  cannot  affect  a  system 
founded  on  his  essential  relations.  No  rule  ever 
propounded  to  man  is  in  such  utter  nonconform- 
ity with  human  affairs,  and  so  universally  reck- 
less of  circumstances,  as  our  Saviour's  great  and. 
comprehensive  rule  of  human  conduct,  "Love 
thy  neighbour  as  thyself."  It  abstracts  from  all 
the  peculiarities  of  individual  fortune  in  a  race 
so  very  widely  diversified  as  ours,  and  condenses 
the  laws  of  Divinity  to  the  comprehension  of  the 
human  heart.  The  relations  of  the  various  parts 
of  a  moral  proposition  are  just  as  fixed,  certain, 
and  invariable,  independently  of  a  direct  appli- 
cation to  any  particular  subject  matter,  as  the 
relations  of  the  various  parts  of  a  geometrical 
figure.  You  might  as  well  seek  to  know  how 
long  the  hypotenuse  of  any  particular  right- 
angled  triangle  is,  before  venturing  to  determine 
what  proportion  the  square  of  its  hypotenuse 
would  bear  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  its  two 
sides ;  or,  when  asked  for  the  proportion,  answer 

mable  advantages  of  the  Christian  revelation  in  giving  absolute 
clearness  and  certainty  to  the  convictions  of  a  natural  con- 
science, or  to  detract  from  its  authority  as  paramount  on  every 
moral  question.  The  scope  of  the  argument  would  have  per- 
haps saved  me  from  any  such  inference,  but  I  make  this  dis- 
claimer ^o  prevent  all  cavil. 


26  NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

that  it  must  depend  upon  the  size ;  as,  when  call- 
ed upon  for  a  moral  rule,  to  inquire  the  case  in 
which  it  is  to  be  applied.  Thus,  for  example, 
the  moral  law  defines  theft  independently  of  any 
actual  case,  and,  when  what  it  calls  a  theft  is 
clearly  made  out,  we  do  not  ask  whether  the 
man  plundered,  in  any  particular  instance,  was 
plundered  of  gold  or  iron,  of  much  or  little, 
whether  he  was  good  or  bad,  rich  or  poor,  wise  or 
simple,  strong  or  weak ;  nothing  but  an  absolute 
and  imperative  necessity,  that  overturns  all  mor- 
als, contravenes  the  o-eneral  rule  thus  abstract- 
edly  laid  down.  If  actual  circumstances  could 
modify  moral  rules  in  the  slightest  degree,  they 
would  utterly  destroy  them.  Thus  those  rules 
are  the  same  for  all  men,  under  all  circumstan- 
ces ;  they  are  derived  from  conscience,  and  con- 
science is,  by  nature,  the  same  in  all. 

There  is,  then,  this  difference  between  the  two 
classes  of  abstract  propositions  above  denoted, 
that  while,  as  to  the  first,  their  abstractedness, 
when  they  are  assailed,  can  furnish  no  just 
ground  for  anything  more  than  a  preliminary 
caution,  to  awaken  the  attention  to  facts,  and  to 
prepare  the  mind  for  the  argument  to  follow, 
which  must  show,  if  it  amount  to  anything,  that 
the  theory  is  not  sustained  by  its  facts  \  on  the 


NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  27 

other  hand,  in  regard  to  moral  propositions,  so 
far  is  their  abstractedness  from  being  a  ground 
of  reproach,  that  it  would  never  be  even  alleged 
against  one  clearly  and  distinctly  appearing  as 
such. 

But  the  difficulty  with  this  subject  of  politics  is, 
that,  embracing,  as  it  does,  in  its  differient  branch- 
es, both  these  kinds  of  abstractions,  their  different 
provinces  have  not  been  kept  rigidly  distinct. 
Distinguished  speculative  writers,  in  debating 
subjects  involved  under  the  practical  department, 
have  advanced  theories  of  government  which  are 
merely  theories,  entirely  abstracted  (and  not  in 
any  respect  deductions)  from  actual  events  and  a 
practical  experience,  where  events  and  experi- 
ence are  the  only  sources  of  truth,  and  have  thus 
unhappily  involved  both  the  moral  and  the  prac- 
tical branches  of  political  theories  and  abstrac- 
tions under  an  imputation  which  the  particular 
idle  schemes  of  those  writers  have  alone  de- 
served. 

Politics  deals  in  theories,  as  every  other  science 
does.  It  requires,  therefore,  abstractions.  It  is 
an  abstract  science  ;  purely  abstract,  so  far  as  its 
moral  principles  are  concerned  ;  only  abstract  in 
the  same  manner  and  to  the  same  extent  that 
every  science  is  necessarily  abstract,  so  far  as  its 


28  NATURE   OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

practical  rules  are  concerned.  For,  in  part,  its 
office  is,  when  the  fundamental  character  and 
principles  of  a  sovereignty  have  been  determined 
on,  to  prescribe  practically  by  what  mechanism 
it  shall  act ;  what  are  the  safest  and  most  efficient 
agencies  to  be  employed,  consistently  with  its 
nature,  in  the  execution  of  its  will ;  how  far  the 
executive,  the  judicial,  and  the  legislative  powers 
shall  be  separated  or  conjoined  ;  whether  the 
legislature  shall  be  composed  of  two  houses  or 
one ;  the  executive  be  divided  or  single ;  the 
judiciary  supplied  by  election  or  by  appoint- 
ment ;  and,  in  dividing  the  Legislature,  how  often 
it  shall  be  divided,  and  on  what  different  bases 
its  various  departments  supplied.  These  are 
questions  to  be  settled  by  circumstances  and  ex- 
perience alone,  as  mere  questions  of  expediency ; 
and  in  settling  these  practical  questions,  theories 
should  be  rigidly  deduced  from  modes  that  have 
actually  been  tried,  and  be  properly  varied  and 
adapted  to  suit  the  peculiar  and  actually  exist- 
ing situation  of  the  people  for  whom  they  are 
devised.  Yet,  in  handling  this  branch  of  the 
subject,  speculative  writers  have  arbitrarily  allot- 
ted an  imaginary  people  by  rule  and  measure 
into  mathematical  divisions ;  have  supposed  them 
to  be  different,  both  in  themselves  and  their  cir 


NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  29 

cumstances,  from  what  any  people  ever  were; 
and  have  then  invaded  every  department  of  pri- 
vate hfe  with  their  artificial  systems,  and  made 
their  schemes  embrace  very  nearly  the  sum  total 
of  human  existence,  as  if  men  lived  only  to  be 
governed.  Thus  have  they  ended  in  creating  an 
imaginary'  mankind  for  a  scheme  of  government, 
instead  of  a  scheme  of  government  for  mankind. 
This  is  speculation  with  a  witness  :  mere  theory, 
mere  abstraction,  without  facts  to  sustain  it ;  the 
fertile  soil  of  Utopian  fables.  Of  such  schemes 
it  has  been  said,  that  they  represent  men  as  they 
ought  to  be,  not  as  they  are ;  though,  with  more 
propriety,  it  might  have  been  said,  that  they 
neither  represent  men  as  they  ought  to  be,  nor  as 
they  are.  Of  such  schemes,  with  some  truth  it 
might  be  alleged,  that  their  mathematical  pre- 
cision, their  apparent "  abstract  perfection,  is  their 
practical  defect."  Against  such  systems,  and  all 
other  systems  that  attempt  thus  arbitrarily  to  de- 
fine precisely  what  mechanical  and  subordinate 
agencies  a  government  ought  to  employ  for  its 
administration,  irrespective  of  the  various  natu- 
ral circumstances  and  the  acquired  character  and 
habits  of  different  people,  all  that  has  ever  been 
said  against  abstract  theories  and  systems  of  gov- 
ernment may  justly  be  launched. 


30  NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

These  mechanical  arrangements  and  subor- 
dinate agencies,  however,  are  so  far  from  being 
the  whole  of  government,  that  they  are,  com- 
paratively, but  an  inconsiderable  part  of  it.  Not 
by  what  means  and  through  what  channels 
shall  its  powers  be  exercised,  are  the  great 
questions ;  but  how  do  its  powers  originate,  and 
within  what  limits  are  they  to  be  legitimately 
restricted  ?  Those  practical  details  which  re- 
spect simply  the  agencies  by  which  government 
can  best  act,  and  present  mere  questions  of  expe- 
diency, are  objects  of  inferior  regard  in  politics. 
Political  is,  for  the  most  part,  a  branch  of  moral 
science.  When  you  prescribe  to  me  a  law,  or 
hold  up  to  me  an  authority,  which  you  say  I 
ought  to  obey,  you  present  to  me  a  case  of  con- 
science coming  within  the  jurisdiction  of  morals. 
You  assume  a  moral  power ;  have  you  a  moral 
right  1  If,  indeed,  I  ought  to  obey,  that  obliga- 
tion is  deducible  from  those  fundamental  moral 
principles  wdiich  Nature  has  implanted  in  our 
bosoms.  Facts  cannot  arbitrarily  prescribe  in 
the  settlement  of  the  question;  it  is  determina- 
ble by  the  moral  and  essential  relations  of  man 
to  man.  States  and  nations  are  but  men — mere 
aggregations  of  individuals.  Their  rights  are 
merely  the  duties  that  one  owes  to  various  men  j 


NATURE    OP    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  31 

their  powers  are  simply  the  powers  which  one 
man  may  acquire  over  another,  and  acquirable 
only  by  the  same  means.  Morals  deal  simply 
with  men,  not  w^ith  bodies  corporate  or  politic. 
We  have,  then,  but  to  interrogate  our  ordinary 
systems  of  morals  to  know  what  power  one  man 
may  acquire  over  another,  and  by  what  means. 
We  find  no  difficulty  in  determining  the  rights, 
relations,  and  duties  of  individuals  with  refer- 
ence to  each  other.  If  we  wish  to  determine  the 
rights,  relations,  and  duties  subsisting  between 
one  and  a  multitude,  we  refer  to  the  same  moral 
code.  The  addition  of  numbers  makes  no  dif- 
ference in  the  application  of  moral  principles. 
No  matter  whether  the  individuals  claiming  any 
right  over  or  duty  from  me  are  one  man  or  ten 
millions ;  the  laws  of  morals  do  not  regulate  men 
by  tens,  or  thousands,  or  millions,  but  by  units ; 
conscience  has  no  reference  to  the  question  of 
their  multitude.  The  political  are  thus  gov- 
erned by  the  same  set  of  rules  as  the  moral  rela- 
tions of  mankind.  Hence,  to  determine  how  a 
political  sovereignty  can  be  legitimately  consti- 
tuted, we  need  no  knowledge  of  actual  establish- 
ments ;  w^e  ask  no  illumination  from  experience, 
no  extensive  collection  and  comparison  of  facts ; 
we  care  not  what  is  the  description  or  the  an* 


32  NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

tiquity  of  governments  that  do  rule ;  we  care  not 
what  are  the  circumstances  of  people  that  are 
ruled ;  we  have  to  do  with  man  under  all  cir- 
cumstances ;  with  his  moral  nature  and  relations 
and  the  judgment  of  conscience  upon  them,  and 
not  with  circumstances. 

Here,  therefore,  the  science  of  politics  rises  to 
the  dignity,  conclusiveness,  universality,  and  par- 
amount obligation  of  moral  demonstrations.  Of 
this  branch  of  politics  alone  do  we  here  treat. 
The  question  involved  in  the  choice  of  a  sover- 
eignty is  not  a  question  of  expediency,  but  of 
justice.  It  is  to  be  determined  abstractedly,  by 
the  reciprocal  rights  and  relations  of  mankind. 
The  decision  is  no  more  fluctuating  than  right 
and  wrong.  It  makes  a  part  of  the  law  of  hu- 
manity ;  and  we  need  no  more  an  intimate  knowl- 
edge of  the  physical  and  intellectual  condition 
and  social  habits  of  distant  people,  to  determine 
what  the  intrinsic  nature  and  essential  principles 
of  their  government  should  be,  than  to  designate 
for  their  use  a  code  of  morals.  The  relations 
sustained  to  that  aggregate  whole  called  a  state, 
are  part  of  the  relations  which  individuals  sustain 
to  each  other.  And,  indeed,  it  would  be  a  sin- 
gularly anomalous  case  in  morals,  if  the  whole 
could  escape  that  moral  jurisdiction  that  com- 


NATURE    OF  POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  33 

prises  each.  The  great  law  of  justice  presides 
over  the  organization  of  government,  as  well  as 
the  subsequent  details  of  its  administration,  and 
our  rulers  must  derive  their  powers  over  us  from 
sources  whence  we  might  derive  the  same  or  a 
similar  control  over  others.  Though  this  univer- 
sal and  inflexible  operation  of  the  law  of  justice 
has  been  generally  admitted  to  regulate  the  in- 
tercourse of  independent  nations,  it  has  been 
almost  universally  disregarded  in  the  more  fa- 
miliar relation  of  states  to  their  own  constitu- 
ency. Yet  it  pervades  with  its  impartial  energy 
every  moral  relation ;  and,  blind  to  the  distinc- 
tions of  foreign  or  domestic,  great  or  little,  pow- 
erful or  weak,  ancient  or  modern,  many  or  few, 
attaches  with  impartial  reciprocity  and  indis- 
criminate power  on  everything  that  bears  the 
impress  of  humanity. 

Thus,  then,  we  have  the  means  of  threading 
the  labyrinth  of  confusion  presented  by  actual  pol- 
itics ;  for,  whatever  rights  states  have,  like  our 
individual  and  private  rights,  of  which  they  are 
but  a  part,  may  be  referred  immediately  to  nature 
or  traced  to  convention.  That  great  moral  neces- 
sity, which  is  superior  to  nature  and  convention, 
may  sometimes  temporarily  intervene  ;  but  as  it  is 
the  utmost  violence  which  human  affairs  can  ex 


34  NATURE    C/F    POLITICAL   SCIENCE. 

perience,  and  is,  in  its  very  essence,  an  exception 
to  the  ordinary  current  of  events,  and  not  a  rule, 
it  can  never  be  the  lasting  foundation  for  any 
permanent  order  of  things.  Equally  certain, 
permanent,  and  universal  are  the  relations  of 
states  to  their  members,  and  the  rights,  duties, 
and  oblio-ations  that  we  recognise  in  our  ordina- 
ry  intercourse  between  man  and  man. 

The  idea  cannot  be  too  severely  reprobated, 
that  the  principles  of  this  branch  of  political 
science  are  too  abstract  for  practical  uses  and 
application,  subject  to  a  conformity  with  every 
variety  of  government,  and  shifting  their  ground 
and  altering  their  aspect  to  authorize  and  es- 
tablish the  prevailing  power  in  every  state 
and  nation  spread  over  the  face  of  the  whole 
earth.  If  the  relations  of  justice  are  universal 
and  immutable,  so  are  these  principles.  If  the 
duties  of  men  to  each  other  are  inflexible,  so  are 
the  mutual  obligations  subsisting  between  com- 
munities and  each  of  their  constituents;  and 
these  can  be  superseded  only  by  such  an  abso- 
lute necessity  as  would  exempt  us,  in  our  ordina- 
ry conduct,  from  the  jurisdiction  of  acknowledged 
moral  precepts,  and  that  but  momentarily.  So 
long  as  man  retains  the  essential  characteristics 
of  his  nature,  and  reason,  truth,  and  justice  prove 


NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  35 

everywhere  the  same,  the  fundamental  principles 
of  this  science  will  continue  invariable,  and  right 
and  liberty  preserve  one  uniform  signilication, 
irrespective  of  circumstances,  in  every  quarter  of 
the  globe. 

It  is  not  true,  therefore,  that  "  circumstances 
give  to  every  political  principle  its  distinguishing 
colour  and  discriminating  effect,"  and  that  "  our 
liberties,  varying  with  times  and  circumstances, 
admit  of  infinite  modifications,  and  cannot  be 
settled  upon  any  abstract  rule."* 

It  would  be  equally  philosophical  to  assert  the 
dependance  of  private  and  individual,  which  rest 
on  the  same  moral  bases  as  our  public  and  polit- 
ical principles,  upon  times  and  circumstances,  as 
if  they  were  entirely  extrinsic,  and  dwelt  with- 
out, not  within  us ;  and  just  as  rational  to  assert 
that  a  good  man  is  produced,  like  any  physical 
phenomenon,  by  a  fortuitous  concurrence  of 
events.  The  distinctions  of  morals  are  uniform, 
because  they  repose  upon  the  essential  charac- 
teristics of  our  universal  nature  j  and  the  tran- 
scendent excellence  of  moral  rules,  from  which 
political  relations  and  civil  liberty  proceed,  con- 
sists in  their  absolute  inflexibleness  and  entire 
nonconformity  with  circumstances. 

♦  Burke's  Reflections  on  the  French  Revolution. 


36  NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

It  is  common,  in  the  discussion  of  political 
subjects,  to  admit  a  proposition  erected  on  a 
moral  basis  as  an  abstract  principle,  and  still  to 
qualify,  not  its  operation,  but  the  principle  itself, 
by  a  reference  to  circumstances.  But  the  very 
end  and  the  renewing  agency  of  moral,  under 
which  I  include  fundamental  political  truths, 
consist  in  rectifying  the  disorders  everywhere 
prevalent  in  human  affairs.  What  is  meant 
when,  by  way  of  impeaching  their  authority, 
they  are  styled  abstract?  Is  it  meant  that  they 
are  brought  from  internal  sentiments  and  feelings 
merely  ?  From  what  other  sources  are  moral 
principles  derivable  ?  Are  not  these  internal 
suggestions  the  axioms  of  moral  demonstration  ? 
Is  not  justice,  like  truth,  approved  by  its  own 
nature  solely?  To  tell  to  whom  property  be- 
longs, must  we  know  in  whose  hands  it  is? 
To  tell  whether  our  native  liberty  belong  to  us, 
must  we  know  in  what  government  it  reposes, 
or  what  is  the  strength,  or  what  are  the  services, 
or  what  is  the  antiquity  of  that  government  1 
I  assert  the  actual  constitution  of  human  nature, 
you  appeal  to  the  actual  condition  of  human  af- 
fairs; the  first  alone  determines  the  nature  and 
extent  of  moral  obligations,  to  whose  force  and 
p^^wer  the  last  should  passively  submit;   the 


NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  37 

province  of  the  first  is  to  command,  of  the  last  to 
obey ;  the  first  embraces  all  the  principles  of  our 
moral  deliberations,  the  last  are  merely  the  sub- 
jects of  them.  "Whence,  then,  the  authority  of 
circumstances  to  modify  moral  rules,  or,  what  is 
the  same  thing,  political  relations  1  What  ref- 
erence should  be  had  to  circumstances,  when  the 
only  condition  for  the  complete  operation  of  mor- 
al rules,  founded  in  the  actual  constitution  and 
necessary  relations  of  man,  is  humanity  1 

Those  abstract  truths,  therefore,  embraced 
within  the  province  of  political  science,  are  real 
truths  and  authoritative  lessons  of  practical  wis- 
dom. Least  of  all  does  it  behoove  Americans 
to  impeach  them,  since,  in  the  very  act  whereby 
they  vindicate  their  independence,  and  formally 
register  their  name  in  the  catalogue  of  nations, 
they  make  a  dignified  appeal  for  the  rectitude  of 
their  intentions  and  the  justice  of  their  conduct, 
from  actual  and  legal  authority,  ancient,  pre- 
scriptive, and  long  recognised,  to  abstract  prin- 
ciples alone.* 

Political  science  is  no  vain  chimera.     It  does 

not  mock  its  votaries  with  notions  theoretically 

systematic  and  accurate,  but  impracticable.     It 

yields  them  truths  beautiful  in  theory  and  sub- 

*  "  We  hold  these  tvutJis  to  be  self-evident," 


38  NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

stantial  in  the  experience.  While  it  thus  re- 
wards the  mere  votary  of  science,  it  may  assert 
a  higher  claim  to  om-  patriotic  regard  as  Amer- 
icans, from  the  protection  it  is  within  its  province 
to  afford  us  against  foreign  influence,  however 
remote  and  circuitous.  With  us  the  integrity  of 
our  principles  is  the  integrity  of  our  government. 
In  vain  w^ould  we  be  independent  of  despots  if 
we  voluntarily  subserve  the  principles  of  despot- 
ism. The  farther  maxims  are  removed  from  the 
ordinary  questions  that  convulse  us,  the  more  fun- 
damental are  they ;  the  more  universal  their  op- 
eration, the  more  subtle  and  sure  their  sway 


SELF-GOVERNMENT  J}i» 


CHAPTER  II. 

Self-Government  by  the  People  the  only  legitimate  Form  of 
Government. — The  universal  Right  of  Mankind  to  Democratic 
Government,  and  their  Competency  to  administer  il. 

It  is  a  part  of  man's  nature  to  be  free.  The 
same  constitution  that  makes  us  moral,  makes  us 
self-governing  beings.  The  right  to  control  our 
own  actions  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
freedom  of  the  will.  If  we  have  not  this  right, 
our  entire  moral  structure  is  a  piece  of  folly  in 
its  end,  and  a  piece  of  awful  mockery  in  its  Au- 
thor. Our  passions  prompt  us  to  action,  our 
moral  and  deliberative  powers  regulate  us  in  our 
choice  of  actions,  and  the  will  sets  the  whole  ma- 
chine in  motion.  But  to  what  tends  all  this  ma- 
chinery but  to  adio7i  ?  and,  if  we  are  not  jTree  to 
act,  to  what  purpose  are  we  yree  to  will  ?  If, 
the  instant  we  begin  to  act,  we  must  be  sub- 
jected to  some  external  governing  power,  the 
whole  man  is  nonplused  at  once ;  and  those  ex- 
alted powers,  that  liken  us  to  the  image  of  God 
himself,  are  made  superfluous  lumber  in  the  hu- 
man breast.     To  avoid  consequences  so  absurd, 


40  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

yet  so  inevitable  on  any  other  hypothesis,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  man  was  made  by  Nature  to 
act  for  himself. 

While,  however,  he  is  thus  made  the  sover- 
eign arbiter  of  his  own  actions,  he  cannot  dis- 
claim the  obligation  of  those  moral  principles 
which,  constituting  an  essential  part  of  his  na- 
ture, form  the  basis  of  his  freedom  ;  and,  at  the 
utmost,  he  can  pretend  to  no  more  than  the  right 
to  conform,  in  the  independent  regulation  of  his 
own  conduct,  to  the  unseen  but  invariable  stand- 
ard of  moral  rectitude.  A  right  to  do  wrong  he 
cannot  have.  How  could  it  ever  have  been  im- 
agined that  rights,  which  belong  to  men  only  by 
virtue  of  their  moral  attributes,  can  subsist  in  the 
absence  or  in  derogation  of  moral  obligations  ?  or 
that  man  in  a  state  of  nature  possesses  the  free 
and  uncontrolled  liberty  of  doing  whatever  he 
pleases,  at  the  same  time  that  he  is  impelled  by 
natural  reason  and  the  innate  power  of  conscience 
to  pursue  the  right  and  to  shun  the  wrong  ?  No- 
thing, certainly,  but  the  authority  of  great  names 
could  ever  have  given  countenance  to  such  absur- 
dities. While,  therefore,  the  same  nature  that 
makes  us  moral  makes  us  free,  and  the  same  dis- 
pensation that  makes  us  responsible  for  our  actions 
gives  us  a  right  to  control  them,  we  cannot  violate 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  41 

the  conditions,  and  subvert  the  foundations  of  this 
freedom,  by  a  disregard  of  that  moral  constitu- 
tion by  virtue  of  which  we  possess  it.  God  has 
invested  us  with  exalted  powers  ;  this  is,  of  itself, 
a  sufficient  authority  for  their  independent  exer- 
tion. But  these  powers  are  not  merely  execu- 
tive, they  are  deliberative  also.  Not  power, 
simply  as  such,  but  only  a  power  to  pursue  our 
own  good,  enters  into  the  composition  of  our 
natural  liberty.  We  are  impelled  by  nature  to 
the  pursuit  of  our  own  true  and  substantial  hap- 
piness, but  governed  and  controlled  in  the  pur- 
suit of  it  by  certain  inherent  moral  principles : 
hence  the  origin  and  the  limit  of  our  natural 
rights.  Though  human  beings  in  a  state  of  na- 
ture may  find  their  hands  and  feet  unshackled, 
they  are  not  therefore  to  assume  at  once  the 
condition  of  the  savage,  and  course  the  forest  in 
pursuit  of  prey,  or  arm  their  hands  with  the  tom- 
ahawk and  scalping-knife,  in  violation  of  every 
man's  rights  and  safety ;  they  have  likewise  rea- 
son and  conscience  incorporated  in  their  natures, 
which  teach  them  to  be  rationally  and  morally 
free. 

Natural  liberty,  then,  consists  in  the  uncon- 
trolled disposition  of  our  persons  and  our  property, 
agreeably  to  our  own  will,  provided  tha<"  we  do 
D 


42  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

not  transgress  the  natural  or  moral  law ;  or,  in 
the  words  of  Montesquieu,  "  it  is  the  power  of 
doing  what  we  ought  to  will,  and  the  not  being 
constrained  to  do  what  we  ought  not  to  will." 

This  natural  liberty  is  by  no  means  irrespective 
of  our  condition  as  social  beings.  Since  it  re- 
gards man  in  his  natural,  it  must  comprehend  his 
social  and  related  capacity.  Society  is  rendered 
indispensable  to  us,  not  less  by  the  instincts  of 
our  nature  than  the  necessities  of  our  physical 
condition ;  and  so  irresistible  are  the  combined  in- 
fluences of  both,  as  to  have  prevented  the  appear- 
ance upon  the  earth,  even  in  its  earliest  ages,  of 
such  a  phenomenon  as  single,  individual,  isola- 
ted man. 

When,  therefore,  we  enter  into  the  political 
state,  are  our  rights  abridged  because  they  must 
be  accommodated  to  the  rights  of  others  1  By 
no  means.  I  never  had  a  right,  in  any  condition, 
to  trespass  upon  my  neighbour.  Nature  has 
adapted  us  to  one  another  in  a  social  state,  and 
1  am  bound,  by  the  law  of  Nature,  to  "  love  my 
neighbour  as  myself,"  not  less  than  by  the  law 
of  civil  society  to  do  him  justice.  Neither  re- 
quires me  to  surrender  anything  that  is  mine,  but 
that  I  should  give  to  every  man  his  own.  Nat- 
ural liberty  is,  therefore,  entirely  compatible  with 


\ 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  43 

the  social  condition  of  man  ;  and  as  nothing  can 
be  more  unnatural  than  that  wild  and  savage 
state  which  it  is  common,  under  the  sanction  of 
great  and  numerous  authorities,  to*  consider  as  a 
necessary  condition  to  natural  liberty,  so  nothing 
can  be  more  absurd  than  the  theory  which  de- 
fines natural  liberty  to  consist  in  the  unrestrained 
allowance  of  every  man's  inclination  or  caprice. 
But  when  it  is  said  that  no  man  has  a  right  to 
do  wrong,  or  to  transgress  the  natural  or  moral 
law,  let  us  not  be  understood  as  asserting  that 
any  one  has  a  right  to  prescribe  to  any  other 
what  that  law  is,  or  to  punish  every  infringe- 
ment of  it.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  of  the  essence 
of  that  individual  liberty  of  action  which  we 
possess  as  moral  beings  that  each  be  allowed  to 
determine  that  point  for  himself;  for  to  this  end 
Nature  has  endowed  each  of  us  with  rational 
and  moral  faculties.  But  suppose  this  personal 
liberty  of  ours  to  be  infringed  by  another,  we 
judge  the  aggressor,  not  for  transgressing  the 
limits  of  his  own  freedom,  but  for  trespassing 
upon  ours ;  of  the  former  he  is  the  judge,  of  the 
latter  we,  by  the  same  right,  are  the  judges.  He 
may  go  beyond  the  fixed  and  absolute  limit  of 
his  own  freedom,  but  we  have  no  right  to  inter- 
fere, unless,  by  so  doin^,  he  enters  into  conflict 


44  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

with  US,  and  encroaches  upon  our  equal  rights. 
This  right  of  sell-defence,  so  far  from  abrogating 
our  own  individual  independence,  is  based  upon 
it,  on  the  ground  that  those  rights  cannot  be  ours 
which  everybody  may  with  absolute  impunity 
appropriate  to  himself.  And  hence  our  right  to 
protect  ourselves  from  injustice  confers  no  author- 
ity over  our  fellow-men  (as  it  would  otherwise 
be  at  war  with  its  own  original),  but  merely  al- 
lows us  to  insist  on  what  is  already  our  own, 
and  to  assume  a  hostile  attitude  within  our  own 
limits. 

One  man  has  no  right,  by  nature,  to  make 
laws  for  another.  He  may  repel  another  when 
his  own  rights  are  infringed,  but  he  has  no  right 
to  govern  him.  He  is  sovereign  merely  over 
himself,  not  over  another.  He  has  a  right  of 
self-protection,  but  that  he  has  within  his  own 
province.  He  may  say,  "  Do  not  infringe  upon 
ray  rights ;"  but  he  has  no  right  to  define  the 
rights  of  third  persons,  or  forbid  any  infringe- 
ment upon  them.  If,  however,  he  unite  with 
others  in  a  convention  for  mutual  protection  and 
defence,  then  the  rights  of  each  become  the 
rights  of  all ;  what  was  before  individual  be- 
comes common,  and  still  the  community  keep 
within  the  limits  of  their  own  concerns  when 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  45 

they  say  to  a  stranger,  "  Do  not  infringe  upon 
the  rights  of  either  of  us,  or  we  will  jointly  repel 
you,"  though  they  do  not  thus  acquire  any  right 
to  direct  him  in  his  intercourse  with  others. 
Thus  man  enjoys  hy  nature,  in  relation  to  other 
men,  the  right  of  repulsion,  and  not  the  right  of 
direction.  The  ditlerence  is,  that  the  exercise  of 
the  former  right  is  confined  exclusively  to  one's 
self,  the  latter  extends  to  and  arrogates  the  di- 
rection of  the  affairs  of  third  persons.  The  of- 
fice of  society  is  to  define  what  individual  rights 
are  (not  arbitrarily  to  direct  individuals  what 
they  shall  or  shall  not  do),  and  to  bind  the  whole 
for  the  defence  of  them.  When  a  society  does 
this  for  itself,  it  is  employed  in  its  own  concerns, 
it  operates  within  its  own  legitimate  sphere; 
when  a  constituent  part  only  of  a  society  do  it 
for  the  rest  or  for  the  whole,  they  assume  a  duty 
and  a  responsibility  for  which  there  is  not  the 
shadow  of  an  argument  to  show  that  Nature  ever 
designed  them. 

We  are  not  made  for  authority  over  our  fel- 
low-beings. That  moral  nature,  by  virtue  of 
which  alone  we  could  claim  it,  has  evidently 
been  given  us  for  the  regulation  and  government 
of  ourselves  alone.  Moral  duties  are  revealed  to 
our  species  by  nature  as  individuals,  and  discov- 


46  ^ELF-GOVERNMENT. 

erable  by  us,  each  for  himself  solely,  upon  the  sep- 
arate inspection  of  his  own  heart.  There  is  Na- 
ture's sole  depository  of  the  immutable  law  of 
right  and  wrong,  justice  and  injustice,  in  its  ap- 
plicability to  human  actions.  Its  only  natural 
sanction  is  vested  in  every  man's  individual  con- 
science, which  reproaches  or  applauds  him  for 
his  own  actions  merely.  Thus  Nature  has  made 
each,  for  himself  alone,  the  executor  of  her  laws, 
and  she  qualifies  no  man  to  prescribe  and  act  for 
another.  His  moral  attributes  are  not  more  than 
sufficient  to  accomplish  him  for  his  own  respon- 
sibilities; and  he  may  only  repel  injuries,  be- 
cause they  violate  those  rights  of  which  Nature 
has  made  him  cognizant,  and  constituted  him  the 
sole  guardian  and  judge. 

Such  being  the  prerogatives  of  all,  who  shall 
assume,  on  the  authority  of  Nature,  definitively 
and  authoritatively  to  settle  and  enforce  the  ex- 
act demands  of  justice  in  disputed  cases  between 
man  and  man  ?  Clearly  no  one  but  that  Su- 
preme Being,  possessing  in  his  own  essence  a  be- 
nevolence that  is  infinite  and  a  wisdom  that 
cannot  err,  and  who,  by  virtue  of  his  Divine  pre- 
rosatives,  is  the  natural  Governor  and  Lord  of 
the  Universe. 

It  is  treason  towards  God  himself,  and  a  mock- 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  47 

ery  of  the  majesty  of  Heaven,  not  less  tlian  an 
injury  to  the  rights  of  man,  for  any  merely  human 
being  to  arrogate  a  claim  so  high  as  that  of 
sovereignty  over  a  race  of  the  same  rational  and 
moral  nature  as  himself.  In  the  absence  of  Di- 
vine authority,  and  while  we  are  conversant  with 
but  one  order  of  intelligent  beings,  universally 
the  same  in  their  essential  attributes,  one  in  genus 
and  one  in  species,  all  are  morally  equal,  that  is, 
equal  in  those  respects  which  constitute  moral 
accountability  (and  this  is  what  is  meant  by  the 
natural  equality  of  man),  and  each  has  a  right 
to  determine  the  limits  prescribed  to  his  actions 
by  the  moral  law  for  himself;  being  still  hable 
to  repulsive  violence,  in  consequence  of  the  uni- 
versal extension  of  the  same  right  to  others,  if, 
by  reason  of  an  erroneous  judgment  upon  his 
own  rights,  his  actions  conflict  with  the  rights 
of  others. 

We  go  yet  farther,  and  contend  that,  as  this 
liberty  of  action  is  derived  to  man  through  his 
moral  nature,  of  which  it  is  the  necessary  con- 
comitant, he  can  as  well  abdicate  his  moral  at- 
tributes and  shift  his  moral  accountability,  as  al- 
ienate it ;  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is  just 
as  capable  of  acquiring  a  new  nature,  and  as- 
suming before  God  the  responsibilities  of  other 


48  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

moral  beings,  and  aggravating  his  own,  as  of 
governing  other  men  in  opposition  to  their  own 
free  and  deUbcrative  will. 

Man  is  by  nature  the  free  and  sovereign  ar- 
biter of  his  own  actions ;  and  as  it  has  been 
proven  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of 
society,  either  in  the  rights  it  respects  or  the  sac- 
rifices it  requires,  incompatible  with  the  unlimited 
exercise  of  his  native  freedom,  so  we  have  shown 
that  he  does  not,  because  it  inheres  in  his  nature, 
and  he  cannot,  resign  it  upon  becoming  a  mem- 
ber of  organized  society. 

Not  such,  however,  is  the  theory  laid  down  in 
foreign  w^orks  and  servilely  copied  by  American 
writers.  Instead  of  adhering  to  their  definition 
of  natural  liberty,  which  we  have  substantially 
adopted,  they  affix  to  it  the  idea  of  the  "  absolute 
and  uncontrolled  power  of  doing  whatever  a  man 
pleases,"  then  compel  him  to  "  give  up  a  part  of 
his  liberty  on  entering  into  society,"  in  opposi- 
tion to  one  of  the  most  prominent  axioms,  sol- 
emnly and  authoritatively  announced  by  the  pa- 
triots of  our  Revolution,  that  liberty  is  among  our 
inalienable  rights ;  and,  finally,  as  a  natural  and 
proper  consequence,  declare  that  "  expediency 
and  the  general  advantage  of  the  public"  define 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  49 

the  limit  to  which  political  power  shall  encroach 
upon  human  rights.* 

"  Natural  liberty,"  says  Blackstone  (and  the 
systems  of  British  writers  are  quite  uniform  on 
this  subject),  "  consists,  properly,  in  a  power  of 
acting  as  one  thinks  fit,  without  any  restraint  or 
control  unless  by  the  law  of  nature ;  being  a 
right  inherent  in  us  by  birth,  and  one  of  the  gifts 
of  God  to  man  at  his  creation,  when  he  endued 
him  with  the  faculty  of  free  will.  But  every 
man,  whe?i  he  enters  info  society,  gives  up  a  part 
of  his  natural  liberty  as  the  price  of  so  valuable 
a  purchase ;  and,  in  consideration  of  receiving 
the  advantages  of  mutual  commerce,  obliges  him- 
self to  conform  to  those  laws  which  the  commu- 
nity has  thought  proper  to  establish.  And  this 
species  of  legal  obedience  and  conformity  is  in- 
finitely more  desirable  than  that  wild  and  savage 
liberty  which  is  sacrificed  to  obtain  it.  For  no 
man  that  considers  a  moment  would  wish  to  re- 
tain the  absolute  and  uncontrolled  poiver  of  doing 
whatever  he  pleases :  the  consequence  of  which 
is,  that  every  other  man  would   also  have  the 

*  "  The  moment  you  abate  anything  from  the  full  rights  of 
men  each  to  govern  himself,  and  sufler  any  artilicial  positive 
limitation  upon  those  rights,  from  that  moment  the  whole  or- 
ganization of  government  becomes  a  consideration  of  conve- 
nience."— Burke  on  the  French  Rcvolulion. 

E 


50  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

same  power,  and  then  there  would  be  no  secu« 
rity  to  individuals  in  any  of  the  enjoyments  of 
life.  Political,  therefore,  or  civil  liberty,  which 
is  that  of  a  member  of  society,  is  no  other  than 
natural  liberty  so  Jar  restrained  (and  no  farther) 
as  is  necessary  and  expedient  Jhr  the  general  ad- 
vantage of  the  public.''* 

Who  is  to  judge  of  this  expediency,  and  to 
determine  what  the  general  advantage  requires  ? 
If,  by  the  mere  fact  of  becoming  members  of  po- 
litical society,  we  resign  a  part  of  our  natural 
liberty  in  consideration  of  civil  and  political  ad- 
vantages, of  course  the  current  usages  and  insti- 
tutions of  the  society  at  the  time  of  our  incorpo- 
ration indicate  the  terms  of  the  compromise ;  we 
oblige  ourselves,  by  that  act,  "  to  conform  to 
those  laws  which  the  community  has  thought 
proper  to  establish;"  the  established  governors 
and  the  established  laws  are  the  judges.  We 
have  abdicated  forever  the  right  to  judge  for 
ourselves.f     Our  rulers,  by  virtue  of  the  powers 

*  Blacks.  Comm.,  vol.  i.,  book  i.,  chap,  i.,  p.  125. 

t  "  If  civil  society  be  the  oflfspring  of  convention,  that  con- 
vention must  be  its  law.  That  convention  must  limit  and 
modify  all  the  descriptions  of  constitution  which  are  formed 
under  it.  Every  sort  of  legislature,  judicial  or  executory  pow- 
er, are  Us  creatures.  They  can  have  no  being  in  any  other  state 
of  things ;  and  how  can  any  man  claim,  under  the  conventions 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  61 

with  which  they  are  actually  vested,  looking  only 
to  what  they  can  do  to  determine  what  they  may 
do,  are  restrained  by  no  limits  but  their  own  dis- 
cretion. Our  natural  rights  are  entirely  devour- 
ed by  our  civil  and  social  privileges. 

Thus,  if  to  constitute  civil  liberty,  our  natural 
liberty  must  be  restrained,  upon  general  consid- 
erations of  convenience  and  expediency,  to  effect 
the  greater  good  of  the  whole,  our  rulers,  of 
course,  as  the  guardians  of  the  public  w'eal,  are 
the  exclusive  judges  of  what  the  good  of  the 
whole  demands,  and  it  needs  but  the  lowest  de- 
gree of  discernment  to  perceive  that,  upon  this 
hypothesis,  liberty  is  as  much  the  concomitant  of 
Turkish  as  of  British,  and  of  British  as  of  Amer- 
ican government ;  or,  in  other  v/ords,  that  it  is 

of  civil  society,  rights  which  do  not  so  much  as  suppose  its  ex- 
istence ?  Rights  which  are  absolutely  repugnant  to  it?  One 
of  the  first  moiives  to  civil  society,  and  which  becomes  one  of 
its  fundamental  rules,  is,  that  no  man  shall  be  judge  in  his  own 
cause.  By  this  each  person  has  at  once  divested  himself  of  the 
first  fundamental  right  of  uncovenanted  man,  that  is,  to  judge 
for  himself  and  to  assert  his  own  cause.  He  abdicates  all  right 
to  be  his  own  governor.  He  inclusively,  in  a  great  measure, 
abandons  the  light  of  self-defence,  the  first  law  of  nature.  Men 
cannot  enjoy  the  rights  of  an  uncivil  and  of  a  civil  state  togeth- 
er. That  he  may  obtain  justice,  he  gives  up  his  right  of  deter- 
mining what  it  is  in  points  the  most  essential  to  him.  That  he 
may  secure  some  liberty,  he  makes  a  surrender  in  trust  of  the 
whole  of  it."— Burke's  Reflections  on  the  French  Revolution. 


52  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

the  inseparable  concomitant  of  governm'ent  in  all 
its  forms ! 

The  error  of  this  system  is  sufficiently  appa- 
rent in  the  absurdity  of  its  consequences. 

Mankind  do  not  need  the  aid  of  organized  so- 
ciety to  plunder  their  rights,  but  to  enable  them 
to  enjoy  them.  They  associate  together  in  free 
communities,  simply  to  define  their  rights  by 
their  mutual  counsels,  and  to  protect  one  another 
by  their  common  strength.  Each  man  attends 
to  his  private,  the  aggregate  whole  to  the  public 
concerns  j  each  takes  an  equal  part  in  the  public 
deliberations  as  he  has  an  equal  share  in  the 
public  interests.  When  the  Legislature  makes  a 
law,  or  a  court  of  justice  passes  judgment,  we  act 
by  our  agents,  and  submit  to  a  tribunal  constitu- 
ted by  our  own  voluntary  consent. 

A  republic  is  what  Cicero  long  since  correctly 
defined  it  to  be :  simply  "  the  union  of  a  multi- 
tude, cemented  by  an  agreement  in  what  is  right, 
and  a  participation  in  what  is  useful."* 

This  theory  is  exactly  conformable  to  what 
Jefferson  has  said  :  "  Our  legislators  are  not  suf- 
ficiently apprized  of  the  rightful  limits  of  their 
powers;  that  their  true  office  is  to  decide  and 

*  Ccetus  multitudinis  juris  consensu,  et  utilitatis  communione 
Bociatus. — De  Repub.,  lib.  i.,  25. 


PELF-GOVERNAIENT.  53 

enforce  our  natural  rights  and  duties,  and  to  take 
none  of  them  from  us.  No  man  has  a  natural 
right  to  commit  aggression  on  the  equal  rights 
of  another ;  and  this  is  all  from  which  the  laws 
ought  to  restrain  him :  every  man  is  under  the 
natural  duty  of  contributing  to  the  necessities  of 
the  society,  and  this  is  all  the  laws  should  en- 
force on  him.  The  idea  is  quite  unfounded,  that 
in  entering  into  society  we  give  up  any  natural 
right."* 

Natural  liberty,  then,  consists  in  the  possession 
of  certain  rights  ;  civil  liberty,  in  the  enjoyment 
of  them.  Natural  liberty  is  what  inheres  in  our 
persons ;  civil  liberty,  what  we  procure  by  gov- 
ernment and  laws.  In  other  words,  civil  liberty 
is  natural  liberty  established  and  secured  upon 
fixed  principles. 

Political  liberty,  therefore,  is  that  of  a  commu- 
nity of  individuals  voluntarily  agreeing  where 
the  limit  prescribed  by  the  natural  or  moral  law 
to  their  respective  private  wills  is  to  be  fixed, 
and  uniting  together  with  their  common  strength 
to  maintain  it.  In  other  words,  as  man  requires 
civil  government  only  by  virtue  of  his  rational 
and  moral  nature,  and  as  by  that  rational  and 
moral  nature  he  is  essentially  a  self-governing 

*  Jefferson's  Correspondence,  Letter  cxxxi. 


54  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

being,  self-government  by  the  people  is  the  only 
legitimate  form  of  civil  government. 

The  law  of  justice  between  man  and  man  es- 
tablishes the  republican  principle.  Let  every 
man  accord  to  every  other  the  possession  and 
enjoyment  of  his  own,  his  rights  as  well  as  his 
property,  and  a  republic  will  be  the  necessary 
consequence.  A  republic  is  only  the  application 
of  the  law  of  justice  to  politics.  The  result  is 
invariable  equality.  The  just  is  nothing  but  the 
equal.  If,  therefore,  what  are  right  and  wrong, 
are  right  and  wrong  everywhere,  irrespective 
of  locality,  and  always  irrespective  of  time  or 
change,  it  is  absurd  to  allege  that  one  form  of 
government  is  just  and  right  in  America,  and  not 
equally  and  exclusively  so  in  Europe,  Asia,  or 
Africa. 

When  our  Saviour  propounded  the  universal 
iaw  of  human  conduct,  he  reduced  mankind  to 
a  level ;  he  recognised  no  higher  personage  in 
morals  than  our  "  neighbour."  When  we  have 
discharged  o\m  duty  to  our  "neighbour,"  we 
have  fulfilled  our  duty  to  mankind;  for  mankind 
are  our  equals  and  not  our  superiors,  and  we  owe 
to  our  "  neighbour"  neither  obedience  nor  alle- 
giance. 

As  the  word  just  has  an  absolute  signification, 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  55 

BO  the  word  free  has  but  one  meaning,  and  ad- 
mits of  no  qualified  sense  or  any  comparative 
degrees.  An  action  is  just  or  unjust ;  a  govern- 
ment is  free  or  it  is  despotic.  If  it  leave  every  man 
in  the  possession  of  his  native  liberty,  it  is  free ; 
if  it  depredate  upon  and  circumscribe  that  liberty 
in  the  least  degree,  it  is  arbitrary  and  oppressive. 
No  circumstances  can  alter  the  nature  of  justice; 
none  can  palliate  the  severity  and  wrong  of  des- 
potism. As  justice  is  practicable  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, because  it  has  its  foundation  in  the 
nature  and  constitution  of  man,  so  is  self-govern- 
ment, his  ability  for  which  is  in  like  manner 
predicated  upon  his  moral  attributes;  and  the 
universal  practicability  of  self-government  is  no 
more  to  be  questioned  than  the  universal  practica- 
bility of  private  morals.  A  treatise  on  politics 
that  adopts  all  the  various  forms  of  government 
as  equally  legitimate,  simply  because  they  have 
all  at  one  time,  and  in  one  place  or  another,  been 
actually  reduced  to  practice,  is  as  absurd  as  a 
treatise  on  morals  sanctioning  all  the  actual  usa» 
ges  and  practices  of  mankind. 

For  more  than  sixty  years  the  Americans  have 
been  governed  by  a  government  of  their  own 
institution,  laws  of  their  own  making,  and  gov- 
ernors and  masfistrates  of  their  own  selection. 


56  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

This  is  self-government.  It  is  free  government. 
If,  in  every  country,  the  majority  in  numbers  were 
predominant  in  power,  the  main  body  of  every 
people  would  necessarily  prevail  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  state,  and  thus  examples  of  self- 
government  would  be  universal.  But  in  politi- 
cal arithmetic,  it  is  said,  two  and  two  do  not  al- 
ways make  four.  The  subjects  of  political  in- 
vestigation are  moral,  not  physical  quantities,  and 
the  relative  strength  of  different  divisions  of  a 
community  cannot  be  determined  by  their  rela- 
tive physical  force,  but  only  by  their  comparative 
amount  of  intellectual  and  moral  strength,  which 
is  the  presiding  and  governing  principle  of  the 
universe. 

It  will  not,  therefore,  be  hastily  concluded, 
from  3  merely  numerical  superiority  of  the  gov- 
erned over  the  governors,  which  is  found  to  be 
the  greatest  in  the  most  despotic  countries 
that  the  will  of  the  people  does  ultimately  pre- 
vail, independently  of  the  form  in  which  the 
government  may  be  administered.  A  conclu- 
sion so  preposterous  will  be  avoided,  by  having 
regard  to  the  force  of  prejudice,  of  antiquity,  and 
of  superstition,  as  well  as  to  the  vast  authority 
derived  by  the  estabhshed  power  from  a  control 
of  the  ordinary  channels  of  the  state,  the  undis- 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  57 

puled  exercise  of  the  powers  of  sovereignty,  a 
possession  of  the  posts  of  office,  and  the  availa- 
ble and  devoted  resources  of  the  treasury  and 
military.  Self-government  is  a  government  of 
free  and  deliberative  opinion.  The  public  mind, 
influenced  by  passion,  or  fear,  or  passive  acqui- 
escence, does  not  form  opinions,  but  prejudices ; 
and  public  and  political  measures  based  upon 
them  are  not  the  result  of  choice,  but  of  a  kind 
of  moral  necessity. 

It  is  absurd,  therefore,  to  declare  that  all  gov- 
ernments are  self-governments.  Nor  are  any 
governments  such,  except  those  under  which  the 
people  themselves  possess  and  exercise  the  entire 
sovereignty.  When  a  people  do  not  govern 
themselves,  they  are  governed.  All  govern- 
ments are  either  governments  of  force  or  gov- 
ernments of  opinion  5  governments  of  usurpation, 
or  governments  of  consent.  There  are  no  inter- 
mediate stages  between  the  two.  Compounds 
of  monarchy,  aristocracy,  and  democracy  are 
not  the  less  sovereignties  exercised  over  the  peo- 
ple, because  limited  :  the  voice  of  the  nation,  in 
being  subjected  to  modification,  is  controlled.* 

*  Desunt  omnino  ei  populo  multa  qui  sub  Rege  est ;  in  pri- 
misque  libertas ;  quaj  non  in  eo  est,  ut  justo  utamur  domino, 
Bed  ut  nulla. — De  Repub.,  lib.  ii.,  c.  xxlii. 


58  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

Indeed,  so  absurd  and  unjust  are  the  prejudices 
on  which  such  governments  are  estabhshed,  that 
they  never  could  have  been  conceived  of  in  a 
rational  view  of  the  public  good,  and  must,  con- 
sequently, be  sustained  by  an  enormous  power 
independently  of  the  public  will.  And  hence 
we  find  monarchy  always  accompanied  and  for- 
tified either  by  an  aristocracy  or  hierarchy,  or  by 
both.  It  must  be  fortified  by  kindred  prejudices 
and  sympathetic  influences.  The  broad  and  sub- 
stantial interests  and  wishes  of  the  people  must 
be  compromised  by  the  prerogatives  of  a  faction 
— not  the  less  a  faction  for  the  considerable  per- 
sons that  compose  it — subsisting  for  itself  in  der- 
ogation of  common  rights,  and  rioting  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  unlawful  power;  an  evil  which  repub- 
lics have  only  to  dread,  but  which  monarchies 
constantly  experience. 

The  plea  on  which  such  governments  are  sus- 
tained, and  all  others  that  are  not  self-govern- 
ments, is  that  alike  of  all  individual  tyrants  and 
all  organized  tyrannies — necessity.  Men,  say 
monarchists,  are  incompetent  to  govern  them- 
selves, therefore  they  must  be  governed ;  some- 
thing must  be  abated  from  those  proud  rights 
which  they  arrogate  by  nature.* 
*  "  Society  requires  not  only  that  the  passions  of  individuals 


SELF-GOVERNMENT,  59 

Indeed,  the  sentiment  is  quite  universal,  that 
the  exercise  of  self-government  requires  very  for- 
tuitous circumstances,  and  an  uncommon  moral 
and  intellectual  superiority.  Even  those  are  of 
this  opinion  who  do  not  scruple  to  affirm  that 
it  is  the  only  legitimate  government.  But  that 
Nature  could  have  so  constituted  or  placed  any 
part  of  mankind,  that  one  mode  of  government, 
that  of  being  governed  by  others,  should  be 
practicable  but  wrong,  and  the  only  other  mode, 
self-government,  right  but  impracticable,  is  equal- 
ly at  variance  with  my  ideas  of  God  and  of  my 
fellow-men. 

Tlie  extreme  of  vice  is  of  course  excluded 
from  these  speculations,  as,  like  the  extreme  of 
virtue,  it  is  nowhere  to  be  found  ;  and  either 
would  probably,  though  by  means  totally  unlike 
and  adverse,  arrive  at  the  same  result,  the  total 
annihilation  of  all  government. 

Nor  do  we  mean  to  affirm  that  every  nation 
would  be  alike  skilful  in  the  exercise  of  self- 
should  be  subjected,  but  that  even  in  the  mass  and  body,  as  well 
as  in  the  individuals,  the  inclinations  of  men  should  frequently  be 
thwarted,  their  will  controlled,  and  their  passions  brought  into 
subjection.  This  can  only  be  done  by  a  power  out  of  themselves, 
and  not  in  the  exercise  of  its  function,  subject  to  that  will  and 
to  those  passions  which  it  is  its  office  to  bridle  and  subdue." — 
Burke's  Refl.  on  French  Rev. 


60  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

government,  but  that  each  would  exert  the  de- 
gree of  skill  required  by  their  wants,  and  pro- 
portioned to  the  importance  of  their  civil  and 
political  affairs. 

Surely,  if  we  are  right  in  our  idea  of  govern- 
ment, that  all  the  obligations  to  which  it  lends 
its  sanction,  except  such  as  are  purely  conven- 
tional, and  respect  merely  its  mechanical  arrange- 
ment and  support,  exist  by  nature  anterior  to 
any  regularly  organized  society,  for  the  due  dis- 
charge whereof  we  are  answerable  to  God,  there 
must  inhere  in  our  constitution,  in  order  to  lay 
the  foundation  for  that  responsibility,  a  compe- 
tency to  discern  and  fulfil  them. 

And,  indeed,  were  it,  in  this  late  age  of  the 
world,  yet  problematical  whether  self-govern- 
ment by  the  people  be  practicable,  and,  if  prac- 
ticable, whether  its  adoption  be  sanctioned  by 
wisdom  and  experience,  to  wJiom  would  the  so- 
lution of  these  problems  belong,  and  ivho  could 
avail  himself  of  their  practical  results  1  If  mon- 
archy and  aristocracy  be  the  forms  of  govern- 
ment agreeable  to  nature,  who  are  the  monarchs 
and  nobles  by  nature  ?  "  One  is  not  born,"  said 
he  whom  principle  and  nature  made  a  republican, 
but  circumstances  and  ambition  an  emperor, 
•'  one  is  not  born  with  a  boot  on  his  leg,  and 


SELF-GOVERNMENT,  61 

another  with  a  pack-saddle  on  his  back.  Ther* 
are  no  naked  kings  ;  they  must  all  be  dressed." 

The  inability  of  men  to  govern  themselves  m- 
volves  their  incompetency  to  designate  either 
how  or  hy  whom  they  shall  he  governed.  The 
claim  to  rule  nations  by  Divine  designation  or 
appointment  has  been  long  since  exploded  ;  and, 
even  were  an  exception  to  be  made  in  favour 
of  settled  dynasties,  whence  could  we  derive  a 
claim  for  the  sovereigns  of  a  new  country  1  If  it 
be,  then,  the  pleasure  of  the  Being  who  made  us 
that  we  be  ruled,  he  has  imposed  on  those  he  has 
destined  to  the  sovereignty,  as  well  as  those  he 
has  marked  for  subordination,  a  duty  arising  le- 
gitimately out  of  their  circumstances  and  rela- 
tions, of  which  they  are  not  and  cannot  be  ap- 
prized ;  and  which  he  has,  therefore,  rendered 
them  incompetent,  as  moral  and  dutiful  creatures, 
to  discharge.  Thus,  whoever  make  it  impera- 
tive upon  society  to  sustain  an  independent  and 
arbitrary  domination,  establish  a  plan  as  agree- 
able to  the  course  of  nature  and  the  will  of  God, 
the  execution  of  which,  otherwise  than  by  means 
clearly  contradictory  to  that  will,  is  utterly  im- 
possible ;  it  must  be  achieved,  if  achieved  at  all, 
through  accident,  usurpation,  violence,  and  crime. 

True,  human  affairs  do  not  enjoy  their  primi- 


62  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

tive  perfection,  but  have  been  deranged  by  our 
depravity.  This  derangement,  however,  extends 
only  to  the  course  of  human  affairs  ;  it  does  not 
impair  the  essential  relations  of  things.  Our 
duties  and  obligations  remain  the  same ;  conse- 
quently, our  rights  and  social  relations  remain 
unimpaired,  as  they  depend  not  upon  human 
character,  but  upon  human  nature. 

It  is  of  no  avail  for  the  advocate  of  arbitrary 
power  to  assert  the  imperfection  incident  to  every- 
thing human  in  our  present  terrestrial  condition, 
and  that,  since  we  will  but  imperfectly  control 
our  own  passions,  they  must  be  controlled  by 
others.  His  king  is  embraced  in  the  wide  circle 
of  humanity,  and  is  placed  under  the  same  exi- 
gency as  ourselves.  The  king,  therefore,  needs 
the  same  control  as  his  meanest  slave ;  and,  if 
his  subjects  are  to  impose  this  control  upon  him 
and  his  actions,  they  must,  after  all,  intermedi- 
ately impose  it  on  themselves,  and  do  not  require 
the  interposition  of  a  royal  automaton. 

It  is  not  sufficient  to  convict  the  people  of 
wrong  in  attempting  to  assume  their  own  gov- 
ernment, but  some  right  must  be  shown  to  ex- 
ist independently  in  the  prince.  If  we  must  be 
governed,  his  authority  to  govern  does  not  fol- 
low as  a  necessary  corollary. 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  63 

Royalty  can  plead  no  exemption  from  the  in- 
firmities incident  to  humanity.  Indeed,  to  exer- 
cise sovereignty  over  others  demands  much  high- 
er qualifications  than  to  impose  the  control  neces- 
sary to  self-government  upon  one's  self.  If, 
therefore,  the  deficiency  exist  inherently  in  sub- 
jects, a  much  greater  deficiency  must  be  predi- 
cated of  the  prince;  and  if  the  advocates  of 
monarchical  institutions  should  assert  the  advan- 
tages of  circumstances  and  position  to  accom- 
plish the  one  better  than  the  other  for  his  offices 
and  duties,  it  may  be  conclusively  replied,  that 
they  desert  the  discussion  of  the  natural  rights 
and  relations  of  man,  and  argue  from  the  arbi- 
trary allotments  of  society.  Nor  can  it  be  denied 
that  the  post  of  government  is  the  very  worst 
place  to  discipline  one  for  government ;  and  that 
those  only  know  how  to  command  who  have 
once  learned  thoroughly  to  obey.  The  passive 
submission,  the  pernicious  flattery,  the  unbounded 
sycophancy  that  attend  upon  kings,  cherish  the 
most  depraved  passions  of  the  heart ;  and  they 
are  accordingly  found  to  be  the  proudest,  the 
most  arbitrary,  the  weakest,  the  most  cruel  and 
licentious  of  human  beings.  Where  will  you 
find  in  private  stations  the  enormity  of  vice  that 
is  heralded  with  the  lineage  of  kings  1     In  vain 


64  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

do  we  seek  for  a  Nero,  a  Caligula,  a  Domitian, 
a  Dlonysius,  an  Alexander  of  Pherffi,  a  Richard 
III.,  a  Henry  VIII.,  a  Mary,  a  Philip  II.,  but  upon 
the  throne.  The  best  and  greatest  examples  of 
kings  and  despots  are  those  who  have  risen 
from  private  life ;  such  were  two  of  the  Ctesars, 
Cromwell,  and  Bonaparte. 

It  is  but  too  true  that  our  nature  is  full  of 
contradictions,  errors,  and  infirmities ;  but  these 
are  to  be  moderated  by  conflicting  with  each 
other,  and  harmonized,  as  the  antagonist  forces 
and  apparent  disorders  of  the  material  world  are 
harmonized,  by  balancing,  and  correcting,  and 
repairing  the  defects  of  each  other.  To  crown 
one  man  king  is  to  give  these  evils  free  scope ; 
it  makes  them  arbitrary  and  supreme,  and  gives 
them  license  to  depredate  upon  the  earth.  The 
passions  are  what  we  have  to  fear.  But  who 
can  suppose  that  the  evils  of  our  system  are  at  all 
compromised  by  making  the  passions  of  one  sov- 
ereign; not  abating  anything  from,  but  cherishing 
the  evil  nature  of  one,  and  giving  it  the  efliciency 
of  all :  or,  at  least,  better  compromised  than  if 
the  passions  of  all  were  left  to  oppose  and  mod- 
erate each  other,  and  adjust  the  universal  har- 
mony ;  than  if,  for  instance,  the  pride  of  one 
were  opposed  to  the  pride  of  another,  to  awaken 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  65 

emulation,  rather  than  that  the  arrogance  of  a 
Ham  an  should  be  armed  with  power  to  execute 
exterminating  vengeance  on  a  whole  nation  ? 

Do  the  vast  body  of  the  people  need  an  inde- 
pendent power  to  oppose  and  assail  their  inter- 
ests and  their  wishes  ?  Compromises  do  some- 
times take  place  in  human  affairs;  but  these, 
when  wise,  are  the  results  of  necessity,  not  of 
choice.  The  only  proper  checks  and  balances  in 
a  constitution  are  those  that  necessarily  and  natu- 
rally arise  out  of  the  rights  and  interests  to  be 
protected. 

We  are  not  more  unfit  to  be  our  own  govern- 
ors than  to  be  governed.  Duties  and  obligations 
are  reciprocal ;  those  we  owe  to  the  state  are 
exactly  correspondent  with  those  the  state  owes 
us  ;  and  if  the  due  measure  of  both  is  not  definite 
and  fixed,  and  as  intelligible  to  the  one  party  as 
the  other,  we  are  as  unfit  to  be  subjects  as  sov- 
ereigns. 

The  relation  of  individuals  to  government  and 
society,  as  well  as  all  other  relations  subsisting 
between  men,  in  every  capacity  human  nature 
is  capable  of  assuming,  are  comprehended  in  our 
moral  duties  to  our  neighbour,  and  unitersally 
embraced  within  the  sphere  of  our  moral  ac- 
countability.    Is  it  possible  that  such  a  responsi- 


66  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

bility  could  be  predicated  of  a  condition  wherein 
we  are  unable  to  perceive  or  to  do  what  apper- 
tains to  us  1  Is  it  possible  that  we  are  bound 
by  nature  to  render  to  each  and  all  others  their 
right,  and  are  yet  incompetent  by  nature  to  dis- 
cern what  it  is,  and  to  perform  what  is  thus  our 
moral  duty  ?  If  we  can  acquit  ourselves  of  our 
duties  to  each  individually,  as  the  whole  have  no 
rights  but  what  are  the  rights  of  each,  we  can  dis- 
charge our  duties  to  all  collectively.  Our  duties 
as  citizens  are  merely  a  part  of  our  duties  "  as 
neighbours,"  and  comprehended  in  the  great  law 
of  Christian  morality  as  expounded  by  our  Sa- 
viour, Unless,  therefore,  that  fundamental  pre- 
cept presuppose  a  greater  degree  of  intellectual 
and  moral  capability  than  mankind  are  universal- 
ly possessed  of,  the  whole  family  of  man  are  com- 
petent to  sustain  and  discharge  the  duties  of  free 
citizens  of  a  free  commonwealth.  Hence  our 
competency  for,  and  our  right  to  self-government. 
Can  it  be  believed  by  a  rational  and  intelligent 
man,  that  the  Author  of  our  nature  has  super- 
added a  moral  sanction  to  our  social  and  relative 
duties,  and  has  yet  left  us  inadequately  provided 
for  the  fulfilment  of  them  ?  Nay,  while  we  are 
confessedly  competent  to  sustain  the  responsibil- 
ities and  the  agency  of  moral  creatures  in  all 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  67 

those  higher  duties  which  we  owe  immediately 
to  God,  can  we  not  respond  to  the  obligations  we 
owe  each  other?  Have  we  been  made  com- 
petent for  the  one,  and  are  we  not  competent  for 
the  other?  Has  the  Supreme  Being  been  so 
provident  of  the  regard  due  from  us  to  one  an- 
other, that,  while  He  has  intrusted  us  with  the 
guardianship  of  our  own  conduct  as  the  subjects 
of  His  empire,  He  is  unwilling  that  we  should  be 
committed  to  our  own  discretion  in  a  matter  of 
merely  terrestrial  import,  and,  in  His  infinite  view, 
of  entirely  subordinate  interest  ?  Has  He  intrust- 
ed us  with  the  care  of  our  eternal  salvation,  and 
not  ventured  to  commit  to  us  the  conduct  and 
supervision  of  all  our  temporal  affairs  ? 

The  advocates  of  arbitrary  power,  so  that  it 
be  properly  acclimated,  and  fall  to  the  dole  of 
ignorance  and  misfortune,  do  yet  steadfastly  in- 
sist upon  the  nobility  and  supremacy  of  man,  as 
a  being  furnished  with  the  prerogatives  of  sover- 
eignty over  the  earth,  and  endowed  with  a  nature 
in  the  semblance  of  God  himself.  Vain  boast- 
ing, if,  while  the  lower  orders  of  creation  are 
competent  to  fulfil  the  ends  of  their  being,  and  by 
the  force  of  mere  animal  instinct  to  regulate  their 
own  economy  ;  if,  while  man  himself  is  so  abun- 
dantly supplied  for  the  sustenance  of  his  animal 


68  SELF-GOVERNMENT, 

nature,  those  exalted  gifts  and  prerogatives  must 
prove  so  entirely  futile  in  enabling  him  to  fortify 
himself  upon  the  very  threshold  of  existence. 
Wretched  is  our  supremacy,  if  we  be  found  un- 
able to  maintain  those  just  and  equal  relations 
upon  which  we  depend  for  our  entire  protection, 
and  to  which  all  our  rights  and  terrestrial  enjoy- 
ments are  made  subordinate. 

Upon  a  hypothesis  contrary  to  that  laid  down, 
the  continual  occurrences  of  the  providence  of 
God  are  as  inexplicable  as  the  apparent  injustice 
of  his  original  disposition  of  us.  Look  at  the  va- 
rious nations  of  the  earth.  Their  different  expe- 
riences, which  are  but  the  experiences  of  various 
communities  of  private  individuals,  are,  to  a  great 
extent,  owing  to  their  different  governments. 
Wars  that  devastate  the  earth,  and  peace  and 
plenty  that  replenish  it;  commerce  and  education,  ~  -^ 
that  cultivate  society,  and  the  preservation  of 
rights,  that  afford  the  enjoyment  of  life,  libert}^, 
and  individual  happiness,  are  in  the  highest  de- 
gree dependant  upon  municipal  regulation,  the 
effects  of  which,  in  all  their  rigour  or  all  their 
benignity,  must  be  sustained  by  the  constituent 
people.  When  they  are  thus  made  answerable 
to  God  and  to  each  other  in  this  public  and  arti- 
ficial capacity,  ought  they  not,  in  justice,  to  con- 


SELr-GOVERNMENT.  69 

trol  this  relation,  and  should  not  their  probation 
be  coextensive  with  the  sphere  of  their  retribu- 
tions 1  And  yet,  if  they  are  not,  in  their  natural 
state  and  independently  of  adventitious  circum- 
stances, able  to  govern  themselves,  they  may,  nay, 
in  most  cases  must,  be  rendered  responsible  for  a 
culpability  not  their  own.  The  earliest  instincts 
of  humanity  teach  us  that  when  we  have  done  no 
wrong  we  should  be  obnoxious  to  no  punish- 
ment; that  our  duties  as  a  neighbour  and  a  citi- 
zen are  embraced  within  the  sphere  of  our  moral 
agency,  and  ought  legitimately  to  be  not  less  un- 
der our  control  than  our  duties  as  a  husband  and 
a  father.  I  am  a  party  to  the  government  in  the 
effects  of  its  measures  and  regulations,  I  ought  to 
be  in  establishing  those  measures  and  regulations. 
If  the  relation  of  governors  and  governed  commu- 
nicate downward,  it  should  be  communicative  up- 
ward ;  and,  when  any  barriers  are  interposed  by 
accident  or  usurpation  to  self-government,  they 
interrupt  the  free  communication  which  Nature, 
in  the  equity  of  her  distributions,  originally  estab- 
lished between  our  duties  and  our  responsibilities. 

An  individual  has  the  same  right  to  be  inde- 
pendent that  a  nation  has. 

"Whence  otherwise  does  man,  whether  civil- 
ized or  savage,  derive  that  innate  feeling  of  in- 


70  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

dependence  that  revolts  at  servitude,  and  that 
prompts  him,  in  every  emergency,  to  rely  upon 
and  act  for  himself?  Why  do  the  efforts  of 
those  who  aspire,  even  vainly,  at  their  own  gov- 
ernment, elicit  so  much  of  the  admiration  of  the 
world  1  Why  does  the  fate  of  Brutus  even  yet 
awaken  a  tear  of  sympathetic  emotion,  though 
he  reposes  beneath  the  ruins  of  republican  Rome  1 
Why  does  the  cause  of  the  Polish  exile  come 
with  the  inspiration  of  poetry  and  music  to  the 
heart  1  Is  it  not  that  there  is  something  natural 
to  man  in  self-government,  and  that  Nature  has 
placed  a  cord  in  e\  ery  breast,  which,  despite  of 
human  sophistry  on  the  one  hand,  or  fatal  mis- 
chance on  the  other,  will  resound  to  a  single 
note  of  liberty  from  any  part  or  any  period  of 
the  world  1 

This  natural  impatience  of  control,  this  admi- 
ration for  those  who  sacrifice  themselves  at  the 
altar  of  Liberty,  are  useless  passions,  and  with- 
out any  correspondent  aim,  unless  the  Deity 
made  us  for  self-government ;  nay,  an  incredible 
artifice  of  Nature  to  seduce  us  from  the  path  of 
legitimate  obedience,  and  subject  us  to  the  accu- 
mulated evils  of  a  most  jealous  tyranny.  Contin- 
ually thwarted  in  what  we  feel  ourselves  com- 
petent to  achieve,  unable  to  assert  an  independ- 
ence derived  to  us  with  existence,  we  would 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  71 

otherwise  appear  at  a  war  with  ourselves,  in 
which  the  worst  cause  must  triumph,  and  the 
more  worthy  and  honourable  principles  of  our 
nature  be  ignobly  sacrificed. 

With  what  wondrous  potency  are  examples 
of  self-government  charged.  One  of  the  chief 
causes  of  the  revolutionary  movement  in  France 
was,  undoubtedly,  the  successful  achievement  of 
our  independence.  That  revolution  inflamed 
England,  and  Italy,  and  Germany,  while  it 
roused  all  Europe  from  the  sleep  of  centuries. 

If  the  principle  of  self-government  is  not  in 
harmony  with  the  nature  of  man,  why  have  his 
energies  been  developed  just  in  the  proportion 
that  he  has  governed  himself?  It  would  be  in 
vain  to  inquire,  upon  any  other  principle,  for  the 
reason  that  free  governments,  occupying  as  they 
have  but  a  small  portion  of  the  geography  and 
chronology  of  the  world,  have  gone  so  far  towards 
monopolizing  its  history  1  Although  the  tran- 
sactions of  the  ancient  republics  transpired  upon  a 
small  theatre,  all  that  is  classic  in  literature,  pro- 
found in  science,  or  illustrious  in  greatness,  seems 
to  be  intimately  associated  with  them.  And  al- 
though, among  the  moderns,  the  examples  of 
such  states  have  been  too  few,  and  too  small,  and 
too  imperfect  to  establish  the  argument,  yet,  in 
modern  as  in  all  other  ages,  history  grows  impor- 


72  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

tant  just  in  the  degree  that  the  government  of 
the  people  of  whom  it  is  written  approximates 
to  self-government. 

With  just  pride,  the  unexampled  prosperity  of 
our  own  country  may  be  adduced.  The  com- 
monplaces of  hyperbole  are  sober  statements  of 
truth  when  applied  to  the  rapid  march  of  culti- 
vation over  our  land.  From  a  bankrupt  colony 
we  have  become  the  second  commercial  nation 
of  the  world.  From  a  population  equal  to  that 
of  only  two  counties  in  Great  Britain,  we  boast 
now  to  equal,  if  not  surpass,  her  in  numbers. 
From  being  confined  upon  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
by  the  ocean  on  our  right,  and  savages  and  in- 
terminable wildernesses  on  our  left,  we  have  sub- 
dued and  occupied  half  a  continent.  Cities  and 
villages  spring  from  beneath  the  feet  of  the  ad- 
venturer as  he  pauses  at  the  West ;  and  those  of 
a  few  years  in  this,  challenge  comparison  with 
the  growth  of  as  many  centuries  in  other  coun- 
tries. Education  and  Christianity  are  so  widely 
diffused  that  they  seem  to  knock  at  every  man's 
door,  and  almost  to  beg  admission  for  the  gifts 
and  offerings  they  bring.  Churches  and  schools, 
and  books  and  newspapers,  are  identified  with 
the  most  intimate  habits  of  the  people.  Com- 
merce floats  upon  artificial  rivers,  and  rides,  with 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  73 

the  speed  of  the  elements,  in  artificial  vales.  In 
estimating  the  more  prominent  characteristics  of 
the  whole,  so  commonly  shared  are  the  necessary 
comforts  and  substantial  supports  of  life  as  to 
make  us  overlook  them,  and  forget  that  in  these 
the  humblest  cultivator  of  the  soil  may  challenge 
comparison  with  the  wealthiest  banker.  We 
forget  that  every  loghouse  furnishes  a  satisfac- 
tory meal  to  the  daintiest  appetite;  that  when 
it  sends  forth  its  youthful  inmates  to  feed  else- 
where, in  a  sound  mind  and  sound  body,  it  gives 
them  all  that  is  needful  to  feed  themselves ;  that 
Merit  seeks  no  patron,  and  Poverty  itself  does 
not  ask  alms. 

Let  those  who  think  the  picture  exaggerated 
and  overcharged  look  at  the  condition  of  the 
great  mass  in  other  countries.  I  will  not  say  the 
few  ;  as  the  wUd  beasts  of  the  wood  might  as 
well  claim  to  restrain  the  cultivating  hand  of 
man,  and  vindicate  the  wilderness  for  their  do- 
main, as  a  few,  in  any  country,  claim  a  monop- 
oly of  the  benefits  which  God  has  made  for  the 
common  enjoyment  of  all.  Look  at  the  mass  in 
other  countries.  What  proportion  of  them  are 
beggared  1  W^hat  proportion  of  them  know  of 
the  protecting  arm  of  government  except  in  the 
experience  of  the  punishments  it  inflicts  7  of  the 


74  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

mild,  consolatory,  and  reforming  influences  of 
Christianity,  except  in  the  exaction  of  tithes  and 
penances  ?  of  the  importance  of  education,  ex- 
cept in  the  frowning  aspect  of  their  colleges  7 
How  many  of  the  mass  till  their  own  lands,  sleep 
in  their  own  houses,  and  eat  the  bread  they  earn  ? 
Whoever,  upon  the  survey  of  these  circumstan- 
ces, judges  the  language  we  have  used  to  con- 
vey too  strong  an  impression  of  our  comparative 
advantages,  may  be  allowed  to  impeach  our  de- 
scription as  declamatory  and  idle. 

Revolutions  in  favour  of  liberal  principles 
have  ever  been  prolific  periods  of  greatness. 
When  will  revive  our  revolutionary  congress  of 
great  men  ?  Look  through  the  slumbering  ages 
of  despotic  France,  and  you  will  search  in  vain 
for  the  mighty  energy  that  characterized  the  pe- 
riod when  each  individual  in  that  nation  indul- 
ged, however  delusively,  the  thought  that  he  was 
an  integral  part  of  it,  and  a  unit  in  society — the 
ennobling  persuasion  that,  from  the  abject  condi- 
tion of  a  subject,  he  had  become  his  own  sover- 
eign. You  will  hardly  find  such  a  galaxy  of  il- 
lustrious orators,  statesmen,  and  generals  as  in- 
troduced, directed,  and  closed  her  disastrous 
revolution  of  '92,  The  same  causes  operated 
in  the  neighbouring  islands  of  Britain,  and  that 


SELl-GOVERNMENT.  75 

kingdom  must  wait  for  another  such  display  of 
genius  and  eloquence  as  characterized  her  own 
senate  at  that  period,  until  the  same  principles 
again  agitate  the  elements  of  society  on  her 
own  or  on  neighbouring  soil.  No  man  in  his 
senses  can  be  supposed  to  justify  the  deeds 
of  that  revolution ;  and  I  do  not  speak  of  it  in 
that  view.  I  refer  merely  to  the  mighty  energy 
which  the  mere  persuasion  of  freedom,  though 
false  and  delusive,  developed  in  those  who  were 
the  subjects  of  such  a  sentiment,  and  elicited 
from  the  antagonist  minds  of  others.  If  a  vi- 
cious freedom  rouse  human  agency  to  such  stri- 
king achievements,  what  may  we  not  expect 
under  a  just  and  true  freedom,  where  human 
power,  equally  stimulated  and  strengthened,  is 
expended  for  the  promotion  of  human  happi- 
ness? 

Upon  a  review  of  all  these  considerations,  can 
we  still  subscribe  to  the  sentiment  that  man, 
when  he  needs  a  magistrate,  must  make  a  ty- 
rant ;  when  he  wants  a  government,  must  make 
himself  a  slave  ?  Is  it  not  more  conformable  to 
truth,  as  well  as  to  the  generous  impulses  of  our 
nature,  to  assert  the  dignity  of  the  human  mind 
as  sufficient  for  its  condition,  and  to  vindicate 
the  providence  of  our  Maker  in  adapting  us  to 


76  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

all  the  exigencies  of  our  state  ?  Certainly  there 
is  a  character  of  truth,  though  perhaps  some- 
thing of  irreverence,  in  the  remark  of  Jefferson, 
"  If  the  people  cannot  manage  self-government, 
it  will  be  hard  for  me  to  believe  that  God  is  not 
a  malevolent  Being." 

It  may  be  insisted  that  these  conclusions  are 
falsified  by  historical  truth,  and,  consequently, 
directly  opposed  to  the  absolute  results  of  actual 
experience.  Indeed,  so  universally  prevalent  is 
the  opinion  that  history  bears  witness  against 
the  competency  of  men  for  self-government, 
that  it  passes  almost  universally  unquestioned, 
and  is  esteemed  a  quite  well-established,  and  al- 
most incontrovertible  position. 

It  is  falsely  said  that  republics  have  not 
proved  to  be  of  long  continuance,  and  this  false 
assumption  is  sophistically  alleged  as  conclusive 
proof  of  their  inability  to  answer  the  ends  of 
their  creation ;  as  if  despotic  institutions  might 
claim  to  be  exempted  from  the  ruin  incident  to 
everything  human ;  and  as  if  a  government,  to 
be  good,  must  be  eternal. 

I  do  not  find  that  republics  were  more  evanes- 
cent in  ancient  times  than  other  governments.  I 
do  find  that  they  excelled  in  whatever  contrib- 
uted to  the  embellishment  and  happiness  of  life. 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  77 

in  arts  and  knowledge,  in  defending  themselves 
from  dangers,  in  reviving  under  disasters,  in  sub- 
duing enemies  and  planting  cities,  in  making 
themselve?  honoured  and  feared  ;  and  that  thus 
their  destruction  was  the  more  signal.  The  Ro- 
man republic  lasted  as  long  as  the  Roman  mon- 
archy of  the  West;  the  Carthaginian  republic 
lasted  as  long  as  the  Spartan  monarchy ;  and  the 
Athenian  republic  endured  a  century  longer  than 
the  Macedonian  kingdom. 

But  the  decision  of  this  subordinate  question  is 
entirely  apart  from  the  merits  of  republican  gov- 
ernment, and  the  practicability  of  self-govern- 
ment by  the  people.  The  ability  of  collective 
bodies  of  men  to  govern  themselves  must  depend 
solely  upon  their  capacity,  morally  and  intellect- 
ually, to  establish  and  enforce  laws  suited  to  the 
exigencies  of  their  condition.  Their  strength 
and  courage  to  defend  a  free  government  may 
affect  its  permanency,  but,  so  long  as  it  endures, 
cannot  impeach  its  intrinsic  excellence,  nor,  if  it 
endure  at  all,  its  absolute  feasibility.  If,  as  a 
form  of  government,  it  accomplishes  all  the  ends 
designed  by  any  mere  form,  it  belongs  to  the 
people  to  defend  their  institutions  and  preserve 
their  inde'pendence.  All  people  have  by  nature 
merit  enough  to  govern  themselves ;  but  all  peo- 


78  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

pie  may  not  still  have  intelligence  and  vigilance 
enough  to  defend  their  own  favourite  institu- 
tions. We  may  hope  for  their  continuance,  we 
may  fear  their  destruction ;  but  the  object  itself 
remains  the  same,  independently  of  our  hopes 
and  fears.  A  bad  government  would  not,  in  it- 
self, be  any  worse,  if  from  extrinsic  causes  it 
should  be  rendered  perpetual,  however  pitiable 
the  condition  of  its  subjects  might  be.  So,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  government  and  dominion  of 
Rome,  pronounced  eternal  by  her  orators  and 
poets,  have  not  been  rendered  less  complete  and 
perfect  by  our  subsequent  knowledge  of  their 
ruin,  notwithstanding  that  the  condition  of  the 
people  was  more  precarious,  and  their  glory  more 
unsubstantial  than  they  imagined.  If  an  able 
and  efficient  prince  be  supplanted  by  fraud  and 
violence,  and  an  insolent  and  tyrannous  usurpei 
reign  in  his  stead,  are  the  ability  and  efficiency 
of  his  previous  administration  necessarily  impli- 
cated in  his  disasters  ?  Neither,  if  a  republic  be 
of  short  duration,  is  the  ability  of  its  constituents 
to  govern  themselves  necessarily  called  in  ques- 
tion ;  such  a  misfortune  only  involves  their  in- 
competency to  perpetuate  it.  We  need  not  be 
prophets,  but  only  statesmen,  to  exercise  a  deci- 
sive choice  among  governments  3  for  we  have 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  79 

only  to  decide  upon  their  present  relative  value 
and  intrinsic  merit.*  It  is  early  enough  to  make 
the  election  of  a  bad  one  when  it  is  forced  upon 
us  by  the  compulsion  of  necessity;  we  may  en- 
dure a  bad  government,  but  will  never  choose 
one.  Meanwhile,  a  march  will  be  gained  upon 
the  hard  and  adverse  conditions  of  our  being. 

No  government  has  yet  proved  immortal.  The 
most  stupendous  fabrics  of  despotism  have  not 
withstood  the  brunt  of  time.  Governments 
that  were  the  enemies,  as  well  as  those  that  were 
the  friends  of  humanity,  are  mouldering  in  mon- 
umental history.  Why  should  we  not  reject  all 
forms  because  all  are  alike  transitory  ?  And 
shall  not  men  of  science  relinquish  the  present 
advanced  state  and  improved  condition  of  the 
sciences,  because  they  have  not  resulted  in  the 
discovery  of  the  philosopher's  stone,  or  the  in- 
vention of  a  restorative  ui  human  life  ? 

If  History  is  to  be  interrogated  as  to  whether 

*  "  It  is  common  to  say,  '  Wait ;  these  are  early  days.  The 
experiment  will  fail  yet.'  The  experiment  of  the  particular 
constitutions  of  the  United  States  may  fail ;  but  the  great  prin- 
ciple which,  whether  successfully  or  not,  it  strives  to  imbody — 
the  capacity  of  mankind  for  self-government — is  established 
forever.  It  has,  as  Mr.  Madison  said,  proved  a  thing  previously 
held  impossible.  If  a  revolution  were  to  take  place  to-morrow 
in  the  United  States,  it  remains  an  historical  fact  that,  for  lialf  a 
century,  a  people  has  been  self-governed." — Miss  Martineau'? 
Society  in  America,  vol.  i.,  chap  i. 


80  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

all  men  are  competent  by  nature  to  govern  them- 
selves, let  her  be  asked,  what  that  could  be  call- 
ed a  republic  has  ever  proved  recreant  to  the 
ends  of  its  institution,  and  has  not,  according  to 
the  peculiar  relations  of  its  people,  their  age, 
their  country,  their  natural  constitution,  and  ac- 
quired character  and  habits,  been  found  to  govern 
wisely,  efficiently,  and  justly  ?  Are  not  the  in- 
stitutions and  laws  of  republics  more  curious  rec- 
ords of  practical  wisdom  and  political  skill,  as 
well  as  of  public  virtue  and  scrupulous  justice, 
than  can  be  paralleled  throughout  the  universal 
constitution  of  monarchical  and  despotic  gov- 
ernments of  the  same  period  ?  While  we  may 
inquire,  whence  are  tyrannies  1  whence  the  op- 
pression mankind  have  suffered  from  the  ear- 
liest ages,  by  means  of  ignorance,  weakness, 
and  licentiousness  ?  Tyrants  and  despots  are 
the  names  of  kings  and  emperors.  Hereditary 
legislators  and  governors,  those  who  inherit  by 
their  bodies  the  sovereignty  over  millions  of  their 
fellows,  who  suck  in  its  delicious  sweets  from 
the  breasts  of  crowned  nurses,  governors  by  Di- 
vine right,  these  have  fertilized  the  pages  of 
history  with  blood — domestic  blood — the  blood 
of  peace.  Sometimes,  indeed,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  French  Revolution,  demagogues  and  anar- 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  81 

c.hists,  mobs  and  factions,  have  assumed  the 
name  and  the  authority  of  the  people,  and  with 
the  cap  of  hberty  upon  their  heads,  and  the  sa- 
cred name  of  the  republic  in  their  mouths,  have 
treated  the  people  as  slaves,  and  sacrificed  them 
as  brutes.  Unless  we  believe  the  only  actual 
difference  between  one  government  and  another 
to  consist  in  the  name,  despotism,  not  republican 
government,  must  be  held  responsible  for  such 
enormities.  So  far  as  men  have  suffered  from 
bad  governments,  just  to  that  extent  have  they 
been  tyrannized  over,  in  opposition  to  their  wills, 
by  arbitrary  power — just  to  that  extent  have  they 
been  governed. 

Let  not  Liberty,  then,  be  flouted  with  the  re- 
proach of  our  inability  to  preserve,  as  proof  of 
her  incapacity  to  govern  ;  others  have  misruled, 
and  many  in  her  name,  but  never  with  her  sanc- 
tion ;  so  far  from  it,  that  all  tyrants  and  tyran- 
nies must  be  judged  by  the  manner  and  the  ex- 
tent of  their  deviation  from  her  prescribed  rules. 
Let  self-government  stand  approved  a  mode  of 
government  the  most  perfectly  adapted  to  reason 
and  nature,  adorned  by  the  most  brilliant  pages 
of  history,  and  a  refuge  accessible  to  all  men 
whom  God  has  made,  whatever  be  their  genius, 

character,  or  condition. 
G 


82  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

As  Americans,  at  least,  we  will  cherish  and 
defend  it,  while  to  cherish  and  defend  it  is  a  vir- 
tue ;  we  will  maintain  it,  since,  by  the  reluctant 
concession  of  its  enemies,  it  is  in  itself  the  most 
perfect  form  of  which  political  affairs  are  suscep- 
tible ;  we  will  stand  by  it  in  honour  of  our  na- 
ture, since  every  other  political  system  is  based 
upon  human  degradation. 

The  voice  of  History  has  been  belied.  It 
yields  its  decisive  testimony  in  favour  of  the 
practicability  of  self-government ;  as  it  discloses 
to  us  the  fact  of  the  actual  exercise  by  man  of 
his  own  government,  under  all  the  various  phases 
which  his  nature,  with  its  destitutions  and  in- 
firmities, its  ignorance  and  precariousness,  has 
ever  exhibited ;  from  the  wandering  Tartar  and 
primitive  Indian,  through  the  successive  revolu- 
tions, gradual  advances,  and  final  perfection  of 
Greek  and  Roman  society,  down  to  the  latest  pe- 
riod of  modern  times,  with  our  luxuries  cheap- 
ened by  science,  our  territory  widely  extended  by 
nature,  and  our  habits  modified  by  Christianity, 
in  republican  America.* 

Whether  we  refer  ourselves,  therefore,  to  the 

*  Caesar,  De  Bel.  Gal.,  1.  iv.,  23.  Tacitus,  De  Ger.,  xi.,  7. 
Robertson's  America,  162.  Jefferson's  Works,  vol.  iv.,  278. 
Colden's  Hist,  of  the  Five  Nations,  passim.  See,  also,  Mit- 
ford's  Greece,  chap,  iii.,  sec.  9- 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  83 

perfections  of  the  Being  who  made  us,  the 
goodness  and  wisdom  of  His  purposes  and  the 
rectitude  of  His  providence,  or  to  our  experience 
of  our  own  constitution,  and  the  unsophistica- 
ted, unbought  sympathies  of  our  nature,  or  to 
the  testimony  of  historical  truth,  we  meet  with 
but  one  uniform  result,  equally  consonant  with 
our  ideas  of  the  Creator  and  honourable  to  our- 
selves, that  MAN  IS,  BY  NATURE,  independently  of 
adventitious  circumstances,  competent  to  govern 

HIMSELF. 

Society  is,  therefore,  when  legitimately  con- 
stituted, entirely  voluntary  in  its  origin,  and  civil 
government  must  derive  all  its  legitimate  pow- 
ers from  the  consent  of  the  governed.  We,  in 
our  public  capacity  as  the  people,  retain  our 
right  to  be  judges  in  our  own  cause,  and  the  max- 
im of  contrary  import  is  applicable  only  to  pri- 
vate and  individual  disputes.  And,  indeed,  to 
whom  could  the  whole  community  resign  this 
power  ?  Not  certainly  to  one,  or  to  any  of  its 
constituent  members ;  since,  in  being  the  consti- 
tuted judges  in  the  cause  of  all  the  rest,  thej' 
would  necessarily  retain  the  prerogative  of  judg- 
ing in  their  own.  Hence  the  futility  of  Burke's 
objection  to  self-government:  "'No  man  shall 
be  the  judge  in  his  own  cause;'  by  this  each 


84  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

person  has  at  once  divested  himself  of  the  first 
fundamental  right  of  uncovenanted  man,  that  is, 
to  judge  for  himself  and  assert  his  own  cause." 
We  have  seen  that,  in  free  communities,  the  set- 
tling of  disputes  according  to  that  fundamental 
rule  is  merely  an  accommodation  of  interests,  by 
a  mode  to  which  all  who  compose  the  society 
have  voluntarily  consented,  and  by  men  whom 
they  have  voluntarily  chosen.  The  citizens  still 
virtually  judge  for  themselves  by  their  agents. 
They  themselves  judge,  not  divested  of  any 
rights,  but  only  of  their  passions,  which  w^ould 
otherwise  disqualify  them  for  the  honest  exercise 
of  those  rights. 

Females,  infants,  maniacs,  and  idiots  are  not 
allowed  a  voice  in  national  affairs.  As  to  ma- 
niacs and  idiots,  as  they  are  not  rational  and 
moral  beings,  they  want  the  necessary  conditions 
of  political  freedom.  Infants  are,  for  a  time,  en- 
tirely helpless  by  nature ;  Nature  indicates  to 
them,  therefore,  during  that  period,  a  condition 
of  necessary  dependance,  and  provides,  in  the  af- 
fectionate solicitude  of  the  parent,  for  their  neces- 
sary protection  during  its  continuance.  They 
are  free  by  nature  as  moral  beings ;  but  they 
have  not  yet  arrived  at  the  maturity  of  that  na- 
ture.    The  only  difficulty  lies  in  determining 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  85 

when  they  arrive  at  that  maturity.  If  the  law 
prescribe  too  late  a  period,  the  law  is  wrong  in 
that  respect,  but  not  in  excluding  infants,  prop- 
erly so  designated.  Woman  has  all  the  requi- 
sites of  political  freedom  in  their  perfection.  But 
whether  or  not  she  has  been  confined  to  the  cir- 
cle of  domestic  life  by  the  appointment  of  Prov- 
idence, and  subjected  to  the  dominion  of  man  by 
an  express  ordinance  of  Heaven,*  are  questions 
which  I  do  not  care  to  discuss,  as  I  would  rather 
admit  the  invalidity  of  the  exception  than  im- 
pair the  force  of  the  general  rule. 

Liberty  is  inherent  and  inalienable ;  but,  what- 
ever the  right  of  a  people  under  an  arbitrary 
government  may  be  to  vindicate  their  freedom, 
the  declaration  is  not  intended  to  be  made,  that  it 
is  just  and  proper  for  any  one,  or  a  few,  to  as- 
sert that  right  without  any  reasonable  prospect 
of  success,  but  with  the  certainty  of  involving  a 
kingdom  in  discord  and  blood ;  or  that  it  is  the 
individual  duty  of  each  subject  to  be  a  rebel.  It 
is  a  common  remark,  that  what  would  have  been 
esteemed  a  treasonable  rebellion  had  not  success 
glorified  it,  is  often  lauded  as  a  most  just  and 
glorious  revolution.     That  fickleness  of  opinion 

*  "  Thy  desire  shall  be  to  thy  husband,  and  he  shall  rule  ovei 
thee." 


86  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

on  this  subject,  which  the  remark  is  designed  to 
reprove,  is  the  offspring  of  a  just  sentiment ;  for 
although  it  be  not  only  the  right,  but  the  duty,  of 
the  concurrent  whole  to  assert  their  freedom,  yet, 
if  the  artificial  strength  of  the  government  be 
far  superior  to  what  a  revolt  in  favour  of  liberal 
principles  can  excite  against  it,  and  the  mass  of 
the  people  so  acquiescent  in  a  state  of  servitude 
that  it  is  in  vain  to  attempt  resistance,  the  mag- 
nanimous impulses  of  liberty  can  never  justify 
an  attempt  that  must  inevitably  end  in  riveting 
the  chains  of  slavery.  The  question,  under  such 
circumstances,  will  involve  considerations  of  pru- 
dence which  no  rational  man  can  or  will  disre- 
gard ;  and  a  man  has  no  more  right  to  discard  the 
use  of  his  reason  and  the  ordinary  maxims  of  pru- 
dence in  the  government  of  his  conduct,  than  he 
has  to  discard  the  use  of  his  moral  faculties. 
Indeed,  the  gift  of  the  latter  presupposes  the 
full  and  complete  exercise  of  the  former.  Thus, 
though  circumstances  do  not  impair  human  rights, 
they  may  and  ought  to  influence  us  in  our  de- 
liberations about  wresting  them  from  the  hand  of 
oppression ;  and  if  we  see  an  unfortunate  issue 
to  the  struggle  to  be  inevitable,  w^e  cannot,  with- 
out renouncing  our  understandings  and  becoming 
temporarily  mad;  engage  in  it. 


SELF-GOVERNMENT  87 

However,  this  is  a  consideration  for  the  op- 
pressed alone ;  it  is  no  argument  for  the  oppress- 
or. He  can  only  allege  the  right  of  the  strong- 
est, which,  in  the  very  nature  of  moral  reason- 
ing, can  never  be  any  right  at  all.  Be  it  once 
granted  that  all  are  universally  competent  to 
practice  self-government,  the  tyrant  is  stripped 
of  his  plea,  the  usurper  must  be  dumb  in  his  own 
justification,  and  the  monarch  must  abdicate  his 
throne,  how  ancient  soever  the  tyranny  that  up- 
holds it,  or  live  in  a  state  of  lawless  and  adulter- 
ous union  with  Power. 


88  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 


CHAPTER  m. 

The  same  Subjects  continued. 

Nothing  can  be  more  simple  than  the  theory 
of  republican  government.  It  may  be  readily 
comprehended  by  the  plainest  minds ;  it  appeals 
to  the  first  maxims  of  common-sense  observa- 
tion, and  the  universal  principles  of  morals. 
When  you  tell  the  plainest  man  that  every  one 
understands  his  own  business  best,  that  every  one 
is  the  best  guardian  of  his  own  interests,  you 
appeal  to  acknowledged  truths,  which  he  has 
long  since  known  to  be  of  constant  application 
in  the  daily  affairs  of  common  life.  When  you 
tell  him  that  God  never  made  one  man  to  be  the 
master  of  another,  you  appeal  to  sentiments  to 
which  no  human  bosom  is  a  stranger.  When  you 
tell  him  that  we  sustain,  in  the  ordinary  allot- 
ments of  Providence,  the  consequences  of  our 
political  regulations  and  civil  laws,  and  ought, 
therefore,  to  have  the  making  of  them  ;  that  we 
are  moral  beings,  and  therefore  invested  by 
Providence  with  the  regulation  of  our  own  con- 
duct in  all  our  moral  relations,  he  is  at  no  loss 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  89 

to  recognise  the  ready  application  and  irresisti- 
ble force  of  fundamental  moral  rules.  In  the 
plainness  and  simplicity  of  republican  princi- 
ples, the  characteristics  of  truth  and  justice  are 
manifest.  Government,  like  religion,  is  essential 
to  our  happiness,  and  was  designed  by  the  Au- 
thor of  our  being  for  universal  use  ;  it  is  a  proof 
of  the  justice  and  propriety  of  a  scheme  of  gov- 
ernment, as  it  is  of  the  genuineness  of  a  religious 
system,  that  it  may  be  easily  and  universally 
comprehended. 

The  first  act  of  every  other  but  republican 
government  over  the  citizen  is  an  act  of  usurpa- 
tion. Man  issues  from  the  hand  of  his  Maker 
without  any  trammels.  The  moment  any  exter- 
nal restraint  is  put  upon  his  will,  the  condition  of 
nature  is  violated. 

Leave  every  man  in  the  possession  of  his  nat- 
ural prerogatives,  and  a  republic  follows.  Let 
every  one  manage  his  own  business  and  interests, 
and  so  simple  and  common-sense  an  arrange- 
ment unavoidably  establishes  the  same  result. 
No  man  is  conscious  of  having  bartered  away 
his  rights.  You  cannot  divest  him  of  his  vilest 
chattel  without  his  assent ;  can  you  transfer  the 
sura  of  all  his  rights,  not  only  without  his  con- 
sent, but  without  his  knowledge  1  Is  our  prop- 
H 


90  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

erty  so  sacred,  and  our  right  of  property  so  as- 
sailable ?  Is  our  person  inviolable  so  long  as 
we  have  been  guilty  of  no  crime,  and  are  our 
rights  of  person  so  unprotected  and  defenceless  ? 

Transatlantic  politicians  do  yet  strenuously 
contend  that  this  transfer  has  been  made.  How 
is  it  made  to  appear?  Is  it  established  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  susceptible  of  proof,  such  as  would  be 
required  in  a  court  of  justice,  from  a  man  asserting 
a  claim  to  an  article  of  the  most  trivial  value  ? 
or  is  it  absurdly  reasoned  out,  by  the  force  of  a 
mere  abstract  and  unsustained  theor}'  ? 

Other  supporters  of  monarchy  argue  that  some 
government  is  necessary,  and  that  it  is  inexpedi- 
ent to  attempt  an  alteration  of  established  forms, 
hence  endeavouring  to  make  out  the  rectitude 
of  their  favourite  system,  where  it  actually  pre- 
vails, from  eocfediency.  But  this  alleged  inex- 
pediency of  resistance  no  more  rightfully  trans- 
fers our  liberties  to  the  government,  than  the  su- 
perior power  of  a  robber  and  the  inexpediency 
of  resistance  transfer  Ihe  property  in  our  purse. 
The  rights  with  which  we  were  endowed  at 
birth  by  God  and  nature,  must  not  only  be 
shown  to  be  capable  of  transmission,  which 
would  be  the  province  of  theory,  but  to  have 
actually  passed  from  us  otherwise  than  by  vio- 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  91 

lence  or  power,  and  this  is  the  appropriate  prov- 
ince of  fact.  What  force  and  fraud  have  estab- 
lished, reason  will  not  sanction. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  rational  institution 
of  republican  government  has  resulted  in  a  ra- 
tional scheme.  In  a  republic,  each  citizen  man- 
ages his  own  private  interests ;  the  community 
provide  for  common  interests.  As  all  attend  to 
the  concern  of  all,  each  is  constituted  the  guar- 
dian of  his  distributive  share  of  the  common 
weal.  Each  is  a  public  man,  and  has  a  political 
capacity  so  far  as  he  has  public  interests.  Man 
governs  himself,  in  all  his  interests  and  in  all  his 
relations,  as  he  was  made  by  God  and  nature  to 
do.  Neither  one  man  nor  five  hundred  are 
made  the  depositories  of  the  public  wants,  the 
public  wisdom,  or  the  public  weal.  The  state 
becomes  a  union  of  all  for  the  protection  of  all, 
cemented  by  common  interests  and  affections, 
governed  by  the  united  wisdom,  and  protected 
by  the  united  strength.  The  government  pro- 
vides as  for  a  community  of  men  ;  of  equals,  not 
of  inferiors ;  of  moral  beings,  and  not  of  beings 
unendowed  with  the  right  voluntarily  to  re- 
gulate their  own  conduct  agreeably  to  the  dic- 
tates of  their  own  will.  It  provides  for  gov- 
ernmenl  Iry  moral   considerations   and  not  by 


92  SELF-GOVERNMENT, 

force.  The  people  arc  the  sovereigns,  the  goV' 
ernment  their  servant.  The  operation  of  this 
system  presents  no  such  palpable  absurdity  as 
a  people,  apparently,  at  least,  existing  for  its 
government ;  as  the  subordination  of  the  whole 
body  politic  to  the  will  of  a  part ;  for,  be  it  re- 
membered, the  struggle  is  not,  properly  speak- 
ing, between  the  many  and  the  few,  but  between 
a  part  and  the  whole.  If  government  be  "  a 
provision  of  human  wisdom  for  human  wants," 
a  republic  is  the  only  proper  form  of  govern- 
ment, as  it  is  the  only  one  ever  expressly  and 
solely  instituted  with  that  view,  pursuing  no  in- 
dependent and  extraneous  objects,  and  furnished 
with  no  superfluous  powers.*  It  presents  the 
stitctest  and  most  rigid  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends.  It  exhibits  the  contrivance  of  skill  and 
wisdom,  and  evinces  its  own  elevated  design.  It 
vindicates  its  own  character,  by  exhibiting  inter- 
nal evidence  of  an  intelligent  and  provisionary 
origin,  free  from  any  ingredient  of  accident  or 
injustice.  It  has,  and  can  have,  no  separate  and 
independent  existence  apart  from  the  people.  It 
subsists  only  as  a  government.     It  has  no  indi- 

*  Si  vero  jus  suum  populi  teneant  *  *  *  domini  sint  legum, 
judiciorum,  belli,  pacis,  foederum,  capitis  unius  cujusque,  pecu- 
niae, hanc  unam  rite  rempublicam,  id  est,  rem  populi  appellari 
putant— Cicero,  De  Repub.,  1.  i.,  c.  32. 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  93 

viduality.  The  officer  and  the  office  are  not 
identified.  When  not  in  the  discharge  of  official 
acts,  the  officer  sinks  into  the  citizen  ;  and  this 
is  one  of  the  most  striking  tests  of  legitimate 
government.  If  the  good  of  the  nation  to  be 
secured  in  the  administration  of  its  affairs  be  the 
object  of  government,  and  that  it  is  even  the  am- 
bition of  despots  often  proclaims,  all  its  legitimate 
powers  must  be  subordinate  to  this  end,  and  ev- 
ery quality  or  prerogative  inappropriate  thereto, 
or  that  naturally  and  obviously  transcends  that 
limit,  is  evidently  a  fraud  and  usurpation  upon 
the  government's  superior.  Look  at  Great  Brit- 
ain, with  its  king  that,  in  the  eye  of  the  Consti- 
tution, "  can  do  no  wrong,"  and  its  Parliament 
that  is  "  omnipotent."  These  are  the  attributes 
of  the  Almighty,  and,  as  no  modification  of  hu- 
manity, whether  individual  or  associated,  can 
acquire  them,  so  no  human  power  can  lawfully 
exercise  that  absolute  authority  which  is  predi- 
cated upon  them. 

But  how  does  republican  government  subsist, 
so  grave  and  simple  in  its  exterior,  allied  to  no 
living  blood,  confederate  with  no  selfish  interests ; 
that  inflicts  no  fear  but  that  of  disobeying  its 
laws,  and  imposes  no  subjection  but  a  voluntary 
subjection  of  the  will  of  man  in  conformity  with 


94  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

the  rules  of  justice,  to  the  dominion  of  his  rea- 
son? Does  the  republican  scheme  make  suffi- 
cient provision  for  proper  control,  for  proper  in- 
tegrity, proper  intelligence,  and  proper  force  ? 

The  general  opinion  that  republican  govern- 
ment requires  for  its  basis  an  unusual  amount  of 
virtue,  is  one  that  adds  but  little  to  the  energy 
of  benevolent  efforts  for  the  promotion  of  good 
morals  (best  left  to  their  own  appropriate  con- 
siderations), while  it  has  a  strong  negative  influ- 
ence in  deterring  enlightened  minds  from  favour- 
ing liberal  efforts,  and  nations  from  making  the 
experiment  of  freedom. 

In  reality,  the  virtue  it  requires  is  the  virtue 
which  almost  necessarily  results  from  our  having 
a  moral  nature ;  a  degree  so  low,  that  no  state 
nor  nation  can,  under  any  circumstances,  be  sup- 
posed to  be  destitute  of  it.  For,  while  we  are 
not,  on  the  one  hand,  to  suppose  men  to  be  per- 
fect, and  presume  upon  that  perfection  as  a  ba- 
sis for  our  political  systems,  neither  should  we, 
on  the  other  hand,  suppose  them  to  be  depressed 
to  the  lowest  extreme  of  vice,  and  from  hence 
deduce  their  inabilty  to  govern  themselves ;  but, 
in  all  our  speculations,  consider  them  as  being, 
what  they  really  are,  mingled  masses  of  good 
and  evil. 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  95 

It  is,  however,  common  to  treat  of  self-gov- 
ernment as  if  it  required  a  moral  power  of  self- 
restraint  in  individuals,  as  effiectual  for  the  pur- 
poses of  civil  control  as  law  is  in  aristocratic 
and  monarchical  counti'ies.  The  subject  is  rea- 
soned upon  as  if  each  individual,  whenever  a 
dispute  arises  between  him  and  his  neighbour, 
were  required  to  be  his  own  judge  and  his  own 
executioner,  and  political  self-government  ren- 
dered essential  that  superhuman  excellence  which 
would  lead  a  man,  under  such  circumstances,  to 
lay  down  and  enforce,  with  absolute  impartiality, 
as  against  himself,  the  perfect  demands  of  jus- 
tice.    Now  such  is  by  no  means  the  case. 

Republican  communities  have  two  offices  to 
discharge  :  in  the  first  place,  to  define  and  settle 
what  the  law  shall  be,  and,  secondly,  to  secure 
it.«  prompt  administration. 

They  do  not  legislate  for  particular  cases  and 
individual  instances  as  they  arise  any  more  than 
other  governments,  nor  (as  we  have  no  such  di- 
visions) for  separate  classes,  but  by  general  rules, 
which  must  have  a  uniform  operation.  Thus 
they  enact  that  property  shall  be  taxed  a  certain 
per  centage,  independently  of  its  amount  or  its 
owner ;  that  it  shall  be  acquired  by  a  certain 
title,  which  shall  be  applied  indiscriminately  to 


96  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

all  cases  of,  acquisition ;  that  a  certain  conduct 
which  it  defines  shall  constitute  a  crime,  and  be 
followed  by  a  prescribed  and  definite  punish- 
ment, whoever  may  be  guilty  of  it.  In  other 
words,  they  are,  like  other  civilized  communities, 
communities  of  laws.  They  cannot  plunder  the 
rich,  for  rich  and  poor  are  denominations  utterly 
unknown  to  the  laws ;  they  cannot  punish  ob- 
noxious individuals  who  have  been  guilty  of  no 
crime,  for  they  pass  no  ex  jtost  facto  laws.  There 
is  no  room  for  discrimination  among  individuals, 
and  the  distinction  of  separate  and  distinct  po- 
litical classes  does  not  exist. 

It  is  clear  that,  under  such  circumstances,  the 
law  of  justice  will  form  the  rule  of  legislative 
conduct,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  particular 
and  accidental  shade  of  the  moral  character  of  a 
people. 

Because,  first,  the  separate  interests  and  pas- 
sions of  large  multitudes  of  people  drawing  in 
different  directions,  the  law  of  justice  furnishes 
the  only  practicable  basis  for  a  general  rule. 
Justice  alone  can  harmonize  and  reconcile  these 
various  and  conflicting  interests  and  passions.  "  It 
is  the  only  neutral  ground  on  which  all  parties 
can  meet.  There  are  no  political  classes ;  the 
con' est  is  between  individuals.     No  individual 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  97 

will  can  be  predominant,  because  individuals  are 
equal.  Their  particular  interests  are  all  different ; 
their  common  interest  only  is  the  same ;  and  the 
law  of  justice  is  their  common  interest.  It  is, 
therefore,  the  only  available  ground  of  compro- 
mise ;  and  if  republican  communities  harmonize 
at  all,  that  is,  if  they  can  exist  at  all,  it  must  be 
by  adopting  it  as  the  basis  of  their  convention. 

Secondly,  all  men  are,  in  a  greater  or  less  de- 
gree, moral ;  all  men  are  sufficiently  moral 
where  neither  passion  nor  interest  perverts  the 
decisions  of  conscience.  Ask  any  man  to  an- 
nounce a  general  rule  where  he  thus  stands  in- 
different, and  he  will  give  you  a  sufficiently  fault- 
less one.  Republican  government  thus  separates 
the  legislator  from  the  impulses  of  passion  and 
the  solicitations  of  private  interest,  and  calls  on 
him  to  pronounce  a  just  general  rule.  If  he  can 
do  this,  he  has  all  the  necessary  moral  qualifica- 
tion for  a  republican  citizen  as  a  legislator ;  and 
if  he  be  morally  incompetent  to  do  this,  he  can- 
not justly  be  made  amenable  for  any  part  of  his 
conduct  to  any  human  government  or  tribunal. 
In  his  capacity  as  legislator,  he  views  questions 
of  right  and  wrong  in  the  abstract.  To  suppose 
a  man,  when  thus  disinterested  and  unimpassion- 
ed,  coolly  to  announce  a  palpably  unjust  law,  is 


98  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

to  suppose  him  possessed  of  a  degree  of  depravity 
rarely,  if  ever,  found  in  any  individual  of  the 
species,  and  which  can  never  exist  in  communi- 
ties until  the  race  becomes  too  abandoned  to 
subsist  upon  the  earth. 

Finally,  whether  honesty  be  the  best  policy 
for  all  individuals  and  under  all  circumstances, 
universally,  there  may  be  men  found  to  question, 
and  specific  instances  of  successful  roguery  may 
be  appealed  to  for  proof;  but  that,  as  a  general 
rule,  applied  to  numerous  instances,  to  communi- 
ties of  men  and  long  periods  of  time,  so  as  to 
exempt  the  general  and  natural  operation  of 
things  from  chance  or  accident,  the  rule  of  jus- 
tice prescribes  the  most  expedient  course  of  con- 
duct, there  is  no  more  doubt  than  that  God  made 
the  universe.  To  dispute  it  would  be  to  deny 
the  natural  authority  of  morals — nay,  would  be 
to  enter  into  conflict  with  the  universal  experi- 
ence and  express  testimony  of  mankind.  When, 
therefore,  one  invariable  rule  must  be  adopted 
for  all,  who  doubts  that  men,  suppose  them  to 
be  as  bad  as  they  ever  actually  are,  will  adopt, 
for  the  internal  regulation  of  their  own  society, 
the  law  of  justice  as  the  most  expedient,  if  not  as 
the  most  just  1  It  has  been  long  since  noted  that 
even  a  community  of  pirates  will  insist  on  the 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  99 

most  rigid  application  of  that  law  among  them- 
selves.* If,  therefore,  we  could  suppose  men  to 
be  utterly  destitute  of  moral  principle,  and  sim- 
ply alive  to  their  own  interest,  we  could  not 
doubt  that  they  would  still  adopT  the  laws  of 
justice  as  the  best  conventional  rules.  The  citi- 
zens of  republics,  in  their  legislative  capacity, 
not  being  able  to  separate  their  private  interest, 
under  the  generalities  of  the  law,  from  the  pub- 
lic weal,  the  same  rule  which  governs  the  case 
of  their  neighbour  prevailing  likewise  in  their 
own,  interest  and  duty  concur  in  practically  in- 
troducing the  great  rule  of  Christian  morality 
into  republican  legislation. 

These  considerations  cannot  be  estimated  in 
figures,  nor  can  their  conclusiveness  be  set  down 
in  the  form  of  a  mathematical  demonstration; 
yet  I  hesitate  not  to  affirm  that  they  amount  to  a 
sufficient  degree  of  moral  certainty  to  risk  any 
human  interest  upon.  Monarchists  must  either 
assent  to  the  moral  ability  of  man  for  self-gov- 
ernment, or  take  refuge  under  the  philosophy  of 
Hobbes,  that  where  men  are  left  in  a  state  of  na- 
ture, without  restraint,  their  natural  condition  is 
that  of  war  and  depredation  upon  one  another, 
and  add  to  this  that  such  a  condition  is  their  de- 
liberate choice  and  preference. 

»  ,-: Ho  nfn.-;i»  lib.  u  .  c.  II. 


100  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

It  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  the  existence  of 
republics  requires  a  perfect  moral  self-control 
to  be  actually  exerted  by  individuals  in  their 
private  conduct.  Its  establishment  is  no  more 
based  on  so  absurd  a  requisition  than  that  of 
any  other  form  of  government.  It  expects  no 
more  than  other  governments  of  its  citizens.  It 
depends  not  so  much  on  moral  action  as  on  mor- 
al resolution  (with  which  the  most  infirm  speci- 
mens of  humanity  are  sufficiently  provided),  and 
that  not  only  where  a  failure  to  act  morally  is  vis- 
ited wuth  the  natural  consequences  of  vicious  ex- 
cesses, but  where  a  failure  to  resolve  morally  is 
visited  with  barbarism  instead  of  civilization, 
and  a  state  of  unrestricted  violence  and  plunder 
in  place  of  the  dominion  of  law.  Laws  are 
merely  the  resolidions  of  community  to  abide  by 
and  enforce  the  principles  of  justice. 

Look  into  republican  legislation  on  all  funda- 
mental laws :  what  an  almost  universal  concur- 
rence of  minds — what  an  almost  perfect  unanim- 
ity of  opinions.  On  all  questions  respecting  con- 
tracts and  redress  for  the  violation  of  them,  re- 
specting property,  respecting  evidence,  respect- 
ing crime  and  its  punishment,  respecting  the 
organization  of  courts  and  sectional  administra- 
tions, there  is  hardly  the  slightest  diversity.   The 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  101 

public  at  large  scarcely  take  any  interest  in  them, 
because  of  the  unqualified  confidence  they  feel 
in  the  result.  In  most  of  our  states  complete 
codes  of  laws  have  been  passed  at  a  single  ses- 
sion, and  without  interrupting  the  ordinary  busi- 
ness of  legislation,  or  unduly  protracting  the  sit- 
ting. On  all  the  great,  vital,  fundamental  points, 
legislators  are  immediately  agreed.  Almost  all 
party  disputes  are,  in  comparison,  of  infinitely 
subordinate  consequence,  not  affecting,  in  a 
scarcely  perceptible  degree,  our  individual  liber- 
ties, our  fortunes,  or  our  happiness.  Their  final 
settlement  often  occupies  but  a  sentence  in  the 
statute-book — they  are  about  matters  for  the 
most  part  of  commercial  regulation  or  of  inter- 
nal improvement,  best  left  to  themselves — agita- 
ting the  propriety  of  taking  private  interests 
under  the  public  guardianship.  Those  points  of 
legislation  about  which  men  differ  so  much  in  re- 
publics are,  mostly,  not  matters  of  justice  at  all, 
or  involving,  in  the  slightest  degree,  the  moral 
capabilities  of  mankind  for  self-government,  but 
merely  subordinate  matters  of  public  policy ;  and 
it  may  well  be  conjectured  that,  when  the  busi- 
ness of  government  shall  be  restricted  to  its  prop- 
er sphere,  political  and  party  strife,  such  as  is 
now  known,  will  be  abolished  forever.     The  ne- 


102  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

cessaries  of  legislation,  like  the  necessaries  of 
human  life,  are  cheap  and  of  easy  acquirement ; 
it  is  the  superfluities  that  cost  the  greatest  toil, 
and  expense,  and  difficulty. 

As  the  legislative  duties  of  a  republican  com- 
munity do  not  require  an  extraordinary  amount 
of  moral  integrity  among  a  people,  so  neither  do 
its  executive  functions. 

De  Tocqueville  thinks  us  in  no  danger  from 
the  weakness  of  our  administration,  but  rather 
from  its  strength.* 

We  feel  that  the  force  of  the  community  is  our 
own  force;  we  feel  that  its  executive  energies 
are  employed  to  enforce  our  own  wills ;  it  com- 
mands all  the  moral  strength  of  a  virtuous  appro- 
bation, because  we  know  that  its  determinations 
are  the  nearest  practicable  approximation  to  ab- 
solute justice ;  but,  above  all,  we  feel  that  our  pri- 
vate interest  is  entirely  implicated  in  the  public 
weal.  The  innate  sense  of  justice  universally 
pervading  the  mass,  governing  the  good  by  the 
excellency  of  its  own  nature,  the  indifferent  by 
a  regard  to  their  own  interest,  the  bad  by  a  con- 

*  "  In  my  opinion,  the  main  evil  of  the  present  democratic  in- 
Btitutions  of  the  United  States  does  not  arise,  as  is  often  asserted 
in  Europe,  from  their  weakness,  but  from  their  overpowering 
strength." — Democracy  in  America,  chap.  xv. 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  103 

viction  of  its  prevalence  and  power,  and  exert- 
ing upon  all  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  the  sanc- 
tion of  conscience,  gives  to  republican  govern- 
ment that  silent  but  sovereign  power  that  sways 
the  state.  It  is  the  strong  presumption  of  justice 
arisinff  in  favour  of  the  laws  that  makes  the 
stalF  of  a  petty  constable  as  potential  as  the  ca- 
duceus  of  a  Mercury,  and  confers  on  one,  as  the 
officer  of  the  laws,  the  executive  power  of  all. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  the  efficacy  of  that  princi- 
ple that  all  should  be  invariably  just,  nor  does  it 
assume  any  imaginary  perfectibility  in  the  spe- 
cies. The  efficiency  of  its  support  is  predicated 
upon  the  fact  that  men  in  general,  without  any 
particular  interest  of  their  own  in  view,  or  any 
private  passion  to  gratify,  will  concur  in  the  ulti- 
mate decision  of  tribunals  of  their  own  institu- 
tion as  just,  and  will  feel  that  in  maintaining  the 
rights  and  interests  of  others  as  settled  by  them, 
they  are  actually  establishing  the  firmest  legal 
guaranty  of  their  own.  Republican  government 
does  not  rely  upon  the  state  of  the  public  morals, 
but  upon  the  union  of  the  virtuous  impulses  of  a 
moral  nature  with  the  strong  motives  of  a  person- 
al interest ;  and,  whatever  doubts  may  be  enter- 
tained, under  various  possible  circumstances,  of 
the  sufficiency  of  either  separately,  there  can  be 


104  SELF-GOVEKNMENT. 

no  doubt  of  their  being  all-sufficient  in  a  state 
of  combination. 

If  an  individual  be  not  thus  the  best  guardian 
of  his  own  interest,  it  may  be  doubted  wheth- 
er republican  governments  have  any  sufficient 
ground  of  reliance.  It  must  then  be  asked 
whether  any  other  system  proposes  a  better.  Is 
there  any  system  which  offers  a  better  guaranty 
for  good  government  than  the  alliance  of  duty 
with  the  strong  natural  impulses  of  self-interest  1 
Do  monarchy  and  aristocracy  present  instances  in 
which  the  fellow-feeling  of  the  higher  ranks  and 
orders  have  provided  a  better  security  for  the 
masses  than  the  self-interest  of  those  masses 
would  have  provided  for  themselves?  cases  in 
which  benevolence  has  proved  stronger  than  self- 
love  ?  cases  in  which  humanity  has  outstripped 
Divinity,  and  done  works  of  supererogation,  by 
loving  its  neighbours  better  than  itself?  What 
moral  securities  do  they  furnish  ?  Doubtless, 
abundant,  that  they  will  govern  us  enough;  but 
what  security  that  they  will  not  govern  us  too 
much  ?  What  that  they  will  govern  themselves  ? 
Duty,  perhaps,  but  not  self-interest;  for  here  these 
are  found  in  apparent,  if  not  real  collision;  al- 
ways seeming  and  seen  to  be  hostile. 

But,  if  they  do  not  provide  better  moral,  do 


SELF-GOVERNMENT.  105 

they  provide  better  intellectual  guaranties  for 
good  government  ?    With  just  the  same  kind  of 
wisdom  and  skill  will  a  people  manage  their  po- 
litical as  their  private  affairs ;  that  is,  in  a  man- 
ner always  proportioned  and  suitable  to  their 
circumstances.      The    intelligent    chemist    may 
think  he  can  manage  ptactical  agriculture  better 
than  the  poor  farmer ;  but  he  will  find,  on  exper- 
iment, that  the  farmer  will  make  a  fortune  where 
he  will  lose  one.     So  it  is  throughout  every  de- 
partment  of  human   life.      Everybody   under- 
stands his  own  business  and  his  own  wants  best, 
and  individual  skill  and  personal  interest  make 
the  best  provision  for  them.     These  are  truths 
which  political  economy  has  been  slow  to  de- 
velop; for  the  governments  of  the  Old  World, 
after  having  kindly  undertaken  the  guardianship 
of  a  race  thrown  by  an  improvident  Creator  upon 
the  earth,  utterly  unprovided,  as  is  said,  with 
requisite   moral    capabilities,  have   undertaken, 
quite  consistently  with  the  regulation  of  the  ex- 
ternal relations  of  mankind,  that  of  their  private 
business  also  !     The  "  let  alone"  principle,  which 
the  political  economists  have  at  length  so  success- 
fully demonstrateil,  extends  also  to  the  region  of 
politics.     W^hat  does  the  palace  know  of  the  ne- 
cessities of  the  cottage  1  or  how  can  a  central 
I 


106  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

administration  be  informed  of  popular  wants 
so  well  as  those  who  have  suffered  them,  or  un- 
derstand so  well  the  operation  of  laws  as  those 
who  judge  from  a  personal  experience?  No 
form  of  government  could  have  less  of  a  prac- 
tical nature  than  a  monarchy  or  an  aristocracy. 
None  could  be  more  ignorant  of  detail  or  of 
facts;  while  republican  government  is,  through- 
out its  whole  administration,  entirely  based  on 
the  closest  and  most  rigid  deductions  of  those 
who  have  had  a  practical  and  experimental 
knowledge  of  the  evils  to  be  redressed,  and  of 
the  various  expedients  that  have  been  devised  to 
redress  them. 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  107 


CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Origin  and  Supports  of  Monarchical  Government. 

Having  seen  that  mankind  are  free  by  nature, 
and  not  less  competent  to  govern  themselves 
than  to  sustain  the  responsibility  of  moral  beings, 
let  us  trace,  as  far  as  we  can,  historically,  the  ac- 
tual origin  of  monarchical  governments,  and  see 
by  what  plea  the  usurpers  of  human  rights  justify 
their  supremacy. 

Most  writers  are -pleased  to  consider  the  con- 
dition of  the  primitive  families  as  exhibiting  the 
image  of  monarchical  governments,  to  which 
they  therefore  assign  the  rank  of  the  highest 
antiquity;  while  monarchists  plume  themselves 
upon  this  assumed  fact  as  an  argument  in  favour 
of  the  simplicity  of  their  favourite  system,  and  of 
its  natural  conformity  to  the  wants  of  man.  But 
those  who  have  no  preconceived  theories  to  sup- 
port will  be  puzzled  to  discover,  in  the  Mosaic 
account  of  the  first  age  of  mankind,  the  features 
of  any  political  organization.  Different  families 
lived,  without  any  common  superior,  upon  the 
footing  of  distinct  and  independent  nations.     The 


108  monaiiciiical  government. 

only  kind  of  authority  known  was  that  of  a  father 
over  his  children,  springing  voluntarily  from  rev- 
erence and  filial  love.  Among  us,  that  authority 
over  the  primitive  famihes  has  acquired  the  des- 
ignation of  'patriarchal  government.  But  it  can- 
not with  any  propriety  be  called,  in  the  political 
sense  of  the  term,  a  form  of  government.  It  was 
not  different  in  its  nature  from  what  family  gov- 
ernment now  is,  and  has  been  in  all  ages.  The 
same  power  has  subsisted  since,  not  only  under 
the  sanction  of  law,  in  far  greater  perfection,  but 
(as  under  the  Roman  government,  embracing 
the  most  absolute  disposal  of  propert)',  person, 
and  life)  to  a  far  greater  extent.  When  gov- 
ernments followed,  this  paternal  authority  was 
not  superseded.  Not  supplying  the  place  of 
government,  it  cannot  properly  be  characterized, 
as  such.  Society  may  strictly  be  said  to  have 
subsisted,  during  its  primitive  age,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  all  government. 

When  revealed  to  us  at  its  next  stage,  fami- 
lies have  become  tribes;  domestic  have  given 
place  to  political  relations;  the  ties  of  habit 
and  association  supply  the  place  of  the  more  in- 
timate ties  of  kindred,  and  an  experience  of  the 
benefits  resulting  from  numerous  counsel,  con- 
centrated power,  and  mutual  defence,  cements 
their  vet  free  and  v-^luntn"/  nnion 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  109 

Jefferson  describes  our  Indians  as  beino-  evi- 
dently  in  this  state.  "  Every  man  with  them," 
he  writes,  "  is  perfectly  free  to  follow  his  owi 
inclinations.  But  if  in  doing  this  he  violates  the 
rights  of  another,  if  the  case  be  slight,  he  is  pun- 
ished by  the  disesteem  of  his  society,  or,  as  we 
say,  by  public  opinion ;  if  serious,  he  is  toma- 
hawked as  a  dangerous  enemy.  Their  leaders 
conduct  them  by  the  influence  of  their  character 
only ;  and  they  follow  or  not,  as  they  please,  him 
of  whose  character  for  wisdom  or  war  they  have 
the  highest  opinion.  Hence  the  origin  of  the 
parties  among  them  adhering  to  different  leaders, 
and  governed  by  their  advice,  not  by  their  com- 
mand." "  The  Cherokees,"  continues  Jefferson, 
"  the  only  tribe  I  know  to  be  contemplating  the 
establishment  of  regular  laws,  magistrates,  and 
government,  propose  a  government  af  represent- 
atives elected  from  every  town.  Of  all  things, 
the  least  they  think  of  is  subjecting  themselves  to 
the  will  of  one  man.  This,  the  only  instance  of 
actual  fact  within  our  knowledge,  will  be,  then, 
a  beginning  by  republican,  and  not  by  patri- 
archal or  monarchical  government,  as  specula- 
tive writers  have  generally  conjectured." 

The  transient  glimpses  of  history  that  reveal 
to  us  the  early  condition  of  the  Greeks,  Gauls, 


110  MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

Britains,  and  Germans,  exhibit  a  state  of  societj 
exactly  similar  in  all  respects  to  that  described 
by  Jefferson,  and  of  the  utmost  possible  freedom 
of  organization. 

They  are  wrong,  therefore,  who  represent 
primitive  man  as  readily  and  naturally  submit- 
ting himself  to  his  father  as  a  king,  and  to  his 
chief  as  a  despot. 

At  the  next  stage  of  observation,  the  tribe 
forms  a  nation,  with  a  king  at  its  head ;  but  in 
the  intervening  period,  its  domestic  struggles 
have  not  been  of  sufficient  importance  to  attract 
the  notice  of  history.  We,  however,  do  know 
the  wild  and  intractable  nature  of  man  in  his 
native  state ;  how  jealous  of  his  independence  ; 
how  impatient  of  control ;  and  we  ourselves 
have  felt  that  the  original  instincts  implanted  in 
our  breasts,  the  natural  dictates  of  our  under- 
standings, are  all  in  favour  of  personal  independ- 
ence. The  voluntary  subjugation  of  one's  own 
will  to  that  of  another  would  be  the  last  act  of 
cultivated  man.  Even  on  the  hypothesis  that 
such  an  act  be,  under  certain  limitations,  politi- 
cally necessary,  by  what  reasons  could  a  semi- 
barbarian  have  been  convinced  of  it?  The 
doomed  subject,  under  any  circumstances,  would 
be  the  last  to  perceive  or  to  recognise  the  neces- 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  Ill 

sity ;  the  superior,  the  first  to  anticipate  his  do- 
minion ;  and  this  antagonist  position  must  have 
been  sufficient  of  itself  to  have  throvi'n  the  two 
parties  into  forcible  collision. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  monarchical  gov- 
ernment has  its  foundation  in  the  successful  usur- 
pation of  arbitrary  power  by  an  individual.  Its 
origin  may  be  referred  to  two  distinct  periods  in 
the  history  of  human  society ;  the  first,  as  we 
have  seen,  succeeding  immediately  after  the  pri- 
meval distribution  of  mankind  into  tribes ;  the 
second,  an  advanced  period,  which  takes  date 
from  the  fatal  termination  of  republics.  In  the 
first  case  it  is  the  offspring  of  a  barbarous,  in  the 
last,  of  a  corrupt  age.  In  both  cases  it  supplants 
free  governments. 

If  any  doubt  arise  as  to  the  means  by  which 
the  first  revolution  was  achieved,  from  the  ab- 
sence of  direct  historical  information,  it  must  be 
entirely  removed  by  the  analogy  which  the  con- 
version of  free  into  absolute  government  in  the 
latter  period  furnishes  for  its  solution.  No  man 
will  contend  that  society  required  at  its  most  ad- 
vanced stages  of  cultivation  and  refinement  harsh- 
er means  to  sway  it  than  in  the  iron  age.  That 
Ca}sar  or  Bonaparte  was  less  scrupulous  of 
means  than  a  chief  dealing  with  semi-barbarousr 


112  MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

or  savage  people.  It  must,  then,  be  allowed, 
that  monarchy,  at  both  stages  alike,  has  taken  its 
original  in  fraud,  violence,  and  usurpation  :  that 
it  was  instituted,  not  for  the  nation,  but  the  man  j 
not  to  answer  the  rational  ends  of  human  gov- 
ernment, but  to  gratify  the  cupidity  of  human 
ambition.* 

The  issue,  therefore,  between  republican  and 
monarchical  governments  is,  whether  the  vices 
or  the  wisdom  of  man  have  made  the  best  pro- 
vision for  human  wants. 

Thus  originating,  it  becomes  matter  of  curi- 
ous inquiry,  by  what  plea  is  monarchical  govern- 
ment sanctioned  1  how  does  it  commend  itself 
to  the  reason  of  man?  to  what  fundamental 
principles  does  it  appeal  ? 

Are  European  constitutions  professedly  the 
result  of  a  people's  judgment  on  what  is  best  or 
what  is  right  ?  Are  they  founded  on  the  actual 
condition  of  things  as  the  best  provision  for  the 
present  ?  Are  they  the  choice  of  the  generation 
for  whom  they  are  designed  ? 

The  direct  contrary  of  all  this.  They  are  es- 
tablished by  precedent,  and  ascertained  by  refer- 
ence to  the  musty  records  of  centuries  long  since 
past,  and  the  practice  of  generations  long  since 
*  See  Burlamaqui,  Nat.  and  Pol.  Law,  booki.,  c.  ii. 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  113 

dead.  The  whole  order  of  nature  is  reversed  ; 
the  past  is  placed  in  front  of  the  present,  and  the 
dead  prescribe  law  to  the  living. 

"  The  queen  of  slaves, 
The  hoodwink'd  angel  of  the  blind  and  dead, 
Ctuitom,  with  iron  mace,  points  to  the  graves 
Where  her  own  standard  desolately  waves." 

If  interrogated  by  the  whole  body  of  the  na- 
tion, "  By  what  right  do  you  rule  ?"  no  sover- 
eign would  dare  refer  it  to  their  consideration, 
that  the  established  government  subsists  because 
it  is  in  its  frame  the  best ;  it  is  of  the  nature  of 
monarchical  and  aristocratic  governments  to  de- 
bar their  subjects  from  the  decision  of  that  ques- 
tion. The  monarch's  only  justification  is,  "  I 
have  ruled,  therefore  I  rule."  The  government 
can  only  say,  "  We  have  exercised  this  power  in 
time  past,  therefore  we  exercise  it  now."  What 
does  this  indicate  but  an  origin  in  force  ?  what 
better  right  than  the  right  of  the  strongest  ? 

Monarchy  is  undoubtedly  a  government  of 
force.  Why  not  yield  the  reins  to  the  people  1 
"  Because,"  its  plea  is,  "  they  would  not  govern 
themselves  wisely  or  justly."  Would  not  the 
monarch  and  his  agents  and  ministers  still  con- 
stitute parts  of  the  nation  ?  "  Undoubtedly  ;  but 
the  people  would  not  listen  \o  them."     How  is  it 


1  14  MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

better  under  a  monarchy  1  "  Because  the  gov- 
ernment has  the  power  to  coerce."  Thus  any 
apology  for  monarchical  government  must  re- 
solve itself  into  an  acknowledgment  tliat  it  is  a 
government  of  force.  Indeed,  the  designation 
of  "subjects,"  given  to  every  individual  of  the 
nation  but  one,  implies  as  much.  All  modern 
European  governments  are  immediately  derived 
from  the  feudal  system — an  institution  of  the  dark 
ages,  designed  to  maintain  subjection  among  a 
conquered  people  and  in  a  conquered  country — 
a  kind  of  martial  law  incorporated  with  the  civil 
jurisprudence.  This  system  has  never  been  rev- 
olutionized, but  only  meliorated  ;  and  it  is  unde- 
niable that  all  the  governments  of  monarchical 
and  civilized  Europe  are  but  mere  meliorations 
of  Gothic  tyranny. 

Monarchical  government  claims  to  subsist  by 
prescriptive  right,  \vhich,  as  applicable  to  such  a 
subject,  is  no  better  than  a  right  by  conquest,  the 
actual  foundation  of  it. 

Prescription  can  of  itself  confer  no  right.  It 
IS  merely  a  legal  presumption,  and,  as  such,  no- 
thing more  than  a  rule  of  evidence.  By  virtue 
of  it,  an  uninterrupted  possession  for  an  indefi- 
nite period,  under  a  claim  of  right,  is  sufficient 
evidence,  in  the  absence  of  conflicting  circum* 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  115 

stances,  of  a  grant  from  him  or  them  in  whom 
the  absolute  propriety  had  been  last  known,  in 
the  view  of  the  law,  to  reside.  If  the  presump- 
tion be  rebutted,  the  prescription  fails.  If  a  claim 
be  acknowledgedly  unjust  in  its  inception,  no 
mere  lapse  of  time  can  impart  to  it  any  sanction 
or  validity.  Prescription,  therefore,  never  has  al- 
tered, nor  can  it  alter,  the  absolute  rights  of  par- 
ties. As  constituted  by  any  limited  period  of 
time,  it  is  not  known  to  morals.  As  famiharized 
to  us,  it  is  purely  a  conventional  principle,  volun- 
tarily adopted  by  a  settled  community  in  a  spirit 
of  compromise,  that  the  quiet  of  society  may  not 
be  disturbed  by  endless  litigations,  and  the  pos- 
session of  property  unsettled  by  continued  and 
violent  changes.  Men  only  agree  by  that  rule 
how  far  they  will  investigate  their  absolute  rights, 
and  what  limitations  they  will  put  to  the  reme- 
dial power  of  their  laws.  In  this,  therefore,  the 
leoal  sense  of  the  term,  it  cannot  subsist  in  the 
absence  of  express  enactment,  nor  without  the 
voluntary  concurrence  of  those  to  be  bound  by 
it.  Our  codes  of  morals  know  no  statutes  of 
limitations. 

Even  if  the  rule  of  prescription  were  appli 
cable  in  its  utmost  latitude,  ten  thousand  years 
of  usurpation  would  not  establish,  in  the  eye  of 


116  MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

morals,  the  justice  of  an  existing  government,  as 
no  length  of  time  can  win  from  morals  a  sanc- 
tion for  what  has  undeniably  taken  its  origin  in 
force.  Nay,  the  most  unequivocal  renunciation 
of  human  rights,  which  are  in  their  nature  inal- 
ienable, could  only  indicate  in  what  temporary 
and  responsible  agents  certain  delegated  powers 
had  been  reposed,  upon  which  the  people  would 
still  be  at  any  time  at  liberty  to  deliberate  in  their 
sovereign  capacity,  and  which  they  would  be  left 
free  at  any  time  to  resume.  On  how  flimsy  a 
pretext  are  the  most  inexorable  tyrannies  erect- 
ed !  It  is  not  less  an  insult  to  the  human  under- 
standing than  an  injury  to  human  rights,  that  a 
kind  of  government  which  confessedly  originated 
in  fraud  and  injustice,  and  which,  even  in  its 
most  enlightened  stages,  gives  to  its  people  the 
name  of  subjects,  should  adduce  its  power  in 
proof  of  its  justice,  and  claim  to  rule  for  ages  to 
come  simply  because  it  had  succeeded  in  main- 
taining subjection  for  ages  past. 

Prescription,  as  it  is  familiarized  to  us,  relates 
to  property,  and  monarchists  claim  "  to  receive, 
to  hold,  to  transmit  their  government  and  their 
privileges  in  the  same  manner  in  which  they  en- 
joy and  transmit  their  property  and  their  lives." 
But  government  is  not  of  the  nature  of  property  j 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  117 

it  is  not  acquired  by  the  same  means,  held  by  the 
same  right,  or  capable  of  transmission  on  the 
same  principles. 

Our  right  to  property,  and  our  right  to  transmit 
it  to  our  descendants,  are  not,  as  some  have  suppo- 
sed, dependant  upon  the  law  of  the  land  or  upon 
any  human  convention ;  they  are  natural  rights. 

Nature,  in  giving  to  man  existence,  imparted 
to  him  also,  at  the  same  time,  a  right  to  maintain 
it;  and  not  only  to  use  her  bountiful  provisions 
for  his  absolute  sustenance,  but  for  his  lawful  en. 
joyment,  and  the  proper  cultivation  and  develop- 
ment of  his  natural  faculties.  To  this  end  indi- 
vidual appropriation  was  requisite.  The  natural 
sense  of  mankind  suggested  prior  occupancy  as 
the  mode  of  appropriation,  and  it  became,  there- 
fore, the  original  groundwork  and  legitimate 
mark  of  property.  Civil  society  did  not  institute 
this  order  of  things,  but  received  it  as  already 
established  by  nature,  and  has  merely  surrounded. 
It  with  positive  sanctions.  Nor  are  present  ine- 
qualities in  what  was  originally  and  naturally 
common  stock,  at  variance  with  the  theory  of  the 
natural  origin  of  the  right  of  property ;  these 
inequalities  are  but  an  obvious  consequence  of 
the  original  appropriation. 

We  have  offspring,  helpless  beyond  all  com- 


118  MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

parison  with  those  of  other  races,  and  Nature 
evidently  imposes  upon  us  the  obligation  to  main- 
tain and  provide  for  them.  It  is  a  duty  we  owe 
to  them  and  to  society,  having  been  the  occasion 
of  bringing  them  into  the  world.  Hence,  by 
every  means  within  our  reach,  we  ought  to  pro- 
vide for  the  supply  of  their  wants  in  such  a  man- 
ner that  their  existence  may  be  a  blessing  to 
themselves,  and  their  addition  the  ornament  and 
strength  of  society.  Such,  however,  are  the  ac- 
cidents of  human  life,  that  the  state  of  helpless 
infancy  sometimes  may,  and  such  is  the  ordinance 
of  Nature  that  it  ordinarily  must,  be  prolonged 
beyond  the  death  of  its  parentage.  It  is  evident- 
ly, therefore,  the  intention  of  Nature  that  the  ac- 
cumulations of  our  lives  be  transmitted  to  our 
children  after  our  deaths  for  their  necessary  sus- 
tenance. 

How,  then,  does  the  inheritance  of  property 
coincide  in  principle  with  the  inheritance  of  gov- 
ernment ?  The  relation  of  monarchical  govern- 
ors to  their  subjects  is  not  a  natural,  but  an  arti- 
ficial relation.  As  Nature  did  not  create,  so  she 
does  not  j^erpetuate  it ;  and  no  natural  obliga- 
tion to  discharge  the  duties  of  governor  surviving 
the  monarch,  there  are  no  natural  means  or  prin- 
ciples provided  for  transmitting  to  his  son  sover- 
eign intellect  or  sovereign  power. 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  119 

Government  is  never,  like  property,  the  right 
cf  the  incumbent.  It  is  the  right  of  the  people — 
unless,  indeed,  the  good  of  the  whole  must  be 
made  subordinate  to  the  interest  of  the  few. 
How,  then,  can  a  right  be  inherited  by  the  son 
which  did  not  exist  in  the  father  ? 

The  judicious  and  philosophical  Paley  does  not 
assert  the  least  analogy  in  principle  between  the 
two  cases  of  government  and  property,  as  ac- 
quired by  prescription  and  transmitted  by  in- 
heritance; nor  does  he  designate  the  sentiment 
that  views  them  in  conjunction  as  the  offspring 
of  just  and  enlightened  opinion.  On  the  contra- 
ry, he  characterizes  the  opinion  of  right  in  gov- 
ernors founded  on  prescription  as  a  prejudice,  and 
labours  to  show,  in  our  familiarity  with  prescrip- 
tion, as  applied  to  property,  the  reason  why  its 
application  to  the  affairs  of  government  meets 
with  respect  or  attention.* 

Monarchy  the  right  of  the  monarch,  and  de- 
scendible to  his  heirs  !  If  so,  certainly  the  nation 
must  be  just  as  much  his  to  govern,  as  the  peas- 

*  "  They  who  obey  from  prejudice  are  determined  by  an 
opinion  of  right  in  their  governors,  which  opinion  is  founded 
upon  prescription.  *  *  *  Nor  is  it  to  be  wondered  at  that  man- 
kind should  reverence  authority  founded  in  prescription,  when 
they  observe  that  it  is  prescription  which  confers  the  title  to 
almost  everything  else,"  &c.— Paley's  Moral  and  Pol.  Phfl., 
book  vi.,  chap.  ii. 


120  MONAIICHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

ant's  farm  is  his  to  till ;  and  government  itself 
must  have  been  constituted,  not  for  the  nation, 
but  merely  to  afford  the  monarch  an  opportunity 
to  govern  ;  not  for  the  good  of  all,  but  to  furnish 
an  agreeable  diversion  for  one! 

Notwithstanding  that  prescription  is  the  chief 
argument  openly  urged  in  favour  of  monarchical 
and  aristocratical  governments,  it  is  easily  to  be 
perceived  that  their  iron-handed  despotism  does 
not  maintain  itself  upon  so  imaginary  and  un- 
substantial a  basis.  If  institutions  so  pure  and 
liberal  as  those  of  a  republican  country  require 
the  stern  supports  of  reason  and  virtue  to  sustain 
what  is  commonly  thought  to  be,  at  the  best,  but 
a  transient  existence,  can  the  corruption  and  vio- 
lence of  monarchical  and  aristrocratic  govern- 
ments find  suflScient  stability  in  a  flimsy  prejudice 
arising  from  an  imaginary  prescriptive  right  ? 

Look  at  the  numbers  whose  self-interest,  in 
derogation  of  the  common  weal,  requires  the  per- 
manence of  such  governments,  and  you  will  as- 
certain the  real  sources  of  monarchical  and  aris- 
tocratic power. 

First,  the  king  himself,  with  his  family  of  dukes 
and  princes — the  chief  nobility  of  the  realm  dig- 
nified by  menial  offices  in  his  household,  and  the 
most  skilful  artists  and  wealthy  manufacturers 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  121 

ambitiously  enrolling  themselves  as  the  objects 
of  his  patronage. 

He  is  the  source  of  power.  Are  there  states- 
men of  illustrious  name,  warriors  of  renown, 
ecclesiastics  that  command  popular  reverence  for 
their  learning  and  piety ;  and,  through  all  sub- 
ordinate grades  are  there  genius,  enterprise,  ac- 
tivity, and  wealth  ? — the  king  can  command  in 
his  service  the  various  talents  and  combined  in- 
fluence of  all.  From  the  prime  minister  to  an 
officer  of  the  customs — from  the  lord-chancellor 
to  a  justice  of  the  quorum — all  are  raised  by  his 
sign-manual  to  the  full  sway  of  office.  He  is  the 
fountain  of  honour.  His  touch  ennobles  the 
blood.  He  keeps  the  golden  gate  that  bars  the 
plebeian  from  the  aristocratic  orders.  Duke- 
doms, bishoprics,  stars  and  garters,  are  the  tokens 
of  his  favour  and  the  badges  of  his  service. 

Add  to  this  influence  that  of  the  overo;rown 
monopolies  and  rotten  corporations,  that  of  the 
debtors  and  the  creditors  of  government.  One 
branch,  at  least,  of  the  Legislature,  all  the  ju- 
diciary, the  executive,  the  nobility,  the  officers 
of  the  army  and  navy,  and  the  dignitaries  of 
the  Church,  are  creatures  of  the  crown;  and, 
once  so  created,  are  pledged  by  self-interest,  by 
the  honours  and  emoluments  of  rank  and  power, 
K 


122  MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

to  sustain  the  hand  that  created  them.  Thus  are 
abstracted  from  the  cause  of  the  people,  and  de- 
voted to  the  service  of  the  governing  party,  the 
greater  part  of  the  health,  vigour,  and  activity  of 
the  body  politic.  The  government  is,  indeed, 
made  up  of  a  minority,  but  a  minority  as  superior 
in  power  as  it  is  inferior  in  numbers.  The  selfish 
interest  of  the  monarch  multiplies  itself,  and  oc- 
cupies the  bosom  of  every  subordinate ;  not  only 
commanding  the  numerical  force  of  all,  but  also 
all  their  means  of  private  and  personal  influ- 
ence. Appalled  by  the  least  prospect  of  change, 
they  dread  revolution  as  a  political  death. 

Notice  the  effect,  as  it  is  clearly  observable  in 
history,  of  but  one  of  the  various  engines  of 
monarchical  power — the  elevation  to  the  peerage. 
De  Lolme,  the  eulogist  of  the  British  Constitution, 
exults  in  this  provision  of  "  a  modern  ostracism," 
as  he  styles  it,  whereby  the  government  may 
separate  the  people  from  their  friends  when  pat- 
riotic integrity  becomes  alarming.  Bribe  with 
honours !  When  one  of  the  most  absolute  powers 
known  to  the  Constitution  is  thus  exerted  to  re- 
ward political  apostacy;  when  such  are  the  ar- 
rangements of  a  government,  that  ambition  re- 
ceives its  highest  gratification  at  the  moment  that 
public  virtue  undergoes  a  paralysis,  what  may  we 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNiMENT.  123 

not  suppose  its  subordinate  provisions  to  be  for 
subduing  and  ruling  a  people  ? 

No  wonder  that  the  real  friend  of  popular 
rights  is  dismayed  by  the  fatal  influence  which 
pervades  and  modifies  every  social  relation,  and 
which,  assuming  a  personal  and  individual  aspect 
in  every  influential  member  of  community,  is  vari- 
ed, from  the  complaisant  smile  of  the  superior, 
who  is  a  conservative  from  self-interest,  to  the 
ridiculous  truckhng  of  the  dependant,  who  is 
either  paid  for  his  compliances,  proud  of  his  ser- 
vitude, or  debased  and  swayed  by  fear :  fear,  not 
perhaps  of  the  guillotine  or  Bastile — not  of  ban- 
ishment or  confiscation — but  of  personal  hostility 
and  proscription  on  account  of  political  opinion, 
from  those  who  control  all  the  energies  of  society, 
and  whose  relative  importance  in  the  social  scale 
is  dependant  upon  the  permanence  of  existing 
orders  and  institutions. 

He  must  be  incorrigibly  stupid  who  supposes 
that  a  standing  army  is  the  only  engine  of  arbi- 
trary power.  How  is  a  standing  army  main- 
tained ?  Under  the  most  despotic  governments 
and  in  its  greatest  efficiency,  it  is  a  mere  instru- 
ment ;  the  primal  and  vivifying  spirit  is  still  a 
different  thing.  Arbitrary  power,  whether  in  an 
absolute  or  mitigated  form,  is  sustained  by  the 


124  MONAUCIIICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

same  principles,  operating  only  by  different 
agencies. 

There  are  but  two  ways  in  which  government 
can  be  upheld  :  either  on  the  voluntary  principle, 
appropriate  to  all  the  complicated  agencies  of  ra- 
tional and  moral  beings,  or  by  coercion,  exer- 
cised through  the  passions,  and  subjecting  men, 
like  brutes,  to  force.  The  least  abridgment  of  one 
of  these  methods  induces  the  necessary  applica- 
tion of  the  other.  The  vices  that  enslave  the 
moral,  are  the  subjugators  also  of  the  political 
world.  All  that  is  appropriate  to  monarchy 
operates  by  means  of  self-interest  in  the  superior 
and  fear  in  the  subordinate,  or  by  a  combination 
of  both  principles  in  the  union  of  both  characters. 
There  are,  it  is  true,  many,  very  many  better  prin- 
ciples in  operation  ;  nevertheless,  it  is  the  force  of 
these  that  gives  to  monarchy  its  distinctive  form. 

It  is  true  that  monarchical  government  is 
sometimes  found  modified  by  some  of  the  most 
essential  principles  of  human  rights,  and  that  its 
mechanical  means  and  instruments  for  the  ordi- 
nary conduct  of  its  administration,  and  frequent- 
ly for  carrying  into  effect  those  principles,  are 
among  the  wisest  provisions  ever  devised  by  hu- 
man skill  and  ingenuity.  That  a  nation  shall 
not  be  taxed  without  its  consent,  or  a  citizen 
condemned  to  loss  of  life  or  limb  except  by  the 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  125 

judgment  of  his  peers,  and  that  every  man  shall 
enjoy  freedom  of  conscience  in  matters  of  reli- 
gion, are  among  the  former ;  the  election  of  rep- 
resentatives, the  trial  by  jury,  the  division  and 
independence  of  the  three  powers  of  govern- 
ment, are  among  the  latter.  The  latter  are  the 
result  of  experience,  and  have  been  extensively 
copied  by  us,  in  the  mechanical  distribution  and 
arrangement  of  political  power  in  our  system. 
But  do  not  mistake.  What  have  been  found  by 
monarchs  the  most  apt  instruments  to  govern 
subjects,  we  have  adopted  as  the  most  efficient 
means  for  governing  ourselves.  These  provis- 
ions are  irrespective  of  the  animating  principle 
of  a  government.  Whence  are  the  former  ?  Are 
they  coeval  with  the  origin  of  monarchy,  and  in 
strict  consistency  with  its  spirit?  Or  are  thev 
innovations  made  by  democracy  upon  monarchy, 
the  encroachment  which  the  rights  of  the  people, 
strengthened  by  the  physical  power  of  the  people, 
have  made  upon  the  prerogatives  of  the  sover- 
eign ?  The  history  of  Magna  Charta  will  tell. 
Whatever  there  is  of  monarchy  in  foreign  gov- 
ernments is  totally  and  radically  wrong  ;  what- 
ever there  is  of  democracy  is  right,  and  must, 
therefore,  be  good  ;  the  dividing  line  is  distinctly 
marked  and  easily  traced. 


126  MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

But  foreign  writers,  whom  we  have  so  servile- 
ly followed  in  our  political  theories,  anxious  to 
vindicate  the  systems  under  which  they  live,  have 
endeavoured  to  present  them  as  one  uniform  and 
consistent  whole,  without  reference  to  the  totally 
repugnant  nature  of  the  materials  of  which  they 
are  composed.  The  consequence  is,  that  instead 
of  laying  down  the  fundamental  principles  of 
politics  in  all  their  just  latitude,  they  subject  them 
to  the  arbitrary  domination  of  circumstances, 
thus  violating  their  essential  nature,  and  utterly 
annihilating  their  authority.  They  attempt  to 
compound  the  republican  principles  w-hich  are 
exhibited  in  their  governments,  and  which  are 
really  the  axioms  of  politics,  with  the  pure  mon- 
archical character  which  prevails  in  those  gov- 
ernments— an  attempt  that  is  like  endeavouring 
to  subject  the  conscience  of  man  to  the  operation 
of  physical  force. 

What  is  in  them  a  practical  error,  is  in  us  a 
foolish  subserviency.  We  are  under  no  necessity 
of  adopting  their  systems.  So  far  from  uphold- 
ing democracy,  they  depreciate  it,  in  the  practi- 
cal scale,  below  all  other  governments.  By  see- 
ing in  the  origin  and  nature  of  monarchy  its  un- 
fitness to  be  considered  a  model  for  any  political 
system,  vfe  are  better  prepared  to  renounce  the 
delusion  under  which  "we  have  laboured.   Unfor- 


MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT.  127 

tunately,  our  predilection  for  republican  govern- 
ment has  been  rather  a  matter  of  sentiment  than 
of  principle;  for  while  we  repudiate  with  hor- 
ror the  idea  of  succumbing  to  a  monarchy,  we 
have  tamely  adopted  those  political  maxims  and 
methods  of  reasoning  which  sanction  and  main- 
tain the  monarchical  form.  We  have  adopted  for- 
eign politics  along  with  foreign  literature,  when  it 
would  have  been  just  as  rational  in  our  school- 
days to  have  imbibed  the  heathen  mythology  with 
classical  learning.  We  must  be  original  and  in- 
dependent in  our  politics.  To  say  that  repub- 
lican government  is  the  best,  while  we  admit 
other  forms  to  be  legitimate,  is  occupying  but 
very  debateable  ground  in  favour  of  our  own 
institutions.  To  say  that  it  is  the  best  for  us,  on 
account  of  some  fancied  superiority  of  intelli- 
gence and  morals,  or  extraordinary  felicity  of 
position  and  circumstances,  is  taking  still  more 
doubtful,  and,  certainly,  far  more  invidious 
ground.  Establish  the  truth  that  republican  gov- 
ernment is  the  only  form  compatible  with  human 
rights,  and  the  question  is  fixed  on  an  immutable 
foundation,  secure  from  the  fallible  and  ever-va- 
rying results  of  human  calculations,  and  all  the 
capricious  decrees  of  fortune. 

Differing  from  the  world  as  we  do  in  our  po- 
litical oroanization,  we  must  not  search  for  iho 


128  MONARCHICAL    GOVERNMENT. 

fundamental  principles  of  politics  among  the 
ruins  of  European  despotism.  We  must  exercis* 
the  same  independence  in  thinking  that  our  fore- 
fathers exercised  in  acting.  We  must  no  more 
search  for  precedents  in  principle  than  they  sought 
for  precedents  in  practice.  True,  from  Great 
Britain  our  blood,  our  language,  our  literature, 
our  laws  and  religion,  were  originally  derived ; 
but  "  why  should  w^e,"  as  Jefferson  has  said, 
"  be  always  looking  backward  instead  of  forward 
for  improvement  ?" 

The  principles  of  our  government  are  the  prin- 
ciples of  common  sense  and  common  honesty. 
While  w^e  enjoy  the  peaceful  dominion  of  these 
principles  around  our  sacred  .and  unpolluted 
hearths  and  altars,  and  view  their  reflected  im- 
age in  the  wealth,  enterprise,  high  moral  and 
intellectual  condition,  and  universal  comfort  of 
our  citizens  at  home,  and  the  dignity  and  inde- 
pendence of  our  nation  abroad,  why  should  we 
suffer  to  pass  unrebuked  the  opprobium  of  those 
who  cry  out  that  "  their  abstract  perfection  is 
their  practical  defect ;"  and  who  eulogize  meas- 
ures which  they  style  "  practical,  for  no  other 
reason"  (as  one  has  happily  expressed  himself) 
"  than  that  they  have  had  the  misfortune  to  put 
them  in  practice  V 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEiMOCRACY.  129 


CHAPTER  V. 

Common  Objections  to  Democracy  considered. — The  Character 
and  Spirit  of  Monarchical  Government  still  farther  illus- 
trated. 

We  think  we  have  conclusively  established 
the  position,  that  mankind  universally  have  the 
same  right  to  manage  their  political  as  their  pri- 
vate interests,  and  that  all  have  the  same  right 
to  manage  the  concerns  of  all  that  each  has  to 
manage  what  exclusively  concerns  himself.  Who 
is  to  provide  for  my  private  and  individual  wel- 
fare ?  There  is  not  a  government  of  any  civil- 
ized nation  but  would  say  that  I  myself;  and  ac- 
knowledge that  any  interference  with  the  volun- 
tary direction  of  what  are  exclusively  my  own 
private  affairs  would  be  tyrannical.  But  is  not 
a  nation  as  competent  to  manage  its  own  affairs 
as  an  individual,  his  ?  And,  by  the  same  right, 
is  it  not  entitled  to  the  direction  of  them  ?  Does 
any  part  of  a  nation  possess  a  power,  a  right,  or 
a  degree  of  wisdom  that  does  not  reside  in  the 
collective  whole  ?  Have  a  part  a  right  to  rule  the 
whole,  and  not  the  whole  to  rule  the  whole  ? 
L 


130  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

Having  established  the  right,  who  shall  deny 
that  it  is  expedient  ?  who  shall  deny  that  it  is 
practicable  ?  Who  shall  say  that  what  is  just 
is  inexpedient  or  impracticable  ?  the  just  and 
the  right  growing  out  of  the  essential  relations  of 
things,  who  shall  thus  impeach  the  Author  of 
Nature,  or  say  that  His  wisdom  or  His  power 
was  unequal  to  His  rectitude  in  determining  our 
condition,  and  establishing  our  relations  as  moral 
beings  ? 

One  of  the  most  prominent  objections  to  re- 
publican government  is,  that  it  gives  the  same 
power  of  controlling  the  state  to  men  who  are 
qualified  by  their  habits  of  thought  and  business 
to  judge  well,  and  to  those  who  are  utterly  and 
brutishly  ignorant,  making  no  discrimination; 
that  it  cannot  be,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case, 
that  the  poor  labourer  who  toils  in  the  streets  of 
our  cities,  and  the  jurist  who  presides  in  our 
courts  of  justice,  or  the  statesman  who  rules  in 
our  Senate,  are  equally  qualified  to  judge  of  po- 
litical measures  and  political  men,  while  our  in- 
stitutions, by  giving  all  an  equal  vote,  give  these 
different  descriptions  the  same  right  and  the  same 
power. 

But,  if  the  right  of  voting  were  dependant 
upon  intellectual  qualifications,  the  distinctions 


1 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  131 

in  this  respect  between  men  would  be  as  innu- 
merable as  the  individuals  of  the  species.  Not 
only  would  the  statesman  and  jurist  be  distin- 
guished from  the  poor  labourer,  but  neighbour 
from  neighbour ;  the  man  of  collegiate  from  the 
man  of  common  school  education ;  the  man  of 
travel  from  the  domestic  man ;  the  man  of  wit, 
though  poor,  from  the  blockhead,  though  rich. 
One  rule  would  be  applicable  to  one  individual, 
another  to  another;  nay,  as  man  is  never  station- 
ary at  any  period,  there  would  be  an  infinite 
number  of  gradations  of  power  and  influence 
in  the  state,  applicable  to  the  same  individual  in 
passing  through  life,  according  to  the  various 
stages  of  his  progress;  and  it  would  be  impossi- 
ble for  the  combined  wisdom  of  mankind  to  de- 
vise a  scale  by  which  the  relative  power  of  each 
one  in  community  should  be  graduated  and  de- 
termined. 

The  poor  labourer  has  an  equal  voice  in  the 
state  because  he  is  a  constituent  part  of  it.  It 
is  not  a  power  conferred  on  him  because  he  is 
particularly  well  qualified  to  exert  it,  but  it  is  a 
right  that  inheres  in  him,  that  he  has  been  en- 
dowed with  by  God,  who  made  him  a  moral 
being.  It  is  exactly  like  the  equal  right  which 
belongs  to  every  roan  of  managing  his  own  prop- 


132  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY 

erty.  The  wise  can  manage  property  better 
than  the  foohsh ;  but  those  laws  are  still  un- 
impeachable which  give  to  both  the  same  right 
to  dispose  of  their  own  agreeably  to  their  own 
will.  There  is  the  same  apparent  absurdity  in 
those  laws  that  suffer  the  rich  fool  to  control  his 
millions,  while  the  wise  man,  who  is  far  better 
qualified  to  dispose  of  them  judiciously,  starves 
in  a  neighbouring  garret,  as  in  the  political  sys- 
tem that  allows  an  ignorant  labourer  the  same 
power  to  vote  as  the  learned  jurist  or  the  accom- 
plished statesman. 

"Ah,  but,"  it  may  be  insinuated,  "in  the  one 
case  a  man  disposes  of  his  own  as  it  seems  meet 
to  him ;  in  the  other,  he  arbitrarily  disposes  of 
what  belongs  to  another."  By  no  means.  When 
the  jurist  or  the  statesman  votes,  does  he  do  it 
because  he  has  rights  over  another,  or  because  he 
is  himself  a  free  citizen  ?  For  the  latter  reason, 
undoubtedly.  He  is  merely  exercising  his  own 
freedom,  not  prescribing  law  to  another.  So  with 
the  poor  labourer.  He  votes  because  he  is  a 
member  of  the  state.  He  does  it  to  protect  him- 
self; it  is  in  the  course  of  his  own  business  and 
interests.  He  does  it  because  self-o^overnment  is 
his  right.  When  a  community  act  for  themselves, 
the  result  of  their  joint  deliberations  must  be  de- 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY  133 

termined  by  a  plurality  of  voices ;  each  mem- 
ber of  that  community  only  acts  for  himself,  and 
disposes  of  his  own,  therefore,  when  he  votes  to 
direct  that  public  determination  either  in  one 
way  or  the  other. 

The  "  I'm-as-good-as-you  principle,"  as  it  is 
called,  is  greatly  calumniated,  without  being  cor- 
rectly understood.  When  we  say  that  all  men  are 
by  nature  equal,  we  mean  nothing  more  than  that 
all  are  by  nature  equal  in  their  moral  attributes 
— equally  moral  and  accountable  beings — and, 
therefore,  equally  entitled  to  the  regulation  of 
their  own  conduct,  as  that  is  the  basis  of  moral 
accountability  ;  therefore,  all  by  nature  equally 
entitled  to  exercise  their  own  government,  pri- 
vately and  publicly,  socially  and  politically.  This 
is  a  principle  which  God  and  Nature  have  estab- 
lished, and  they  who  dispute  it  enter  into  con- 
troversy wuth  the  essential  foundation  of  morals. 

Republicans  do  not  contend  for  the  annihila- 
tion of  social  distinctions.  Distinctions  of  rank 
in  society  are  legitimately  allowed  in  matters  of 
taste  and  fashion.  A  republican  may  be  as  fas- 
tidious as  he  pleases  in  the  selection  of  his  as- 
sociates without  violating  his  principles ;  but 
whoever  would  convert  arbitrary  distinctions 
into   political   rights   and   franchises,   whoever 


134  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

would  give  one  man  a  higher  consideration  than 
another,  in  the  eye  of  the  Constitution  or  the 
laws,  plots  against  the  liberties  of  his  fellow- 
man.  If  I  am  a  man  of  education,  I  shall  throw 
open  my  doors  to  a  man  of  education  ;  if  a  man 
of  wealth,  to  him  whose  usual  gratifications  are 
similar  to  mine  ;  if  a  man  of  polish  and  refine- 
ment, to  him  whose  habits  and  manners  do  not 
disgust  me.  No  party  is  injured  by  this  distinc- 
tion. If  I  am  ignorant,  I  do  not  like  to  be  mor- 
tified by  a  comparison  between  my  acquirements 
and  those  of  a  learned  man ;  if  I  am  not  rich, 
I  feel  most  contented  and  happy  with  those  with 
whom  I  can  enjoy  a  reciprocity  of  favours;  if 
unaccustomed  to  high  rank,  the  fastidiousness  of 
mode  and  fashion  is  more  disgusting  to  me  tha._ 
my  rudeness  is  shocking  to  them.  These  social 
preferences  and  affinities  are  a  mere  matter  of 
taste,  convenience,  or  caprice  ;  and,  however  ar- 
bitrarily they  may  be  exercised,  never  can  af- 
fect one's  rights  or  occasion  an  injustice. 

That  there  are  inequalities  among  men,  fur- 
nishing important  grounds  of  distinction,  the  re- 
publican does  not  deny ;  but  he  does  deny  that 
any  man  is  different  from  another  in  his  essential 
moral  attributes.  He  does  not  deny  that  one 
man  has  a  more  exalted  understanding,  a  more 


OBJECTIONS  TO  DEMOCRACY.      135 

vivid  imagination,  a  more  powerful  judgment, 
than  another;  but  he  holds  that  no  man  is  des- 
titute of  reason  and  conscience ;  that  diversities 
are,  therefore,  in  degree,  not  in  kind ;  that  they 
cannot  affect  the  essential  relations  of  man  to 
man;  that  they  cannot,  therefore,  make  the 
rights  of  one  man  greater  than  those  of  an- 
other. 

If  one  man  has  a  more  inventive  genius,  a 
more  comprehensive  prudence,  a  more  enlarged 
experience,  a  more  scrupulous  integrity  than  an- 
other, what  is  the  natural,  I  may  say,  the  inevi- 
table consequence,  from  the  possession  of  such 
superior  qualities  ?  He  possesses  superior  power 
and  influence.  How  ?  from  the  arbitrary  force 
of  circumstances,  or  the  coercive  power  of  human 
laws  1  No  :  it  is  from  the  voluntary  homage  of 
the  human  mind  and  heart.  Distinctions  such  as 
those  I  have  mentioned  ai*e  the  only  just  distinc- 
tions among  men,  and  they  vincHcate  themselves. 
They  are  the  distinctions  of  nature  and  reason, 
and  they  are  established  by  nature  and  reason. 
These  distinctions,  so  far  from  being  repudiated 
by  republicans,  exhibit  themselves  in  their  utmost 
latitude  in  republican  countries,  where  there  are 
no  arbitrary  laws  and  usages  to  con-trol  their  oper- 
ation and  effect.    It  is  true  that  Nature  has  estab- 


136  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  <^ 

lished  inequalities  in  the  world  of  man  as  well 
as  in  the  world  of  brute  and  inanimate  objects. 
But  Nature  has  not  been  so  impotent  as  to  require 
human  aid  to  execute  her  decrees.  The  distinc- 
tions which  she  has  designed  she  has  not  wanted 
power  to  carry  into  effect ;  nay,  she  never  makes 
known  her  plans  but  by  the  execution  of  them. 
It  is  absurd,  therefore,  for  man  to  come  in  with 
his  empirical  devices  of  monarchy  and  aristocra- 
cy, as  if  he  had  caught  Nature  in  travail  and  un- 
able, by  her  own  means,  to  effect  the  same  har- 
mony of  ranks  and  orders  in  society  which  she 
has  so  successfully  achieved  in  the  vegetable  and 
animal  creation. 

Republicans  are  far  from  being  levellers ;  they 
are  for  distinctions  and  inequalities;  not  for  the 
ranks  and  orders  established  by  the  arbitrary 
decrees  of  man,  or  the  accidental  allotments  of 
birth  and  fortune,  but  for  the  distinctions  and 
inequalities  of  reason  and  nature  in  their  most 
unqualified  extent.  Not  so  with  monarchists  and 
aristocrats.  They  are  the  worst  levellers  in  the 
world.  They  are  worse  than  levellers  \  for  they 
not  only  do  all  in  their  power  to  annihilate  the 
just  grounds  of  distinction  among  men,  but  they 
establish  in  their  stead  distinctions  of  the  most 
false  and  arbitrary  character.  They  not  merely 
dethrone  the  only  true  lords,  but  they  establish 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  137 

stupid  idols  in  their  places.  In  America  the 
distinctions  of  society  are  constituted  by  the 
various  kinds  and  degrees  of  real  merit  alone ; 
in  Europe,  no  matter  how  legitimate  the  grounds 
of  distinction  one  may  allege  in  his  favour,  he  is 
inevitably  subordinated  to  the  kings,  princes,  and 
nobles  of  the  empire — constituted  how  7  by  birth  ! 
The  highest  degree  of  rational  and  moral  worth 
is  degraded  beneath  the  most  capricious  accident 
that  presides  over  human  destiny  ! 

Aristocrats  omit,  in  their  zeal  for  the  inequali- 
ties and  diversities  of  rank  and  power,  the  most 
essential  part  of  the  argument  they  profess  to 
urge,  and  an  indispensable  condition  to  its  being 
wielded  in  their  favour.  That  Nature  and  rea- 
son have  established  grounds  for  the  utmost  di- 
versity among  mankind  is  absolutely  undeniable ; 
all  experience  is  in  favour  of  it ;  but  that  she 
has  constituted  birth  and  family  the  indices  of  that 
superior  merit  which  entitles  one  by  natural  right 
to  great  power  and  an  extended  influence,  was 
never,  I  believe,  seriously  argued.  If  it  were  to 
be,  we  should  not  dispute  the  advocate's  reasons, 
but  question  his  sanity. 

A  republic  provides  for  the  proper  divisions 
of  rank  and  grade  in  society  on  the  true  grounds 
of  distinction,  and  for  the  exercise  of  their  legiti- 


138  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

mate  influence  in  its  appropriate  mode,  and  to  a 
just  extent :  that  is,  it  leaves  the  matter  entirely 
to  the  regulation  of  itself.  It  leaves  reason  to 
acquire  its  just  force  by  the  control  which  a  su- 
perior understanding  inevitably  gives  over  other 
minds  ;  morals,  to  sway  mankind  by  the  influence 
of  an  elevated  character  and  example ;  experi- 
ence, to  be  honoured  in  the  verification  which  its 
lessons  receive  from  practical  results ;  and  all 
the  power  which  Nature  has  given  one  rational 
and  moral  being  over  another,  to  be  exercised  by 
rational  and  moral  means.  Leave  men  free,  and 
it  is  natural  that,  not  being  governed  by  force, 
they  should  place  themselves  under  the  dominion 
of  reason. 

If  a  poor  and  ignorant  man  wants  a  lawyer  or 
a  doctor,  or  wishes  to  put  his  son  at  school,  and 
cannot  of  himself  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  judg- 
ment among  the  competitors  for  his  choice,  he 
asks  his  wiser  or  more  experienced  friend,  and 
governs  his  conduct  by  the  advice  or  the  conduct 
of  others.  The  same  lights  that  he  avails  him- 
self of  in  the  direction  and  government  of  his 
private  affairs,  he  employs  to  regulate  his  public 
and  political  conduct.  This  natural  result  gives 
to  the  wise  their  just  influence,  while  it  enables 
the  ignorant  and  uneducated  to  act  judiciously, 
and  leaves  thera  in  the  unrestricted  enjoyraentcf 


OBJECflONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  13U 

their  rights.  It  is  not  more  difficult,  and,  certain- 
ly, to  the  immediate  interests  of  the  individual 
concerned,  not  a  more  important  task,  to  choose 
a  public  representative  than  to  choose  a  counsel- 
lor to  attend  to  one's  legal  interests,  or  a  physician 
to  whom  to  commit  one's  health  and  life ;  and 
the  same  means  of  information  and  the  same  mea- 
sure of  intelligence  accomplish  every  man  to 
make  in  either  case  an  equally  judicious  choice. 

Perhaps,  after  all,  the  people  do  not  choose 
the  wisest  governors,  nor  always  the  wisest  meas- 
ures. But  this  evil  can  never  be  very  striking, 
because  it  would  then  be  apparent ;  and,  being 
aj^arent,  would  be  remedied  by  the  people,  who 
can  only  have  their  own  true  and  substantial  in- 
terest at  heart.  Besides,  if  they  choose  poorly, 
no  one  has  a  right  to  complain  ;  their  power  to 
choose  emanates  from  God,  and  they  are  respon- 
sible only  to  Him. 

A  mistake,  however,  is  often  made  on  this 
head.  The  greatest  statesmen  and  men  of  the 
most  shining  abilities  are  not  always,  perhaps  I 
may  say,  are  not  usually,  chosen  ;  but  this  feature 
in  the  practical  operation  of  our  institutions  is  a 
subject  of  congratulation  rather  than  chagrin  to 
the  real  friends  of  republican  government.  For, 
in  the  iirst  place,  the  greatest  geniuses  and  states- 
men dc  not  always  make  the  most  judicious  gov- 


140  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

ernors :  as  they  do  not  always  make  the  best  fa- 
thers of  families,  so  they  do  not  always  make  the 
most  provident  heads  of  nations.  A  sound  judg- 
ment, which  is  not  invariably  an  accompaniment 
of  the  most  shining  and  brilliant  qualities,  is  one 
of  the  most  essential  qualifications  for  the  exercise 
of  power ;  while  a  bright  genius  always  expands 
in  particular  directions,  and  is  not  apt  to  take  a 
general  and  comprehensive  survey  of  all  the  dif- 
ferent views  and  interests  that  ought  to  be  taken 
into  account. 

I  think  I  can  discover  the  reason  why  the  mod- 
erately great,  rather  than  the  very  great,  are  apt 
to  be  selected  for  office,  and,  at  the  same  time,  see 
in  it  a  provision  for  the  safety  of  republican  insti- 
tutions. If  a  man  is  elected  to  office  in  this  coun- 
try, it  must  be  by  the  supremacy  of  party.  But 
one  whose  genius  prompts  him  to  rely  upon 
and  act  for  himself,  will  be  very  apt  to  yield  re- 
luctantly that  subordination  to  party  which  is 
requisite  with  us  to  give  effect  to  any  political 
organization.  It  is  not  very  likely,  therefore, 
that  such  a  man  will  be  chosen  as  the  leader  of 
a  party.  For  this  same  reason,  however,  the  man 
who  is  fixed  upon  will  command  the  more  hearty 
reliance  of  the  community ;  as  he  must  be  more 
dependant  upon  the  people,  and  have  less  confi- 
dence in  himself  independently  of  his  siiin^orters. 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  141 

He  will,  therefore,  be  more  prone  to  consult  his 
interest  by  devoting  himself  to  the  public  good, 
than  in  pursuing  plans  of  individual  ambition. 
The  very  great,  if  they  have  more  power  to  do 
good,  have  greater  power,  as  well  as  greater 
inducements,  to  do  harm;  and,  if  the  book  of 
experience  be  consulted,  it  will  be  found  that 
nations  have  ever  suffered  more  from  a  want  of 
integrity  than  a  want  of  ability  in  their  rulers. 

The  liberty  that  republics  accord  to  all  men 
of  every  rank  of  governing  themselves,  elevates 
their  characters,  and  qualifies  them  for  self-gov- 
ernment. The  elevation  which  this  freedom  con- 
fers on  people  of  the  lowest  station,  stimulates  to 
a  degree  of  self-improvement,  and  attention  to  the 
improvement  of  their  families,  which  does  not 
cease  to  surprise  even  those  who  daily  witness  its 
results,  in  the  case  of  foreigners  coming  to  our 
land  without  consideration  or  character,  but  rank- 
ing in  the  second  generation  with  the  wealthiest 
and  most  influential  of  the  nation.  Deprive  a 
man  of  influence,  let  him  become  of  no  account, 
and  consequently  pass  unobserved  in  society,  and 
he  loses  one  of  the  highest  inducements  to  ac- 
quire character,  or  to  preserve  his  integrity ;  but 
add  to  his  weight  and  respectability,  let  him  feel 
that  he  and  his  children  are  integral  parts  of  the 
nation  in  the  midst  of  which  they  live,  parties  to 


142  ©BJECTIONS    10    DEMOCRACY. 

its  laws,  and  equal  partakers  of  its  rights  and 
privileges,  and  you  increase,  as  much  as  human 
means  can,  the  force  of  his  moral  motives  and 
the  energy  of  his  active  powers. 

Many  weighty  objections  are  urged  against 
republics  because  they  do  not  provide  for  a  rep- 
resentation of  property,  and  there  are  not  a  few 
among  us,  even,  who  contend  that  the  exclusive 
privilege  of  directing  the  state  ought  to  be  se- 
cured to  those,  at  least,  who  have  some  property ; 
partly  because  it  has  a  natural  tendency  to  ensure 
a  greater  amount  of  intelligence  in  the  direction 
of  public  affairs  (and  so  far  the  argument  has 
already  been  anticipated),  partly  because,  as  it  is 
asserted,  the  man  of  property  has  a  greater  in- 
terest at  stake  than  the  poor  man.  We  will  en- 
deavour to  reply  briefly  to  the  latter  argument. 

From  the  right  of  self-government  follows  the 
right  of  representation.  Of  course  it  belongs  to 
all  of  whose  moral  constitution  the  right  of  self- 
government  can  be  predicated.  It  does  not  be- 
long to  property.  It  belongs  to  what  are,  prop- 
erly speaking,  the  constituents  of  the  state.  The 
state  is  made  up  of  an  association  of  individuals 
on  certain  common  principles  on  which  all  are 
agreed ;  and  all  the  parties  to  the  association  have 
a  right  to  participate  in  its  common  concerns; 
property,  however,  is  not  one  of  the  parties. 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  143 

The  object  of  government  is  to  provide  for  and 
secure  the  rights  of  men.  But  all  men  are  equal 
in  their  rights ;  therefore  all  have  an  equal  in- 
terest in  the  common  stake.  Laws  do  not  oper- 
ate upon  property  directly,  but  indirectly,  in  set- ' 
tling  and  fixing  the  right  of  property,  and  the 
principles  upon  which  it  shall  be  acquired  and 
transferred,  without  reference  to  the  amount;  in 
making  the  laws,  therefore,  all  ought  to  have  an 
equal  voice  independently  of  the  extent  of  their 
wealth.  My  right  of  property  is  not  less  impor- 
tant to  me,  though  worth  but  a  hundred  dollars, 
than  yours  to  you,  though  worth  a  hundred  thou- 
sand ;  the  same  law  which  protects  your  prop- 
erty protects  mine,  and  the  same  law  which 
breaks  down  the  barriers  of  your  property  leaves 
mine  also  unprotected  and  defenceless.  And, 
though  I  have  nothing,  yet  I  depend  on  the  same 
law  for  the  benefit  I  expect  from  my  future  earn- 
ings, for  prompt  returns  from  my  daily  labour,  and 
a  shield  from  the  wretchedness  of  immediate  des- 
titution, as  does  the  millionaire  to  enforce  the 
payment  of  his  rents  and  mortgages.  The  statute- 
book  is  a  code  of  general  rules,  and  the  consid- 
eration of  rich  and  poor,  of  great  and  little 
amoimts  of  property,  cannot  arise  in  the  business 
of  law-making,  to  which,  therefore,  the  poor  ar« 


144  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

equally  competent  as  the  ricli,  having  not  only  no 
antagonist,  but  not  even  any  separate,  interest. 

Which  do  we  esteem  most  clearly,  our  rights 
of  person  or  our  right  of  property  ?  Does  any 
man  hesitate  whether  to  prefer  the  inviolability 
of  his  property  or  the  sacredness  of  his  domestic 
relations,  and  the  inviolability  and  security  of  his 
person  1  Does  one  doubt  for  a  moment  whether 
he  would  rather  have  his  wife  and  children  in- 
sulted and  outraged,  his  character  traduced,  him- 
self and  all  who  are  most  dear  to  him  loaded 
with  every  kind  of  contumely  and  abuse,  without 
redress,  and  hold  the  lives  and  personal  safety 
of  himself  and  his  family  at  the  mercy  of  every 
villain  in  the  community,  or  be  stripped  of  every 
cent  in  the  world  ?  But  at  least  the  personal 
rights  of  the  poor  are  the  same  as  those  of  the 
rich.  The  poor  man's  life,  his  domestic  com- 
forts, his  wife  and  children,  are  as  dear  to  him 
as  those  of  the  richest  man  in  the  world  are  to 
him  ;  and  it  must  be  allowed  that  there  is  no  man 
in  the  world  so  rich  but  that  he  esteems  himself 
above  his  property  :  therefore  the  poor  man, 
however  poor,  has  a  stake  in  society  and  the 
laws  greater  than  is  represented  by  the  millions 
of  the  richest  man  in  corara\mity,  however  rich. 
If  great  public  works  are  to   be  constructed, 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  145 

whose  labour  is  to  build  them  1  If  battles  are 
to  be  fought,  who  is  to  fight  them  ? — every  hu- 
man being  counts  one  in  the  muster-roll  of  armies. 
The  poor  man  has,  in  his  hands,  the  only  com- 
modity which  has  original  value,  the  first  price 
of  all  other  commodities — human  labour.  He 
can  dispense  with  the  capital  of  the  rich,  but 
the  rich  cannot  dispense  with  his  labour.  It  is 
not  true,  therefore,  of  any  man,  that  he  has  no 
stake  in  society. 

All  should  have  an  equal  voice  in  the  public 
deliberations  of  the  state,  however  unequal  in 
point  of  circumstances,  since  human  rights,  by 
virtue  of  which  alone  we  are  entitled  to  vote 
at  all,  are  the  attributes  of  the  man,  not  of  his 
circumstances.  Should  the  right  to  vote,  the 
characteristic  and  the  highest  prerogative  of  a 
freeman,  be  at  the  mercy  of  a  casualty  ?  I  am 
rich  to-day,  worth  my  hundred  thousands ;  but 
my  wealth  consists  in  stock  and  merchandise; 
it  may  be  in  storehouses,  it  may  be  upon  the 
ocean  ;  I  have  been  unable  to  effect  an  insurance, 
or  there  is  some  concealed  legal  defect  in  my 
policy;  the  fire  or  the  storms  devour  my  wealth 
in  an  hour :  am  I  the  less  competent  to  vote  ? 
Have  I  less  of  the  capacity  of  a  moral  and  in- 
telligent being  1  Am  I  the  less  a  good  oiti- 
M 


146  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

zen  1  Is  it  not  enough  that  I  have  been  depri- 
ved of  my  fortune — must  I  be  disfranchised  by 
community  1 

My  having  a  greater  or  less  amount  of  prop- 
erty does  not  alter  my  rights.  Property  is  mere- 
ly the  subject  on  which  rights  are  exercised ;  its 
amount  does  not  alter  rights  themselves.  If  it 
were  otherwise,  every  one  of  us  would  be  in  some 
degree  subject  to  some  wealthier  neighbour,  and, 
if  the  representation  of  property  were  consist- 
ently carried  out,  the  affairs  of  every  commu- 
nity, instead  of  being  governed  by  the  majority 
of  rational  and  intelligent  beings,  would  be  gov- 
erned by  a  preponderance  of  houses,  lands,  stocks, 
plate,  jewellery,  merchandise,  and  money !  It  is 
not  true  that  one  man  has  more  at  stake  in  the 
commonw^ealth  than  another.  We  all  have  our 
rights,  and  no  man  has  anything  more.  If  we 
look  at  the  subject  philosophically,  and  consider 
how  much  superior  man  is  by  nature  to  what  he 
is  by  external  condition,  how  much  superior  his 
real  attributes  are  to  w-hat  he  acquires  from  the 
accidents  of  fortune,  we  shall  then  view  the  dis- 
tinctions of  rank  and  wealth  in  their  true  com- 
parative insignificance,  and  make  as  little  dif- 
ference on  these  accounts  w'lih  the  political  as 
with  the  moral  man. 

From  what  has  already  been  observed,  it  will 


OBJECTIONS    TO     DEMOCRACY.  147 

be  seen  that  we  do  not  maintain  republics  on  the 
ground  that  "  the  majority  are  always  right ;" 
and,  therefore,  the  many  arguments  which  have 
been  urged  against  the  absurdity  of  such  a  prop- 
osition do  not  assail  the  truth  and  propriety  of 
republican  principles.  The  real  foundation  of 
republican  government  is  the  truth  of  the  propo- 
sition, that  men  have  a  right  to  judge  for  them- 
selves ;  that  whether  they  judge  right  or  wrong, 
therefore,  if  they  do  not  infringe  the  equal  right 
of  another  to  judge  for  himself,  they  are  amenable 
to  no  human  tribunal.  We  maintain  that  there 
is  no  common  superior  among  men  who  are  not 
connected  by  any  human  convention ;  that  those 
who  make  up  a  community  have  the  same  right 
to  act  for  themselves  in  their  common  and  public 
concerns,  that  as  individuals  they  have  in  their 
private  and  individual  affairs ;  and,  consequently, 
that  the  right  of  nations  to  self-government  no 
more  depends  upon  the  assumption  that  they  al- 
ways act  right,  than  that  of  an  individual,  in  his 
private  capacity.  The  proposition  is,  simply,  that 
they  have  in  all  cases  the  right  to  act ;  and,  as 
the  only  way  in  which  communities  can  act  to- 
gether is,  when  they  act  in  particular  cases  and  in 
aggregate  masses,  to  abide  by  the  decision  of 
majorities,  that,  therefore,  the  majority  have  in 
such  cases  a  right  to  decide. 


148  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCIIACY 

Indeed,  now  at  length  it  would  seem  that  the 
objections  to  republican  governraent  have  been 
rather  captious  than  real. 

In  the  earliest  part  of  our  history,  its  enemies 
were  foreboding  that  it  would  be  able  to  main- 
tain no  more  than  a  transient  existence ;  but,  now 
that  subsequent  events  have  shown  the  perma- 
nency of  our  institutions,  they  have  turned  from 
impeaching  our  principles  to  ridiculing  our  hab- 
its and  depreciating  our  people. 

Happily,  we  are  impregnable  by  this  new 
method  of  attack  so  long  as  we  are  truly  repub- 
lican in  our  tastes,  feelings,  and  habits ;  and  when 
we  are  guilty  of  the  foolish  vanity  of  emulating 
European  extravagance,  or  aping  foreign  and  in- 
appropriate usages,  we  richly  deserve  the  rebukes 
we  are  quite  sure  to  receive.  We  ought  to  know 
wherein  our  strength  lies,  and  rest  in  that  as  our 
stronghold  :  it  is  not  in  the  condition  of  the  few, 
but  in  the  universal  contentment  and  happiness 
of  the  mass.  We  are  truly  flattered  that  our 
circumstances  are  such  as  to  suggest  a  compari- 
son, as  to  the  luxuries  and  embellishments  of 
life,  between  the  two  worlds,  and  that  the  coun- 
try of  one  century  falls  no  farther  behind  that 
of  ten  centuries.  But,  if  the  foreign  traveller 
washes  to  know  what  we  really  are,  he  must  not 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  149 

confine  his  excursions  to  the  fashionable  saloons 
of  our  cities,  where  he  will  only  learn  what  we 
are  not ;  nor  seek  for  fine  castles,  fine  cabinets, 
fine  parks  and  gardens,  fine  equipages,  and  laws 
of  etiquette.  He  must  traverse  the  interior,  look 
at  our  farms,  enter  our  farmhouses  and  our  shops, 
converse  with  our  farmers  and  labourers,  exam- 
ine our  schools  and  our  churches,  and  ascertain 
the  circumstances  and  condition  of  our  common 
people.  Let  him  inquire  as  to  the  number  of 
paupers  and  criminals ;  contrast  the  relative 
safety  of  our  woody  wilds  with  the  open  and 
inhabited  country  of  the  Old  World  ;  observe 
the  relative  intelligence  and  virtue  of  the  mass- 
es by  which  both  countries  are  occupied.  Let 
him  ascertain  how  commonly  the  ordinary  and 
necessary  comforts  of  life  are  shared  by  all; 
what  provision  industry  and  economy,  without 
fortune,  can  make  for  the  present,  and  what 
hopes  reasonably  cherish  of  the  future ;  and,  if 
circumstances  throw  him  much  into  the  com- 
pany of  the  wealthiest,  the  most  intelligent,  or 
the  most  powerful  in  the  land,  let  him  inquire 
the  history  of  their  early  fortune,  and  learn  from 
what  origin  they  sprang,  and  by  what  means 
they  have  risen. 

We,  too,  in  our  turn,  have  been  too  observant 


150  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

of  those  externals  that  strike  at  first  glance. 
Dazzled  by  the  adventitious  splendour  which 
surrounds  foreign  governments,  our  view  is  di- 
verted from  an  inspection  of  their  intrinsic  at- 
tributes. We  are  apt  to  confound  the  govern- 
ment with  the  nation,  and  to  give  to  the  govern- 
ment the  credit  of  what  the  nation  has  achieved 
in  spite  of  its  government.  When  the  subject 
of  monarchy  is  considered,  the  imagination  im- 
mediately crowds  upon  the  mind  an  assemblage 
of  chiefs  of  the  greatest  and  most  enlightened 
nations,  in  the  ancient,  peaceful,  and  undisputed 
exercise  of  sovereignty,  commanding  the  greater 
part  of  the  wealth,  intelligence,  and  power  of  the 
world.  But  the  moral  judgment  abstracts  from 
all  these  external  circumstances,  and  considers 
government,  as  it  weighs  an  individual,  apart 
from  accidental  position,  and  in  relation  simply 
to  the  question  of  the  just  or  the  unjust,  the  good 
or  the  bad.  And  who  can  endure  the  absurdity 
of  monarchical  government  in  all  its  naked  ab- 
straction ?  A  sovereign,  selected,  not  by  choice, 
but  by  fortune ;  not  from  among  those  possessing 
competent  qualifications,  but  taken  indiscrimi- 
nately from  the  embryo  in  the  w'omb,  the  child 
at  the  breast,  the  boy  in  his  bib,  the  youth  in  his 
teens,  or  the  old  ifian  or  woman  in  their  dotage 
or  insanity,  as  the  capricious  chances  of  birth  and 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  151 

death  in  the  royal  family  happen  to  determine. 
These  chances  have  now*  made  a  female  and  a 
minor  sovereign  over  one  hundred  and  fifty  mill- 
ions of  people,  comprising  one  of  the  most  en- 
lightened portions  of  the  human  family.  The 
ablest  statesmen  of  the  age,  the  most  profound 
scholars  and  jurists,  and  the  most  renowned  gen- 
erals, yield  to  a  supremacy  as  ridiculous,  if  not 
as  idolatrous  and  profane,  as  the  worship  of  the 
Egyptian  Apis  or  the  Grand  Lama.  The  su- 
preme execution  of  the  laws  is  vested  in  a  girl,  to 
whom,  were  she  in  private  life,  those  laws  would 
not  intrust  the  disposition  of  her  own  pin-money. 
One  to  whom,  perhaps,  in  a  different  position,  a 
discreet  father  might  not  have  allowed  the  direc- 
tion of  her  own  wardrobe,  governs  a  Icingdora ; 
arbitrarily  disposes,  without  question  and  without 
appeal,  of  every  civil  and  military  post  in  the 
greatest  of  modern  empires ;  and,  by  holding  in 
her  hand  the  powers  of  peace  and  war,  need  only 
utter  a  capricious  decree  to  embroil  a  world ! 

And  how  is  it  with  the  hereditary  nobles  and 
legislators  ?  an  order  of  men,  in  the  caustic  lan- 
guage of  Burke,  "  swaddled,  and  rocked,  and 
dandled  into  legislators."  Are  they  a  race  dis- 
ciplined to  business,  or  a  race  nurtured  to  pleas- 
*  A.D.  1839: 


152  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

we  1  a  race  of  statesmen,  or  merely  a  race  of  gen- 
tlemen? The  order  would  sink  into  universal 
contempt  were  it  not  receiving  continual  recruits 
from  the  plebeian  stock.  And  as  it  is,  when  we 
would  think  a  literary  body  no  better  than  a  con- 
gregation of  lunatics  were  it  to  make  a  profes- 
sorship hereditary,  or  an  individual  a  fool  if  he 
should  acknowledge  the  office  of  his  meanest  ar- 
tificer to  be  transmissible  by  descent,  how  absurd 
to  acknowledge  an  hereditary  right  to  the  most 
elevated  and  responsible  authority  that  man  can 
possibly  exercise  over  his  fellow-man. 

What  is  the  consequence  7  The  laws  are  ex- 
pressly made  to  countenance  and  build  up  this  ab- 
surdity ;  and,  though  equality  is  the  very  essence 
of  justice,  this  first  principle  is  studiously  violated 
in  the  distiibution  of  property.  Those  children 
who  have  an  equal  claim  to  a  competent  provis- 
ion are,  from  pride  of  caste  and  family  ambition, 
though  nature  has  made  them  equal,  arbitrari- 
ly allotted  to  different  ranks,  the  very  worst  pas- 
sions being  thereby  generated  in  the  midst  of  the 
most  tender  and  intimate  relations.  A  soil  hard- 
ly ample  enough  to  sustain  its  population  on  the 
most  just  and  equal  division,  is  studiously  accumii- 
lated  and  presci-ved,  by  the  acknowledged  policy 
of  the  laws,  in  the  fewest  possible  hands.     But, 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  163 

the  more  there  is  thus  absorbed  by  the  few,  the 
less  is  left  to  be  distributed  among  the  mass ;  and 
where  you  find  fortunes  inordinately  great  on  the 
one  hand,  you  will  find  a  proportionate  amount  of 
poverty  and  destitution  on  the  other.  Providence 
has  given  this  earth  and  the  blessings  it  contains 
for  all  those  who  live  on  it.  If  a  greater  portion 
is  to  be  enjoyed  by  one  than  another,  it  is  by  him 
who  is  most  richly  endowed  with  those  qualities 
that  deserve  it.  While  the  justice  of  the  laws 
will  not  suffer  any  arbitrary  alteration  of  the  land- 
marks of  property,  their  policy  ought  not  to  place 
restrictions  upon  desert  in  obtaining  it. 

The  nobility  "  the  Corinthian  capital  of  soci- 
ety ?"  They  do  far  more  to  debase  it  by  their 
vices  than  to  adorn  it  by  their  accomplishments. 
Labour,  which  was  to  primitive  man  a  curse,  is  to 
fallen  man  his  chief  blessing.  Active  life  de- 
velops all  the  elevated  energies  which  our  nature 
is  capable  of  exerting,  while  it  is  the  parent  of 
every  virtue.  An  hereditary  aristocracy,  with 
whom  the  necessity  of  labour  is  superseded,  soon 
come  to  regard  all  industrial  occupations  as  dis- 
honourable. Anything  but  amusement  and  j)leas- 
ure  appear  unbefitting  their  rank;  and  when 
amusement  and  pleasure,  instead  of  being  a  re- 
laxation from  toil  and  business,  become  thein- 


154  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACV 

selves  the  business  of  life,  they  immediately 
degenerate  into  vices.  Aristocracy  is  not  mere- 
ly itself  corrupted ;  it  becomes  a  powerful  agent 
of  corruption  in  its  turn.  Furnishing  an  ex- 
araj)le  to  other  classes,  it  induces  all  sorts  of 
extravagance,  and  makes  vice  itself  fashiona- 
ble ;  while,  from  its  elevated  position  and  com- 
manding influences,  it  has  means  of  seduction 
happily  unknown  where  there  is  no  definite  and 
permanent  division  of  ranks.  From  this  inequal- 
ity of  ranks  springs  the  distress  everywhere  inci- 
dent to  monarchical  and  aristocratic  govern- 
ments: hence  one  quarter  of  the  annual  income 
devoted  to  taxes  ;  hence  one  quarter  of  the  pop- 
ulation devoted  to  beggary. 

Luxury  ought  always  to  be  the  subsidiary  or 
the  reward  of  labour ;  so  far  as  it  is  not,  it  is  the 
curse  of  society.  When  it  comes  to  solace  a  man 
in  the  progress  of  his  labours,  or  to  greet  him  v/ith 
repose  and  comfort  at  the  close  of  them,  it  finds 
no  enemy  in  the  political  economist.  But  when 
a  whole  class,  from  generation  to  generation,  and 
from  century  to  century,  transmit  excessive  for- 
tunes,, acquired  without  labour  and  preserved 
without  merit,  it  is  a  sign  of  disease  in  the  body 
politic,  which  will  inevitably  display  itself  in  the 
debased  condition  of  the  lov^er  classes.  Such  a 
state  of  society  does  not  result  from  the  natural 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  155 

operation  of  things,  but  from  vicious  laws.  In 
such  a  restricted  territory  as  that  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, to  industriously  convert  large  portions  of  the 
earth,  designed  for  the  subsistence  of  mankind, 
into  its  original  wilderness  state,  to  afford  an  op- 
portunity for  noblemen  to  indulge  in  the  sport 
of  the  chase,  while  thousands  around  them  are 
starving  for  the  want  of  what  is  consumed  by  the 
game,  is  a  perversion  of  the  gifts  of  nature  and 
the  bounties  of  fortune  which  shocks  the  moral 
sense. 

Yet  republicanism  is  not  of  an  agrarian  char- 
acter or  spirit.  Its  immediate  object  is  an  equal 
division  of  rights,  not  of  property.  Institutions 
which  lay  their  only  sure  foundation  in  the  law 
of  justice,  which  claim  to  exist  only  by  virtue  of 
that  law,  cannot  aim  at  spoliation.  They  estab- 
lish the  firmest  legal  guarantee  of  private  rights, 
as  they  repose  the  guardianship  of  the  sacred  trust 
in  those  whose  interest  as  well  as  whose  duty  it  is 
to  defend  it.  But  republicanism  does  aim  a  death- 
blow at  all  those  laws  and  usages  the  object  of 
which  is  to  perpetuate  property  in  certain  hands, 
or  to  give  it  a  particular  and  exclusive  direction 
as  a  means  of  political  power.  It  has  no  fellow- 
ship with  the  law  of  entails  or  the  law  of  primo- 
geniture. While  it  meddles  with  no  vested  rights 
its  tendency  is  to  break  down  all  those  impolitic 


156  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

regulations  which  serve  to  make  property  a  polit- 
ical element.  The  landmarks  of  private  prop- 
erty are  as  sacred  and  immovable  in  a  republic 
as  in  a  monarchy.  It  is  political  institutions  and 
matters  of  public  policy  only  that  are  thrown  en- 
tirely into  the  hands  of  the  people;  and,  under 
that  control,  while  those  laws  only  are  enacted 
which  respect  future  acquisitions  and  not  any 
present,  vested  right,  property  is  made  easily 
transmissible  from  hand  to  hand,  and  liable  to 
a  party's  legal  obligations ;  those  perpetuities  are 
prevented  which  serve  only  to  pamper  the  pride 
of  wealth  and  family,  without  answering  any 
purpose  which  the  law  ought  to  encourage,  and 
the  natural  operation  of  things  achieves  the  rest, 
distributing  wealth  among  the  industrious  and 
deserving. 

Republicanism  is  the  uncompromising  enemy 
of  a  political  aristocracy  in  all  its  forms,  whether 
of  property  or  of  birth.  It  will  not  allow  that  an 
inanimate  possession  or  a  mere  casualty  should 
prescribe  to  beings  of  a  rational  and  moral  nature. 

It  shows  the  same  stern  hostility  to  a  hierar- 
chy that  Christianity  itself,  when  an  unpreju- 
diced ear  is  lent  to  its  precepts,  is  most  clearly 
understood  to  announce.  A  union  of  church  and 
state,  from  the  advent  of  our  Saviour,  beginning 


OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY.  157 

with  the  then  existing  Jewish  hierarchy,  down  to 
the  present  time,  has  been  the  nurse  of  bigotry 
and  superstition,  and  the  parent  of  all  the  religious 
persecution  which  has  disgraced  the  annals  of  our 
species.  The  fruitful  source  of  tyranny  on  the 
one  hand,  and  of  hypocrisy  and  corruption  on  the 
other,  under  its  baneful  influence  the  Church  has 
been  made  a  stepping-stone  of  political  power 
and  ambition,  the  profession  of  its  tenets  a  mere 
worldly  fashion,  and  Christianity  itself,  from  be- 
ing the  great  and  paramount  object  of  an  immor- 
tal existence,  has  been  degraded  to  a  subordinate 
means  of  terrestrial  and  temporary  distinction. 

These,  then,  are  the  ends  which  republicanism 
proposes  to  itself:  no  exterminating  war  but 
that  of  reason  against  force ;  no  destruction  but 
of  tyranny ;  no  division  but  of  rights ;  no  su- 
premacy but  that  of  principle. 

The  prevailing  tendency  of  our  institutions  is 
to  place  the  common  enjoyments  of  life  within 
the  reach  of  all ;  to  make  popular  books,  cheap 
newspapers,  education  accessible  and  attainable ; 
to  spur  forward  mechanics  to  that  perfection 
which  will  bring  manufactures  within  the  means 
of  all,  resting  for  their  success  upon  the  number 
rather  than  the  quality  of  their  patrons ;  leaving 
unobstructed  to  enterprise  and  merit  every  station 


158  OBJECTIONS    TO    DEMOCRACY. 

in  society ;  tending  to  "  the  greatest  happiness 
of  the  greatest  number. " 

The  reverse  tendency  is  manifest  in  the  opera- 
tion of  monarchical  and  aristocratical  govern- 
ments.  The  few,  acting  on  the  assumption  that 
they  are  Heaven's  favourites,  aim  to  raonopohze 
its  bounties,  while  they  in  fact  engage  in  a  con- 
troversy with  Heaven,  and  the  benefits  and  bless- 
ings which  Providence  makes  abundant,  their 
constant  effort  is  to  make  rare. 


PERMANENCY  OF  DEMOCRACY      lb\f 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Permanency  of  Democratic  Government,  and  the  eventual 
Prevalence  of  Democratic  Principles. 

"If  we  examine  what  has  happened  in  France 
at  intervals  of  fifty  years,  beginning  with  the 
eleventh  century,  we  shall  invariably  perceive 
that  a  twofold  revolution  has  taken  place  in  the 
state  of  society.  The  noble  has  gone  down  on 
the  social  ladder,  and  the  roturier  has  gone  up , 
the  one  descends  as  the  other  rises.  Every  half 
century  brings  them  nearer  to  each  other,  and 
they  will  very  shortly  meet. 

"  Nor  is  this  phenomenon  at  all  peculiar  to 
France.  Whithersoever  we  turn  our  eyes,  wc 
shall  witness  the  same  continual  revolution 
throughout  the  whole  of  Christendom. 

"The  various  occurrences  of  national  exist- 
ence have  everywhere  turned  to  the  advant^;^*^ 
of  democracy ;  all  men  have  aided  it  by  thcit 
exertions  ;  those  who  have  intentionally  labour- 
ed in  its  cause,  and  those  who  have  server!  ]*■ 
unwittingly  ;  those  who  have  fought  for  it,  and 
those  who  have  declared  themselves  its  oppc- 


160  PERMANENCY    AND    EVENTUAL 

nents,  have  all  been  driven  along  in  the  same 
track,  have  all  laboured  to  one  end,  some  igno- 
rantly  and  some  Unwillingly ;  all  have  been  blind 
instruments  in  the  hands  of  God. 

"  The  gradual  development  of  the  equality  of 
conditions  is  therefore  a  providential  fact,  and  it 
possesses  all  the  characteristics  of  a  Divine  de- 
cree :  it  is  universal,  it  is  durable,  it  constantly 
eludes  all  human  interference ;  and  all  events,  as 
well  as  all  men,  contribute  to  its  progress."* 

Thus  says  De  Tocqueville.  And  this  furnishes 
of  itself  a  strong  presumptive  argument  in  fa- 
vour of  the  justice  and  propriety  of  democrat- 
ic government.  Does  God  will  universal  an- 
archy or  universal  injustice?  the  supremacy  of 
the  mob,  the  annihilation  of  property,  or  the 
dissolution  of  the  bands  of  law  and  order  ?  Re- 
publican government,  then,  partakes  of  none  of 
these  qualities.  Will  not  the  Divine  Providence 
respect  institutions  founded  in  justice,  and  matu- 
red by  wisdom  and  experience  ?  Such,  then, 
cannot  be  the  basis,  nor  such  the  maturity  of 
monarchical  and  aristocratical  governments. 

The  transitoriness  of  republics  has  long  been 
a  favourite  theme  «f  declamation  with  the  ene- 

*  Democracy  in  America,  by  De  Tocqueville,  part  i.,  Intro 
duction. 


IREVALENCE  OF  DEMOCRACV.      101 

mies  of  human  liberty,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  constant  spread  and  eventual  prevalence  of 
democratic  principles  ever  will  be  subjects  of 
grateful  contemplation  to  its  friends.  The  ad- 
mirable discussion  of  De  Tocqueville  is  based 
upon  the  constant  and  uniform  tendency  of  events, 
as  shown  by  the  light  of  history.  The  subject 
seems  to  admit  equally  well  of  a  priori  reason- 
ing, and  the  conclusion  to  which  he  arrives  to  be 
capable  of  a  philosophical  demonstration,  inde- 
pendently of  historical  facts. 

We  have  seen  that  mankind  are  universally 
entitled  to  the  exercise  of  self-government,  as  a 
matter  of  right,  by  the  law  of  justice,  and  that 
every  other  form  of  government  is  no  better  than 
an  usurpation.  Establish  but  one  uniform  law 
of  justice  for  all  mankind,  and  a  republic  is  the 
necessary  consequence.  A  republic  is  not  so  cor- 
rectly a  form  of  government  as  it  is  the  suprem- 
acy of  principle.  It  is  that  state  in  which  man- 
kind enjoy  liberty.  It  is  an  exemption  from  all 
unlawful  restraints.  Forms  of  government  have 
been,  for  the  most  part,  only  so  many  various 
modes  of  tyranny.  Where  the  people  are  every- 
thing, and  political  forms,  establishments,  insti- 
tutions, as  opposed  to  the  people,  nothing,  there, 
and  there  only,  is  liberty ;  such  a  state,  and  such 
N 


j;62  PERMANENCY    AND    EVENTUAL 

a  state  only,  constitutes  republican  government, 
the  fundamental  principle  of  which  is  not  a  hu- 
man invention,  buf  results  from  the  leaving  un- 
trammelled by  human  devices  the  just  and  natu- 
ral relations  of  man  to  man.  Let  man  be  just  to 
his  fellow-man,  and  relinquish  all  usurpation,  and 
we  shall  all  be  as  exactly  equal  in  the  eye  of 
politics  as  we  are  in  that  of  morals. 

The  question,  then,  as  respects  the  progress 
and  eventual  supremacy  of  republican  principles, 
is  no  more  nor  less  than  this :  will  justice  be 
maintained  in  the  public  relations  of  man  to  man, 
and  its  empire  be  enlarged,  or  wull  society  be 
surrendered  up  to  the  dominion  of  force  ?  will 
men,  like  brutes,  be  governed,  or,  like  raional 
and  moral  creatures,  govern  themselves  1  The 
whole  tendency  of  man's  moral  nature  must  de 
termine  him  towards  self-government,  and  every 
step  which  society  takes  in  moral  improvement 
must  bring  it  nearer  to  a  republican  form  and 
spirit.  If  there  be  a  tendency  in  the  species  to- 
wards progressive  improvement,  if  there  be  a 
dispensation  over  us  which  points  to  the  eventual 
realization,  in  the  affairs  of  men,  of  those  princi- 
ples of  rectitude  existing  in  the  Divine  Mind,  we 
must  be  continually  approximating  to  this  con- 
■iummation  of  political  ji^tice.     The  cause  of  the 


PREVALENCE    OF    DEMOCRACY.  163 

republican  is  intimately  allied  with  the  highest 
terrestrial  hopes  and  the  best  interests  of  man- 
kind, and  we  cannot  cherish  the  prospect  of  the 
universal  political  emancipation  of  our  race  with- 
out elevating",  nor  relinquish  it  W'ithout  depress- 
ing, ourselves  in  the  scale  of  existence. 

We  must  keep  continually  in  view,  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  this  subject,  a  distinction  to  which  we 
have  repeatedly  adverted,  between  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  government  and  its  mechan- 
ical structure  and  practical  operations.  The 
essence  of  republican  government,  its  peculiar 
and  distinguishing  principle,  is  the  supremacy  of 
the  popular  will.  It  is  this  that  constitutes  a  re- 
public; it  is  this  that  makes  it  an  emanation 
from  the  eternal  and  immutable  law  of  justice. 
That  a  people  have  the  moral  right  of  self-gov- 
ernment is  equally  true  of  every  people  in  every 
age  and  country.  This  fundamental  principle, 
as  permanent,  as  universal,  as  the  race  itself,  pre- 
vents republican  government  from  ever  becoming 
obsolete  when  once  instituted.  Its  moral  nature 
and  relations,  like  those  of  man,  never  change. 
But  in  its  practical  character  it  is,  like  man,  the 
mere  creature  of  circumstances.  That  men  should 
govern  themselves  is  its  fixed  and  unalterable 
principle,  predicated  upon  the  moral  character 


164     PERMANENCY  AND  EVENTUAL 

of  man ;  but  what  particular  frame  they  should 
adopt  in  the  exercise  of  self-government,  what 
particular  measures  of  public  policy,  when  the 
government  is  once  organized,  are  questions 
which  it  leaves  to  be  determined  entirely  by  lo- 
cal position,  by  previous  habits,  by  the  age,  and 
the  thousand  other  capricious  circumstances  that 
make  up  the  diversities  of  human  condition.  The 
people  of  a  republic  never  can,  therefore,  be  at 
variance  with  their  government.  In  its  essential 
principles  it  is  a  transcript  from  their  nature ;  in 
its  practical  character  it  is  the  mere  creature  of 
their  will.  A  thousand  years  hence,  if  we  should 
so  long  endure  as  a  nation,  a  republic  will  be  as 
proper  for  us  as  now.  Hence  it  possesses  a  prin- 
ciple of  permanency  which  monarchical  govern- 
ment can  never  acquire. 

Monarchy  is  ordinarily  the  product  of  a  dis- 
tant age,  and  its  authority  is  generally  absolute 
in  proportion  as  its  origin  is  remote.  In  every 
other  provision  for  our  wants,  in  all  affairs  in 
which  mankind  are  left  free  to  provide  for  their 
own  wants  in  their  own  way,  the  dictates  of 
wisdom  and  our  habits  of  life  prompt  us  to  adopt 
the  latest  inventions  and  improvements ;  we 
adopt  nothing  simply  because  it  is  old,  nor  reject 
anythinp:  simply  because  it  is  new ;  but,  while 
our  preju  lifTs  ntt.irh  us  to  the  (•]{],  our  rcasr^n 


PREVALENCE    OF    DEMOCRACY.  165 

points  US  to  the  new,  and  we  subject  everything 
to  the  test  of  utility.  In  the  all'air  of  govern- 
ment alone,  civilized  and  enlightened  men  are 
found  weak  enough  to  bind  themselves  implicitly 
lo  the  past,  and  renounce  the  benefits  of  experi- 
ence and  improvement.  But  how  absurd  the 
s}stem  that  points  to  a  race  which  lived  ten  cen- 
turies ago,  as  endowed  with  such  supernatural 
farsightedness  as  to  be  able  to  prescribe  for  the 
present  generation  better  than  the  present  gener- 
ation, with  all  the  experience,  and  all  the  accu- 
mulated wisdom  and  improvements  of  every  other 
added  to  its  own,  can  prescribe  for  itself.  Ori- 
ginating, as  monarchical  government  generally 
does,  in  a  veiy  remote  age,  but  exercising  its 
functions  to  provide  for  the  wants  and  necessities 
of  the  present ;  ambitious  and  encroaching  in  the 
character  of  its  chief  functionary,  but  inflexible 
in  its  constitution  to  the  spirit  of  improvement  j 
basing  itself  upon  prescription,  and  governing 
itself  by  precedent,  it  must,  in  its  very  nature, 
be  continually  at  variance  with  its  subjects.  It 
is  the  past  in  conflict  with  the  present.  It  is 
necessarily  at  war  with  every  proposed  meliora- 
tion. The  people  cannot  feel  a  new  want  with- 
0}ii  its  being  necessary  to  assail  the  constitution 
in  order  to  obtain  it.  The  governing  power  must 
fitick  to  old  landmarks,  or  it  would  be  entirely 


166      PERMANENCY  AND  EVENTUAL 

overwhelmed  by  innovations.  Actuated  by  a  de- 
sire to  maintain  its  sovereignty  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  people  actuated  only  by  a  sense  of  in- 
jury and  by  necessity  on  the  other,  two  separ- 
ate  and  independent  parties  are  created,  hav- 
ing distinct  interests  and  antagonist  forces.  The 
seeds  of  strife  are  sown  in  the  very  elements  of 
such  governments.  The  longer  they  endure,  the 
more  oppressive  become  the  prerogatives  of  sov- 
ereignty, the  more  numerous,  extensive,  and  irre- 
sistible the  wants  of  the  people.  Time  inflicts 
its  changes  indiscriminately  on  both  parties,  and 
places  them  more  and  more  widely  at  variance 
with  each  other,  until  at  length  the  government, 
which,  unless  forcibly  reformed  by  the  people, 
only  becomes  continually  more  absurd,  at  the 
same  time  that  it  grows  proportionally  more  vio- 
lent and  tyranical,  must  finally  yield  to  the 
growing  intelligence,  and  greater  strength  and 
numbers  of  the  people.  So  much  have  force  and 
fear  to  do  with  the  nature  of  monarchical  govern- 
ment, that  every  improvement  it  receives  is  look- 
ed upon  as  a  concession;  it  is  not  considered 
whether  all  has  been  allowed  that  the  interests 
of  the  people  demand,  but  whether  all  has  been 
conceded  that  cannot  safely  be  withheld.  And, 
be  it  observed,  every  improvement  which  is  thus 
conceded  to  the  increasing  intelligence  and  liberal 


PREVALENCE    OF    DEMOCRACY.  167 

s})irit  of  the  age  only  assimilates  monarchy  more 
nearly  to  republican  government.  Thus  jealousy 
of  feeling,  opposition  of  interests  and  of  motive, 
which  are  only  aggravated  by  time,  inhere  in  the 
very  constitution  of  monarchical  government  and 
predestinate  it  to  destruction,  while  republican 
government  has  for  its  basis  the  eternal  and  im- 
mutable principles  of  justice,  which  preserve  the 
people  in  an  unvarying  relation  to  their  political 
institutions,  and  admit  without  disturbance  every 
human  improvement. 

Republicanism  is  the  common  cause  of  the 
species.  Republican  government  is  everywhere 
essentially  the  same,  for  it  is  everywhere  the 
government  of  man  by  himself.  The  division 
into  nations  is,  therefore,  in  its  view,  a  question 
of  expediency  and  convenience  merely.  The 
glory  of  a  monarch  is  his  power ;  of  a  republic, 
its  liberties.  A  monarch  aspires  to  conquest  as 
the  means  of  gratifying  his  pride  and  ambition, 
augmenting  his  revenue,  increasing  the  number 
of  his  subjects,  multiplying  his  means  and  re- 
sources for  other  conquests,  and  throwing  into 
his  hands  numerous  posts  of  honour  and  profit 
for  the  gratification  of  his  dependants.  But  a 
republic  can  conquer  only  to  impart  its  liber- 
.  ties.     Under  such   a   supremacy  it   ceases   to 


168      PERMANENCY  AND  EVENTUAL 

be  an  object  of  ambition  for  man  to  subdue  and 
enslave  his  fellow-man.  All  mankind  are  taught 
by  the  principles  of  republicanism  to  regard  each 
other  as  of  one  common  family,  and  national  dis- 
tinctions sink  into  the  most  perfect  insignificance. 
In  republican  principles  being  thus  the  com- 
mon cause  of  all  mankind,  the  same  in  every 
age  and  nation,  we  see  the  real  source  of  that 
sympathy  which  binds  us  so  strongly  to  the  pa- 
triots of  Greece,  of  Rome,  and  of  Poland,  and  to 
the  brave  assertors  of  liberty  in  every  clime  and 
of  every  period.  The  principle  of  liberty  is  a 
fraternizing  principle.  Republics  are  bad  neigh- 
bours for  other  governments.  It  is,  always  has 
been,  and  always  must  be  so.  No  state  expedi- 
ents, no  vigilance  of  government  can  prevent  it. 
The  cause  of  the  oppressed  of  every  country  is 
identical.  People  will  make  common  cause  with 
people.  And  how  contemptible  must  appear  the 
tyrants  and  oppressors  of  the  species,  how  des- 
picable their  strength,  how  mean  their  devices, 
how  glaring  their  usurpation,  when  arrayed 
against  the  innumerable  and  united  hosts  they 
have  plundered  of  liberty,  and  reduced  to  the 
condition  of  subjects.  It  is  appalling  to  think 
of  the  almost  universal  combination  of  interests 
which  really  subsists  against  monarchy,  reposing 
in  inactivity  only  from  want  of  intelligence  and 


PREVALENCE    OF   DEMOCRACY.  169 

of  concert.  The  physical  strength  of  society,  and 
all  its  real  interests,  combine  with  the  justice  of 
republican  government  to  precipitate  society  into 
that  form.    Monarchy  subsists  only  by  sufferance. 

The  cause  of  monarchy  is,  to  a  great  extent, 
of  a  personal  nature,  and  undergoes  simultane- 
ous changes  with  every  fluctuation  in  the  fortune 
of  the  individual  or  family  with  whom  it  is  as- 
sociated, and  is  subjected  to  all  the  vicissitades 
of  human  experience.  Not  so  with  republican 
government.  It  is  of  an  abstract  nature,  to  which 
nothing  can  be  added,  from  which  nothing  can 
be  subtracted.  The  hopes  and  wishes  of  man- 
kind are  constantly  directed  towards  it  as  a 
fixed  point.  Whatever  deviations  political  tem- 
pests may  force  them  to  undergo,  their  ultimate 
course  must  and  will  be  rectified  by  this  polar 
star. 

Combinations  are  much  more  easily  effected 
to  subvert  monarchy  than  to  support  it,  to  ad- 
vance liberal  principles  than  to  uphold  usurpa- 
tion. Every  other  political  cause  but  that  of 
democracy  is  the  cause  of  ■power ;  it  addresses 
itself  to  the  interest  of  its  associates.  It  can 
command  as  many  as  it  can  bribe  with  the  expec- 
tation of  rewards;  it  can  retain  them  while  it  can 
h()1d  out  a  prospect  of  success.    It  fmils  its  read- 


1/0  PERMANENCY    AND    EVENTUAL 

iest  converts  in  those  who  are  most  corrupt- 
Not  so  with  combinations  in  favour  of  democ- 
racy. It  is  the  cause  of  principle,  of  justice.  It 
is  easily  made  known.  Its  confederates  do  not 
address  themselves  to  personal  and  individual  in- 
terests, but  to  the  conscience.  If  they  wish  to 
make  a  proselyte,  they  have  not  to  exhibit  a  mus- 
ter-roll of  their  strength  and  numbers,  or  make- 
an  imposing  display  of  the  multitude  and  extent 
of  their  resources.  They  convert  by  addressing 
themselves  to  the  enlightened  dictates  of  the  un- 
derstanding, and  the  warm  and  upright  impulses 
of  the  heart.  The  merit  of  the  cause  does  not 
depend  upon  its  success.  Every  good  man  is  its 
natural  ally.  Its  supporters  are  the  best,  not  the 
worst  of  the  species.  If  the  attempt  fail,  failure 
may  bring  temporary  misfortune,  but  it  brings  also 
permanent  fame.  Confederations  thus  easily 
formed,  and  of  such  materials,  must  always  be 
the  apprehension  of  despotic  governments ;  and 
the  fact  that  such  are,  in  the  nature  of  things,  so 
highly  probable,  must  render  the  existence  of 
monarchy  in  this  age  highly  precarious,  and  its 
long  continuance  in  enhghtened  countries  ex- 
tremely problematical.  Attempt  after  attempt 
may  fail,  but  men  will  pertinaciously  persist  in  a 
cause  that  commands  so  much  virtuous  admira- 
tion, and  is  so  congenial  to  our  native  impulses. 


PREVALENCE    OF    DEMOCRACY.  171 

Every  failure  will  but  give  birth  to  a  new  enter- 
prise, until  success  must  eventually  crown  efforts 
which,  in  all  human  probability,  will  be  inces- 
santly renewed  so  long  as  humanity  remains  un- 
changed. 

To  have  the  permaneacy  of  nature,  every  in- 
stitution must  conform  to  the  laws  of  nature. 
Monarchy  is  at  variance  with  the  natural  dispo- 
sition of  man  and  his  innate  sense  of  justice 
What  is  unjust  cannot  in  its  nature  be  durable. 
The  Providence  which  presides  over  the  universe 
does  not  admit  of  it.  In  the  separate  and  isolated 
cases  of  individuals,  the  law  of  justice  may  often 
be  violated,  and  yet  be  unavenged  by  nature.  It 
is  certainly,  however,  the  natural  tendency  of 
things,  even  in  this  life,  that  vice  should  be  fol- 
lowed by  punishment;  and,  whatever  may  be  the 
facfln  individual  instances,  when  we  comprehend 
so  large  a  number  of  individuals,  or  so  long  a  pe- 
riod of  time,  as  to  represent  the  aggregate  of  hu- 
man experience,  the  laws  of  morals  will  gener- 
ally be  found  to  have  been  vindicated  by  the  ret- 
ributions of  Providence.  The  histories  of  nations 
represent  the  aggregates  of  human  experience. 
Time — (a  lapse  of  time,  which,  though  long  for 
an  individual,  is  still  short  for  the  species) — time 
has  been  maturing  these  great  principles  for  their 
development,  and  at  this  advanced  period  of  the 


172      PERMANENCY  AND  EVENTUAL 

world,  when  society  is  everywhere  in  such  a  fer- 
ment, it  needs  no  hardy  prophet  to  predict  the 
proximate  downfall  of  monarchy  in  civilized 
states. 

Infirmity  is  involved  in  the  very  form  and  con- 
stitution of  monarchical  government.  It  is  the 
sovereignty  of  the  few  over  the  many ;  compar- 
atively few,  therefore,  are  directly  interested  in 
its  defence  and  preservation;  yet,  the  absolute 
strength  actually  residing  in  the  masses,  it  is 
compelled  to  trust  its  defence  to  those  who  have 
no  immediate  interest  in  its  preservation,  nay,  to 
those  who,  if  they  properly  appreciated  their  own 
situation,  would  become  sensible  of  a  direct  in- 
terest in  its  downfall.  To  the  subject,  usurpation 
or  conquest  is  merely  a  change  of  masters; 
whereas,  on  the  contrary,  every  republican  has  a 
direct  personal  interest  in  asserting  and  main- 
taining the  liberties  of  his  country.  Hence  repub- 
lics often  arm  en  masse,  and  no  republic  has  ever 
been  conquered  until  it  has  first  been  corrupted. 

Every  form  of  government  which  is  not  self- 
government  is  necessarily  centralized ;  is  in  the 
few.  It  has  a  separateness  and  locality  admit- 
ting of  every  unfriendly  attempt  being  concen- 
trated upon  one  or  a  few  points,  which,  once 
carried,  it  falls.  Hence,  in  the  most  despotic 
countries,  as  Russia  and  Turkey,  a  successful 


PREVALENCE    OF    DEMOCRACY.  173 

plot  in  the  palace  changes  the  sovereignty  of 
the  nation;  in  countries  less  so,  a  successful 
emeute  in  a  city.  The  scene  of  the  late  revolu- 
tion in  France  was  confined  to  the  streets  of 
Paris.  It  is  an  invariable  ordinance  of  nature, 
the  more  despotic  the  power,  the  fewer  hands  it 
must  be  concentrated  in,  and  the  more  unstable 
"will  be  its  foundation.  The  same  defect  may  be 
predicated  of  every  government  of  one  man  or 
set  of  men  over  others  ;  and,  though  it  becomes 
less  and  less,  in  proportion  as  power  is  less  con- 
centrated, yet,  as  the  disproportion  between  the 
governors  and  the  governed  in  monarchies  must 
always  be  great,  it  is  an  intrinsic  and  unavoid- 
able defect  which  predisposes  all  such  govern- 
ments to  decay  and  dissolution.  Not  so  with  re- 
publics. The  sovereignty  is  coextensive  with 
the  limits  of  the  state.  What  matters  it  to  their 
citizens  if  their  capital  be  taken  ?  It  no  more 
deranges  their  measures  of  defence  than  if  it 
were  the  most  inconsiderable  town  in  the  coun- 
try. Accustomed  to  be  informed  and  to  act  upon 
every  public  interest,  to  regard  their  governors 
as  their  servants,  and  not  as  their  masters,  they 
are  prepared  for  every  emergency.  They  are 
not  subdued  while  the  smallest  part  of  them  is 
free.  No  secrets  of  state  repose  in  the  portfolios 
P2 


174     PERMANENCY  AND  EVENTUAL 

of  their  ministers.  If  their  governors  are  pris' 
oners  of  war,  the  people  are  not  dismayed.  The 
nation  is  the  government,  and  the  government  the 
nation ;  and  the  government  will  subsist  until  the 
whole  people  are  subdued.  While  a  man  is  free, 
he  knows  that  he  has  something  to  fight  for ;  for 
he  feels  that  he  himself  is  a  sovereign. 

The  infirmities  in  monarchical  government 
from  the  concentration  of  its  powers  are  equally 
apparent,  whether  reference  is  made  to  its  dan- 
ger from  internal  or  from  external  force.  They 
are  the  concomitants  of  a  subjecting  power  in  all 
its  forms,  whether  that  of  kings,  or  of  nobles,  or 
of  cities. 

Hence  the  destruction  of  ancient  republics.  In 
violation  of  liberty,  they  lorded  it  over  neigL 
bouring  cities  and  whole  nations.  In  their  in- 
terior economy,  indeed,  they  were  republican; 
but  in  their  relation  to  other  states  and  commu- 
nities they  were  monarchical.  They  had  all 
the  centralization  of  monarchical  government. 
Athens  ruled  Attica  with  imperial  sway ;  Spar- 
ta, Laconia ;  Thebes,  Boeotia;  Rome,  the  world. 
The  natural  and  inevitable  consequence  by  de- 
cree of  Nature  followed.  They  broke  in  pieces 
from  the  extent  of  their  dominion.  Their  empire 
was  augmented  in  an  arithmetical  ratio ;  their 
strength  and  durability  were  diminished  in  a  ge- 


r-REVALENCE  OF  DEMOCRACY.      175 

ometrical  or  compound  ratio  ;  the  numbers  in 
terested  in  the  sovereignty  became  comparatively 
less,  while  the  extent  of  conquest  to  be  maintain- 
ed became  continually  greater.  The  citizen  sol- 
dier was  supplanted  by  the  mercenary.  The  ser- 
vant of  the  state,  and  himself  a  constituent  part 
of  the  state,  fighting  in  self-defence,  was  sup- 
planted by  the  soldier  of  fortune,  attached  to  the 
person  of  his  general,  and  fighting  for  the  acqui- 
sition of  plunder  or  power.  While  the  empire 
was  coextensive  with  the  republic,  the  state  de- 
pended upon  itself  for  its  armies,  and  was  ade- 
quate to  its  own  preservation ;  but  when  the  con- 
quests of  the  republic  were  so  widely  extended, 
it  had  to  employ  a  force  able  to  dictate  its  own 
terms  to  the  empire.*  The  republic  was  no  better 
off  with  its  subjects  than  its  armies.  The  nations 
it  subdued  became  less  warlike;  they  were  easily 
detached  from  their  sovereign ;  they  had  no  per- 
sonal interest  in  maintaining  the  power  which 
had  subjugated  them.  It  is  an  invariable  law  of 
Providence,  which  nothing  can  resist,  that  man, 
not  being  made  for  the  government  of  his  fellow- 
man,  can  never  hold  him  in  permanent  subjection. 
The  extensive  dominion  of  the  ancient  repub- 
lics was  likewise  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  their 
corruption.  Hence  the  tribute  derived  from  sub- 
*  Grandeur  et  Decadence  des  Romains,  chap.  v. 


176     PERMANENCY  AND  EVENTUAL 

jugated  provinces,  that  enabled  the  idle  populace 
of  the  imperial  cities  of  ancient  times  to  subsist 
on  the  public  treasury,  and  furnished  their  lead- 
ers and  demagogues  with  the  means  of  corrupt- 
ing the  people  with  their  own  money.  It  was 
this  extensive  dominion  that  eventually  brought 
all  occupations,  except  those  of  the  soldier  and 
the  politician,  into  disrepute,  and  excluded  busi- 
ness industry,  that  great  preservative  of  morals, 
from  the  ordinary  habits  of  ancient  people.  It 
was  this  that  made  whole  states  select  individ- 
ual citizens  for  their  patrons,  and  fee  them  with 
princely  presents ;  that  enabled  the  great  men  of 
those  times  to  realize  immense  wealth  from  the 
plunder  of  unfortunate  provinces,  and  laid  the 
foundation  for  that  contest  of  bribery  when  they 
were  prosecuted  for  extortion,  between  their  mu- 
nificent fortunes  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
wealth  and  resources  of  oppressed  states  on  the 
other,  which  brought  all  the  public  virtue  in  the 
empire  into  market.  Thus  the  extensive  empire 
of  the  ancient  cities,  entirely  at  variance  with 
republican  principles,  and  gained  by  unjust  con- 
quests, opened  and  fed  all  the  avenues  of  cor- 
ruption, and  Providence,  by  one  of  those  just 
retributions  which  characterize  the  moral  gov- 
ernment of  the  universe,  made  their  unjust  usur- 
pations the  instrument  of  their  own  destructiom 


PREVALENCE    OF    DEMOCRACY.  177 

We  are  not  to  expect,  in  the  natural  course  of 
things,  either  public  or  private  degeneracy  in  a 
republic  from  the  influx  of  public  or  private  pros- 
perity. Ease  and  abundance  are  the  appropriate 
rewards  of  labour  j  they  ordinarily  come  at  the 
latter  part  of  a  man's  career,  when  moderate 
habits  have  rendered  him  secure  from  their  se- 
ductive influences.  Leave  property  to  seek  its 
own  channels,  enact  no  laws  to  make  it  inalien- 
able, and  the  natural  course  of  things  will  di- 
rect its  transmission  to  those  who  have  earned  it 
by  their  industry  and  frugality  j  while  the  largest 
accumulations  will  pass  rapidly  from  the  prodigal 
and  licentious,  and  reduce  them  and  their  pos- 
terity to  a  condition  of  want  and  dependance, 
whence  they  can  only  rise  by  a  renewal  of  those 
virtues  by  which  the  wealth  of  their  ancestors 
was  originally  acquired.  There  is  no  danger, 
therefore,  when  things  are  left  to  take  their  nat- 
ural and  proper  course,  our  habits  not  corrupted 
by  vicious  legislation,  and  a  perverse  policy  on 
the  part  of  our  government.  There  is  no  dan- 
■  ger  to  be  apprehended  from  the  increase  of  pub- 
lic wealth,  and  the  multiplication  and  improve- 
ment of  the  comforts  of  life.  Our  wants  must 
still  be  supplied  by  human  labour  and  skill ;  and, 
so  long  as  these  are  necessary,  in  whatever  form 


178      PERMANENCY  AND  EVENTUAI 

they  are  exerted,  they  will  operate  as  an  effec- 
tual protection  to  the  pubhc  morals. 

But  we  have,  in  these  modern  times,  a  more 
powerful  guarantee  for  the  public  morals.  We 
have  the  Christian  religion,  which  Greece  and 
Rome  had  not.  Its  code  of  morals  is  perfect. 
Its  sanctions  are  as  powerful  as  it  is  possible  for 
the  imagination  to  conceive.  It  is  never  satisfied 
with  the  improvement  of  its  disciples ;  it  will 
never  cease  to  make  converts,  until  it  embraces 
the  universal  race  of  man.  If  humanity  had  a 
downward  tendency,  this  religion  would  arrest 
its  progress.  It  is  implicitly  believed  by  us  that 
its  achievements  will  be  equal  to  its  aims,  and 
that  it  will  go  on  conquering  and  to  conquer  until 
it  shall  have  restored  our  race  to  its  primeval  pu- 
rity. On  the  contraiy,  rites  and  ceremonies  con- 
stituted the  chief  part  of  the  religion  of  the  an- 
cients ;  and  those  rites  and  ceremonies,  so  far  from 
improving,  corrupted  their  votaries.  The  most 
disgusting  and  abominable  orgies  formed  a  part 
of  them ;  while  theft  had  a  patron  in  Mercury, 
drunkenness  in  Bacchus,  licentiousness  in  Venus, 
and  every  vice  a  precedent  in  the  conduct  of  some 
of  the  numerous  divinities  of  the  ancient  mythol- 
ogy. It  may  readily  be  supposed  that  heathen- 
ism had  but  little  connexion  with  the  study  of 


PREVALENCE    OF    DEMOCRACY.  179 

morals,  which,  while  that  odious  system  was 
universally  popular,  excited  no  interest  among 
the  people,  but  was  confined  to  the  schools  of  the 
philosophers.  There  was  thus  no  renovating 
principle  for  human  nature ;  and  it  was  left  under 
all  the  seductive  influence  of  circumstances,  com- 
bined with  a  religion,  itself  the  offspring  of  the 
passions  and  vices  of  men,  to  an  uncertain  de- 
pendance  on  natural  temperament  and  the  un- 
aided sanctions  of  a  natural  conscience. 

But  the  Christian  religion  not  merely  preserves 
our  morals  from  corruption,  and  gives  them  a  de- 
cided and  continuous  impulse  towards  improve- 
ment :  it  tends  directly  to  the  institution  of  de- 
mocracy. Make  men  just,  and  they  must  be 
democratic.  What  will  become  of  usurpation 
and  force,  corruption  and  fraud,  as  Christianity 
takes  its  march  over  the  earth  ?  It  respects  no 
abuses,  however  ancient.  It  sanctions  nothing 
but  what  is  wise  and  what  is  good.  It  abhors 
the  corruption,  extravagance,  and  vanity  of 
courts.  It  imbues  man  deeply  with  the  fear  of 
God,  and  those  who  fear  God  are  inaccessible  to 
any  other  fear.  It  fills  us  with  a  sense  of  the 
absolute  equality  of  the  species.  It  teaches  us 
to  respect  nothing  so  much  as  principle.  It  in- 
spires the  most  dignified  independence.     It  is 


180     PERMANENCY  AND  EVENTUAL 

democratic  in  its  Author;  our  Saviour  himself 
came  from  the  common  people ;  he  was  born  in 
a  manger;  he  was  a  carpenter's  son.  It  was 
democratic  in  its  apostles;  they  were  fisher- 
men, poor,  ignorant,  and  despised.  It  expresses 
its  pr-eference  of  the  poor.  Its  morals  are  di- 
gested to  the  comprehension  of  the  poor  and  illit- 
erate. Its  sanctions,  no  man  so  stupid  but  that 
he  can  comprehend.  It  inculcates  the  liberty 
of  conscience;  and  no  man  who  is  thoroughly 
impressed  with  the  truth  that  his  Creator  has  in- 
trusted to  him  his  own  eternal  salvation,  can  well 
doubt  that  the  same  wise  Providence  has  fully 
accomplished  him  for  the  subordinate  relations 
and  responsibilities  of  this  life,  and  his  own  gov- 
ernment among  the  rest.  No  book  ever  written 
makes  us  so  sensible  as  the  Christian  revelation 
of  the  dignity  of  man  as  man,  and  the  frivolity 
of  all  those  temporary  or  accidental  distinctions 
with  which  the  world  has  been  so  long  oppressed. 
I  cannot  refrain  from  noticinof  some  strong 
points  of  similarity  between  the  history  of  reli- 
gion and  of  democratic  liberty  ;  nor  can  I  believe 
these  points  of  resemblance  between  the  fate  of 
truth  in  religion  and  of  truth  in  politics,  man's 
chief  terrestrial  and  the  summary  of  man's  celes- 
tial good,  to  be  entirely  capricious  and  fanciful 


PREVALENCE    OF    DEMOCRACY.  181 

Both  have  always  had  the  predominance  of 
numbers  against  them.  Both  are  sustained  by 
principle,  and  would  be  annihilated  by  precedent 
or  authority.  Both  flourish  best  on  the  same  soil, 
and  sympathize  deeply  in  each  other's  success- 
es. Both  have  always  inculcated  the  same  con- 
tempt for  human  authority,  the  same  regard  for 
the  poorer  and  humbler  classes,  the  same  disre- 
gard of  merely  adventitious  and  accidental  dis- 
tinctions, the  same  paramount  authority  of  prin- 
ciple. Both  have  for  their  basis  the  law  of  be- 
nevolence. Both  have  been  reproached  with  the 
origin  and  character  of  their  supporters.  Both 
have  been  stigmatized  as  the  occasion  of  an  ex- 
tensive destruction  of  the  species.  Both  have 
borne  the  reproach  of  being  disorganizing  and 
anarchical. 

The  Christian  religion  is  emphatically  a  reli- 
gion for  the  people.  It  impregnates  the  masses 
■with  something  better  than  humanity.  What  a 
religion  for  the  many  !  What  a  basis  for  popu- 
lar government !  How  elevated  and  how  sub- 
stantial the  hopes  of  the  friend  of  popular  rights, 
when  he  feels  that  the  progress  of  human  liberty 
must  keep  pace  with  the  progress  of  Christian 
illumination,  and  that  the  cause  of  man  is  thus 
identified  with  the  cause  of  his  Maker ! 


PART    II. 
CHAPTER  I. 

The  alleged  "Tyranny  of  the  Majority"  in  America.* 

We  do  not  subscribe  to  the  principle  that  the 
majority  are  always  right  and  can  do  no  wrong. 
The  presumption  is  certainly  in  their  favour, 
from  the  vast  combination  of  wisdom  and  of 
will ;  but  we  are  as  far  from  acknowledging  a 
pope  in  our  politics  as  in  our  religion,  and  hold 
majorities,  like  individuals,  to  be  but  fallible 
men. 

Let  us  revert  to  the  foundation  on  which  the 
power,  or,  more  properly  speaking,  the  right  of 
majorities  in  republican  communities  is  founded, 
and  see  how  far  it  actually  extends. 

The  great  aim  and  end  of  civil  society  are  to 
secure  justice  between  man  and  man ;  and,  on 
examination,  it  will  be  found  that  in  republics  al- 
most all  its  powers  are,  in  point  of  fact,  while  it 

*  See  De  Tocqvieville's  "  Democracy  in  America,"  part  L, 
rhap.  IV. 


184  TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

may  well  be  doubted  whether,  legitimately,  all 
ought  not  to  be,  restricted  to  the  necessary  means 
for  the  accomplishment  of  this  great  end.  The 
power  to  declare  war  and  raise  armies  is  to  protect 
government,  and  the  power  to  levy  taxes,  to  sup- 
port it  in  the  administration  of  this  office ;  the 
power  to  coin  money,  and  the  power  to  regulate 
weights  and  measures,  furnish  it  with  fixed 
standards  for  this  object ;  its  power  to  issue  pa- 
tents merely  secures  a  right  founded  on  the  first 
principles  of  justice;  and  so  of  most  of  the  other 
powers  of  government :  its  power  to  make  inter- 
nal improvements,  and  its  power  to  manage  the 
postoffice,  seem  to  be  of  a  different  character. 
But  whether  or  not  the  jurisdiction  of  govern- 
ment should  be  exclusively  restricted  to  the  ob- 
ject just  mentioned,  it  is  certain  that  what  other 
powers  soever  it  does  exercise  are  for  infinitely 
subordinate  purposes,  and  sink  to  nothing  in  the 
comparison  of  importance.  When  men  unite, 
therefore,  in  civil  societies,  it  is  for  the  purpose 
of  securing  the  prompt,  uniform,  and  peaceful 
administration  of  justice,  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing  (as  justice  is  the  practical  discharge  of 
what  our  rights  claim  from  other  men),  for  the 
protection  and  enjoyment  of  our  rights.  But 
how,  when  we  are  all,  as  we  have  seen,  made 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  185 

the  natural  judges  of  our  rights,  are  we  to  ar- 
rive at  what  justice  really  is  1  There  is,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  a  perfect  rulej  but  we  see  it 
imperfectly,  and  individuals  view  it  under  va- 
rious and  different  combinations  of  error.  One 
holds  it  to  be  this,  another  to  be  that,  and  this 
various  sense  of  individuals  does  not  admit  of 
a  definite  and  harmonious  action ;  we  must  have 
a  positive  rule  in  order  to  concentrate  the  action 
of  community. 

Now,  when  the  existence  of  society  requires 
a  positive  rule  authoritatively  promulgated ; 
when  its  primary  object  demands  that  this  rule 
shall  be  the  law  of  justice  ;  and  when  the  con- 
stitution of  our  nature,  resulting  in  human  free- 
dom, demands  that  we  ourselves  be  the  sole 
judges  and  interpreters  of  that  law,  what  can  we 
do,  when  the  subject  is  submitted  to  aggregate 
bodies  in  their  primary  capacity,  but  abide  by 
the  determination  of  majorities  ?  Theoretically, 
the  prerogative  of  determining  the  rule  of  right 
resides  in  the  whole ;  but,  unless  all  will  agree 
in  opinion,  which,  until  men  are  perfect,  they 
never  will,  we  must  take  up  with  as  near  an  ap- 
proximation to  a  perfect  mode  as  we  can  get. 
Modern  republics,  by  the  manner  in  which  they 
take  the  public  determination  by  majorities, 
P 


186  TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

adopting  the  representative  system,  dividing  ter- 
ritory into  sections,  legislatures  into  different  bod- 
ies, creating  public  offices  with  different  tenures, 
and  filling  them  at  different  elections,  while  the 
sovereignty  itself  is  divided  into  state  and  nation- 
al, make  great  provision  for  the  sentiments  and 
opinions  of  the  minority  also,  and  bring  us  as 
near  as  is  practicable  to  the  aggregate  sense  of 
community,  and  near  enough  for  all  human  pur- 
poses. Each  citizen  being  allowed  his  equal 
vote,  he  thus  enjoys  the  utmost  possible  amount 
of  human  freedom,  and  all  that  man  ever  could 
or  ever  did  desire. 

What  then  ?  Is  the  positive  rule  thus  adopted 
in  itself  right,  because  it  is  the  determination  of 
the  7najority?  No;  but  we  yield  it  implicit 
obedience  as  if  it  were  right,  because  it  is  in 
practice  the  nearest  approximation  to  the  perfect 
standard,  and  the  best  possible  compromise  with 
human  imperfection.  We  observe  the  decision 
(not  the  arbitrary  will)  of  the  majority,  so  far  as 
it  is  announced  in  the  prescribed  constitutional 
modes,  as  the  rule  of  our  civil  and  political  con- 
duct— as  the  positive  law — until  it  is  reversed  by 
the  same  authority.  Not  that,  as  law,  it  is  per- 
fect ;  but  that,  as  a  positive  rule  emanating  from 
an  authority  which  Freedom  herself  has?  consti- 
tuted, if  we  would  have  constitutions  and  laws 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  187 

at  all,  we  must  observe  it.  Majorities  thus  do  for 
us,  in  a  good  degree  (not  absolutely,  as  will  be 
soon  shown),  in  politics,  what  the  judge  does  for 
us  in  expounding  the  laws ;  and  there  is  the  same 
distinction  between  perfect  enactments  and  posi- 
tive statutes  that  there  is  between  that  perfect 
abstract  justice  which  we  call  law,  and  the  actual 
authoritative  decisions  of  the  judge.  So  far  as 
the  regular,  active  interference  of  society,  through 
the  interposition  of  its  organized  forces,  is  con- 
cerned, the  decisions  of  the  judge  and  positive 
statutes  must  be  acted  upon  as  if  they  were  ab- 
solutely and  perfectly  right,  because  whatever 
of  abstract  perfection  is  wanting  has  been  sac- 
rificed to  the  necessity  of  positive  rules ;  but,  so 
far  as  individual  opinion  is  concerned,  they  are 
no  more  than  a  presumptive  standard,  which 
every  citizen  is  at  liberty,  if  he  can  by  legal  and 
proper  measures,  to  get  revoked. 

Thus,  though  we  never  assail  the  decrees  of 
the  majority  when  uttered  in  the  constitutional 
voice  of  the  whole,  yet  we  often  feel  the  most 
perfect  assurance,  in  assailing  the  opinions  enter- 
tained by  its  individual  components,  and  endeav- 
ouring to  convert  it  into  a  minority.  In  othei 
wo:ds,  we  yield  an  implicit  obedience  to  the 
laws  so  far  as  they  are  enacted  by  the  constitu- 


188  TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

tional  force  of  the  majority,  but  we  never  feel 
called  upon  to  renounce  individual  opinions  from 
deference  to  that  majority. 

Even  in  the  enactment  of  laws  we  by  no 
means  hold  the  power  of  majorities  to  be  abso- 
lute and  unqualified.  It  acknowledges  this  lim- 
itation in  its  very  nature,  that,  being  merely  au- 
thorized to  announce  the  law  of  justice,  it  can 
never  in  any  instance  extend  to  the  perpetration 
of  a  clear  and  palpable  injustice.  In  this  respect 
political  power  is  subject  to  the  same  limitation 
as  the  decisions  of  a  legal  tribunal.  An  occa- 
sion, however,  with  us  for  such  a  limitation  to  be 
actually  put  upon  the  powers  of  the  majority, 
can  only  very  rarely,  if  ever,  occur ;  for  it  is  im- 
possible to  imagine  a  case  in  which  a  body  of 
citizens  large  enough  to  constitute  a  majority  in 
our  large  democracies  could  concur  in  perpe- 
trating a  palpable  injustice..  Against  political 
tyranny  in  every  shape  we  have  the  best  possible 
security  that  human  nature  admits  of  j  and  if 
we  are  really  still  insecure  from  its  assaults,  it  is 
only  because  God  has  denied  all  refuge  from  it 
to  mankind.  Contemplate  the  great  numbers 
which  are  required  to  constitute  a  majority. 
Now  it  is  possible  that  among  its  leaders  there 
may  be  ambition,  may  be  corruption,  tortuous 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  189 

Views,  unjust  aims ;  but  among  the  mass  of  that 
majority,  never.  Its  opinions  may  be  mistaken, 
but  its  feehngs  must  be  right ;  it  is  morally  im- 
possrible  that  so  large  a  body  should  have  any 
other  interests,  any  other  sympathies^  than  those 
which  belong  to  the  universal  whole.  It  may  be, 
often  is,  misled;  but  when  it  is,  it  is  in  pursuit  of 
the  public  good.  It  sometimes  takes  the  wrong 
path  by  mistake,  never  by  design.  Nay,  those 
who  hold  the  balance  of  power,  constituted  by 
the  excess  of  the  majority  above  the  minority, 
are  usually  a  comparatively  small  number,  whose 
adhesion  to  the  cause  of  virtue  and  the  common 
weal  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  save  the  state  from 
palpably  unjust  or  improper  measures. 

When  we  hear  of  the  tyranny  of  the  majority, 
one'wottkl  think  it  a  body  as  fixed  and  perma- 
nent as  a  monarchical  dynasty  rioting  in  the 
greatest  excesses  of  power,  and  responsible  only 
to  itself.  We  know,  however,  that  it  is,  in  truth, 
an  extremely  fluctuating  body,  the  composition 
of  which  is  changing  every  day,  sustaining  daily 
losses,  and  receiving  daily  accessions  of  new 
converts.  It  is  accountable  to  an  ever-vigilant 
minority,  that  is  continually  and  rigidly  criticising 
every  measure  at  the  bar  of  public  opinion.  Its 
excesses  are  visited  with  the  immediate  loss  of 


190  TYRANNY    OF   THE    MAJORITY. 

its  power,  and  the  indignant  exclusion  of  its 
agents  from  office.  Tiie  majority  that  is  is  re- 
sponsible to  the  majority  that  is  to  he.  Let  it 
act  with  violence  or  tyranny,  and  it  will  inevita- 
bly be  converted  into  a  minority.  No  party  can 
in  this  country  engage  in  a  course  of  vicious  le- 
gislation, and  exempt  themselves,  as  a  part  of 
the  common  country,  from  its  retributive  effects; 
and,  when  these  are  felt,  it  immediately  renoun- 
ces its  leaders  and  its  measures  by  adopting  their 
opposites.  A  course  of  tyranny  is  thus  utterly 
impracticable,  unless  we  are  to  suppose  republi- 
cans capable  of  devoting  themselves,  in  spite  of 
sense  and  suffering,  to  the  work  of  self-destruction. 
Nor  have  we  to  apprehend  a  majority's  becom- 
ing so  excessive  as  to  exempt  it  from  the  salutary 
restraint  imposed  by  the  fear  of  degenerating  into 
a  minority.  A  majority  is,  on  the  contrary,  made 
more  infirm  by  becoming  very  considerable.  It 
immediately  encounters  the  danger  of  falling  in 
pieces  of  its  own  weight.  In  proportion  as  it  is 
small  is  the  necessity  of  union  and  the  conse- 
quent perfectness  of  its  organization.  Men  act 
together  in  parties,  not  because  there  is  a  perfect 
unanimity  of  opinions,  but  by  a  sacrifice  of  minor 
differences  to  paramount  public  objects.  "W^hen 
a  party  are  very  numerous,  the  necessity  of  sub- 
ordination becomes  less  in  point  of  fact,  and  still 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  191 

less  in  appearance ;  hence  individuals  strike  out 
plans  of  personal  ambition,  and  individual  wills 
set  up  for  greater  independence :  it  falls  a  sac- 
rifice, and  the  evil  of  too  strong  a  majority  thus 
rectifies  itself.  The  tyranny  of  majorities  is 
therefore  rendered  impossible,  because  they  are 
subject  to  the  continual  control  of  public  senti- 
ment, which  is  the  judgment  of  the  people  on 
their  own  interests. 

"  When  an  individual  or  a  party  is  wronged 
in  the  United  States,"  says  De  Tocqueville,  "  to 
whom  can  he  apply  for  redress?  If  to  public 
opinion,  public  opinion  constitutes  the  majority ; 
if  to  the  Legislature,  it  represents  the  majority, 
and  implicitly  obeys  its  injunctions ;  if  to  the 
executive  power,  it  is  appointed  by  the  majority, 
and  remains  a  passive  tool  in  its  hands ;  the  pub- 
lic troops  consist  of  the  majority  under  arms;  the 
jury  is  the  majority  invested  with  the  right  of 
hearing  judicial  cases ;  and,  in  certain  states, 
even  the  judges  are  elected  by  the  majority." 
All  this  is  mere  idle  declamation.  If  a  man  be 
injured  in  this  country,  and  the  law  afford  him  a 
remedy,  our  judges  and  juries  afford  him  a 
prompt,  cheap,  and  effectual  mode  of  redress, 
as  free,  not  merely  from  a  partial  and  party 
bias,  but  as  free  even  from  all  suspicion  of  it, 


192  TYRANNY    OP    THE    MAJORITY. 

as  any  judicatories  upon  the  face  of  the  earth ; 
and  whoever  should  wish  the  arbitrary  inter- 
vention of  the  executive  or  the  army  where 
the  law  is  silent,  would  call  for  an  agency 
which  would  make  every  possession  and  every 
right  a  pitiful  accident,  subsisting  at  the  mer- 
cy of  a  despotic  will.  If  a  man  suffer  by  rea- 
son of  the  imperfection  of  the  law,  he  applies 
to  public  opinion,  whose  creature  and  slave  the 
majority  are,  and  the  present  majority  will  either 
be  coerced  by  fear  of  that  appeal,  or  be  turned 
out  by  sentence  passed  upon  it,  and  the  evil  soon 
redressed  by  a  future  majority.  The  evil  will 
certainly  be  redressed ;  because,  arising,  on  the 
supposition  made,  from  an  imperfection  in  the 
law,  it  must  operate  with  equal  severity  on  all 
classes  of  a  republican  country,  where  the  in- 
terest of  all  is  inseparably  connected  with  the 
interest  of  each,  and  the  interest  of  each  and  all 
is  dependant  upon  just  laws.  No  intelligent 
member  of  this  republic  has  failed  to  observe 
how  every  citizen,  even  the  humblest  and  most 
ignorant,  when  he  suffers  a  private  injury,  re- 
solves and  generalizes  the  cause  from  which  he 
suffers  into  a  universal  evil  applicable  to  the 
whole  community,  and  deduces  universal  conse- 
quences from  it.    "  What  becomes  of  our  boast- 


TYRANNY  OF  THE  MAJORITY.      193 

ed  freedom  ?"  he  says ;  "  what  is  the  use  of  laws  ? 
"why  call  this  a  free  country  1  what  is  the  security 
of  property,  if  a  man  under  these  circumstances 
can  do,  and  his  neighbour  must  suffer,  such  an  in- 
justice '?"  stating  his  own  injury  in  the  form  of  a 
general  proposition,  to  make  it  tell  upon  the  sym- 
pathies of  those  about  him.  What  he  thus  says 
in  his  own  case,  he  understands  when  said  in  the 
case  of  another ;  and  he  listens  to  the  tale,  and 
unites  in  the  cause  of  his  compatriots,  that  his  tale 
may  be  listened  to,  and  his  cause  promoted,  in 
turn.  Thus  citizens  learn,  by  continual  and  per- 
sonal experience,  that  the  interest  or  the  injury  of 
the  individual  is  the  concern  of  the  whole;  and 
public  opinion  thus  becomes  as  safe  a  guarantee 
for  the  common  weal,  as  private  interest  is  for 
individual  prosperity. 

It  is  wrong  to  represent  the  American  people 
as  subject  to  the  uncontrollable  will  of  the  ma- 
jority. It  is  true,  that  in  the  original  adoption 
of  a  constitution  the  majority  governed,  and, 
whenever  it  comes  in  review  before  the  people, 
a  numerical  majority  must  again  govern.  This 
is,  however,  a  very  rare  case ;  and  it  is  not  in 
thus  setting  up  the  skeleton  and  framework  of  a 
society  (in  which  the  legislation  of  a  people  is  at 
tlie  most  distant  remove  from  human  infirmity, 
R 


194        •     TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

and  wherein  they  are  likely  to  be  perfectly  unan- 
imous on  all  most  essential  points)  that  injustice 
and  injury  are  seriously  to  be  apprehended.  Af- 
ter society  is  thus  organized,  and  by  that  very 
organization,  the  will  of  temporary  majorities  is 
subjected  to  many  practical  limitations. 

In  the  first  place,  this  Constitution  itself  is  the 
paramount  law.  No  majority,  however  great, 
can  ordinarily  add  to,  alter,  amend,  or  in  any 
way  contradict  it.  Until  a  question  be  formal- 
ly presented  to  the  people,  on  the  amendment  of 
the  Constitution,  that  instrument  itself  towers 
above,  and  presents  the  first  broad  limitation  to, 
the  power  of  majorities.  By  giving  to  the  rep- 
resentative a  fixed  and  independent  tenure  of 
office,  it  places  him  beyond  the  immediate  reach 
of  majorities.  By  making  requisite,  in  many 
cases,  a  majority  of  two  thirds  for  the  passage  of 
various  descriptions  of  laws,  it  provides  a  farther 
restraint;  and,  finally,  by  the  creation  of  two 
distinct  and  independent  sovereignties. 

We  often  find  one  majority  among  the  people 
of  a  state,  and  a  different  majority  in  its  Legisla- 
ture ;  sometimes  a  Legislature  of  one  politics, 
and  the  executive  of  another,  which  gives  a  tem- 
porary predominance  to  the  minority ;  often,  a 
state  with  one  politics,  while  one's  immediate  ter- 


I 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  195 

ritorial  administration  and  judiciary  are  of  anoth- 
er ;  very  often  a  state  with  one  politics,  and  the 
nation  of  another.  Rarely,  very  rarely — indeed, 
I  think  I  may  safely  say  never — do  we  find  all  the 
political  authorities  under  which  we  happen  to  be 
placed  the  creatures  of  one  party.  The  power 
of  one  majority  is  thus  modified,  and  very  much 
modified  and  controlled,  by  the  power  of  another; 
or,  if  you  please,  the  power  of  the  majority  is 
modified  and  controlled  by  the  power  of  the  mi- 
nority, which  has  thus  secured  to  itself,  at  least,  as 
great  an  influence  in  the  administration  of  affairs 
as  it  is  entitled  to  by  the  relative  proportion  of 
its  numbers  to  the  aggregate  whole.  Thus  we 
are  fully  entitled  to  say,  that  by  the  contrivances 
of  our  government  we  have  secured  in  its  ad- 
ministration the  action  of  the  whole  people. 

When  I  first  read  the  sections  of  De  Tocque- 
ville  on  the  tyranny  and  unlimited  power  of  the 
majority  in  this  country,  I  was  for  a  long  time  at 
a  loss  to  conjecture  what  original  could  have  set 
to  his  imagination  for  the  picture.  Sensible  of 
no  such  state  of  facts  as  was  there  described,  I 
could  not  but  wonder  that  the  poor,  persecuted 
victims  of  too  free  a  state  should  never  have 
found  a  voice.  Where  are  their  uttered  com- 
plaints ?  I  asked.     The  press  is  free ;  it  disgorges 


196  TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

everything,  from  a  schoolboy's  complaint  to  a 
president's  message  ;  perfect  immunity  is  secured 
by  anonymous  publication,  to  the  utterance  of  ev- 
ery opinion  ;  yet,  among  all  the  various  literature 
Avhich  our  books  and  newspapers  present,  an 
American  writer  complaining  of  the  tyranny  of 
majorities,  as  majorities,  is  yet  a  rara  avis  quite  un- 
known even  to  the  curious.  Indeed,  De  Tocque- 
ville  himself  seems  to  admit  that  the  evil  exists, 
for  the  most  part,  only  in  apprehension.  "  I  do 
not  say"  (he  concludes  one  of  those  sections) 
"  that  tyrannical  abuses  frequently  occur  in  Amer- 
ica at  the  present  day ;  but  I  maintain  that  no 
sure  barrier  is  established  against  them,  and  that 
the  causes  which  mitigate  the  government  are  to 
be  found  in  the  circumstances  and  manners  of  the 
country  more  than  its  laws."  In  other  words,  we 
have  no  security  against  the  passage  of  tyranni- 
cal laws  but  in  the  people  themselves;  which, 
however,  is  the  same  kind  of  security  that  a  com- 
munity have,  that  an  individual  will  not  voluntar- 
ily destroy  his  own  property  or  cut  his  own  ttu'oat. 
According  to  the  republican  theory,  it  is  security 
enough.  We  do  not  require  guarantees  from 
ourselves  for  the  judicious  exercise  of  our  own 
powers.  Not  only  "  the  causes  that  mitigate,'* 
but  the  causes  that  make  the  government,  are 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  197 

the  characters  and  wills  of  the  people  3  and  this 
fact,  so  far  from  exciting  our  apprehensions,  is 
the  foundation  of  our  confidence.  We  derive 
our  security  from  ourselves,  not  from  our  laws, 
or  only  so  far  from  our  laws  as  they  may  be  said 
to  leave  the  government  entirely  in  our  hands. 

De  Tocqueville,  in  his  speculations  on  this 
head,  has  evidently  confounded  two  distinct  sub- 
jects, the  power  of  a  political  majority  under  re- 
publican government,  and  the  phenomena  result- 
ing from  that  almost  entire  unanimity  constitu- 
ting public  apinion,  which  are  not  different  in 
their  nature  (though  they  may  be  more  powerful 
in  their  effects)  from  what  are  exhibited  under 
every  form  of  government. 

So  far  as  political  majorities  in  our  country 
are  concerned,  I  think  perhaps  they  may  enforce 
a  greater  subordination  to  party  than  political 
majorities  in  other  countries,  and  that  such  is  a 
natural  consequence  of  greater  freedom.  Mi- 
norities, however,  are  equally  tyrannical  in  this 
respect,  though  their  organization  may  be  less 
apparent ;  because,  while  an  administration  have 
an  independent  set  of  measures  to  sustain,  all 
that  is  required  to  organize  an  opposition  is 
union  in  assailing.  The  truth  is,  that  in  repub- 
lics the  organization  of  parties  ought  to  be  more 


198      TYRANNY  OF  THE  MAJORITY. 

perfect  than  elsewhere,  for  the  very  reason  that 
the  real  subjects  of  division  are  fewer  and  of 
less  importance.  What  may  be  called  the  nat- 
ural ties  of  party  are  weaker ;  to  act  with  effect, 
the  artificial  ought  to  be  stronger.  Where  the 
subjects  of  division  are  fundamental  and  of  vitaJ 
consequence — where  they  are  clearly  marked  ou' 
in  the  nature  of  things,  and  the  division  of  inter- 
ests and  of  classes — these  interests  and  classes 
may  safely  be  trusted  to  themselves :  each  mac 
knows  his  place,  and  is  bound  to  it.  But  it  has 
long  since  been  discovered  that  in  republics, 
where  the  real  subjects  of  difference  are  much 
more  minute  than  elsewhere,  they  are  much  less 
coercive ;  and  that  a  party  owes  a  great  deal  of 
its  success  to  its  organization  as  well  as  to  its 
principles.  Hence  subordination  is  more  rigidly 
enforced.  But  this  kind  of  influence  exercised 
by  party  operates  only  upon  politicians,  not  on 
the  community  at  large,  who,  on  the  contrary, 
generally  regard  the  man  with  greater  favour 
that  acknowledges  no  party  trammels.  The  only 
consequence  that  follows  from  renouncing  it  is 
loss  of  party  consideration,  and  the  power  and 
prospects  of  office ;  a  loss  which  he  who  is  guil-ty 
of  defection  may  be  thought  perhaps  to  deserve, 
by  reason  of  his  having  impaired  the  strength  of 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  199 

the  party  through  whose  prevalence  alone  he 
could  hope  for  political  rewards. 

"  But,"  says  De  Tocqueville,  "  it  is  in  the  ex- 
amination of  the  display  of  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States  that  we  clearly  perceive  how  far 
the  power  of  the  majority  surpasses  all  the  pow- 
ers with  which  we  are  acquainted  in  Europe;" 
and,  thus  confounding  the  poUtical  force  of 
majorities  with  the  natural  force  of  public  opin- 
ion, he  launches  his  most  severe  denunciations 
asainst  it. 

Probably  the  greatest  force  of  public  opinion 
in  this  country  is  exercised  in  suppressing  the 
expression  of  atheistical  and  infidel  sentiments, 
while  a  similar  restraint  seems  to  be  exercised  in 
preventing  the  dissemination  of  views  unfriendly 
to  republican  government.  A  keen  and  sensi- 
tive observation  of  its  effects  in  these  two  in- 
stances seems  to  have  given  birth  to  De  Tocque- 
ville's  erroneous  speculations  on  the  tyranny  of 
the  majority  in  America. 

In  neither  of  these  instances,  however,  do  we 
meet  with  that  million-headed  monster  of  tyran- 
ny so  terribly  depicted  by  De  Tocqueville,  spread- 
ing itself,  like  one  of  the  plagues  of  Egypt, 
throughout  every  part  of  man's  daily  existence, 
and  depriving  him  of  every  comfort  and  enjoy- 
ment of  life — a  tjTarmy  that,  if  it  really  existed, 


200  TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

would  be  infinitely  worse  than  Uie  ecclesiastical 
despotism  of  the  dark  ages. 

It  is  natural  that,  where  opinion  is  the  most 
enlightened  and  the  most  free,  it  should  have  the 
greatest  natural  force,  as  the  presumption  is 
greater  in  favour  of  its  justice  and  propriety.  In 
proportion,  therefore,  as  you  relax  other  forces, 
you  strengthen  that  of  public  opinion,  and,  where 
government  is  the  weakest,  opinion  must  be  the 
strongest.  Is  this  a  fault  of  governments  or  of 
man  ?  If  public  opinion  be  strong  here,  it  is  not 
that  government  has  made  it  so,  not  that  major- 
ities  have  made  it  so,  but  that  such  is  the  inevi- 
table result  of  the  nature  and  constitution  of 
man.  If  its  force  be  legitim&te  and  proper,  we 
must  rejoice  that  it  is  strong  with  us,  and  that  it 
is  strong  because  it  is  right.  No  man  can  fail 
to  have  observed  how  much  wiser  and  better  we 
are  for  our  neighbours  than  for  ourselves ;  how 
much  more  exact  we  are  in  laying  down  a  rule 
for  another  to  act  by,  than  in  squaring  our  own 
conduct  by  any  rule  3  how  much  better  all,  by 
virtue  of  continually,  as  the  phrase  is, "  putting 
their  best  foot  foremost,"  outwardly  Jippear  than 
they  really  are  :  by  just  so  much  is  public  opin- 
ion better  than  private  practice,  and  just  so  much 
does  what  is  called  character,  a  creature  of  pub- 
lic opinion,  superadd  to  the  force  of  our  moral 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  201 

motives.  It  seems  to  be  the  great  force  of  this 
highly  efficient  and  really  moral  agent  which  is 
characterized  by  De  Tocqueville  as  the  tyranny 
of  the  majority,  and  which  is  represented  to  be 
so  great  as  to  prevent  the  avowal  of  individual 
opinions. 

It  is  true  that  it  has  a  mighty  force,  though 
not  so  great  as  represented  by  De  Tocqueville, 
against  the  atheist  and  the  infidel  ;*  and  why 
should  it  not  ?  It  operates  in  suppressing  their 
opinions  as  it  would  in  suppressing  a  vice ;  and 
why  should  it  not  1  It  is  generally  believed  that 
atheism  and  infidelity  sap  the  foundations  of  pri- 
vate morals,  of  public  prosperity,  and  of  political 

*  "  In  America  the  majority  raises  very  formidable  barriers  to 
the  liberty  of  opinion ;  within  these  barriers  an  author  may 
write  whatever  he  pleases,  but  he  wjll  repent  if  he  ever  step 
beyond  them.  Not  that  he  is  exposed  to  the  terrors  of  an  auto 
de  fe,  but  he  is  tormented  by  the  slights  and  persecutions  of  dai- 
ly obloquy.  His  political  career  is  closed  forever,  since  he  has 
offended  the  only  authority  which  is  able  to  promote  his  suc- 
cess. *  *  *  The  Inquisition  has  never  been  able  to  prevent  a 
vast  number  of  anti-religious  books  from  circulating  in  Spain. 
The  empire  of  the  majority  succeeds  much  better  in  the  United 
States,  since  it  actually  removes  the  wish  to  publish  them.  Un- 
believers are  to  be  met  with  in  America,  but,  to  say  the  truth, 
there  is  no  public  organ  of  infidelity.  Attempts  have  been  made 
by  some  governments  to  protect  the  morality  of  nations,  by 
prohibiting  licentious  books.  In  the  United  States  no  one  is 
punished  for  this  sort  of  works,  but  no  one  is  induced  to  write 
them  ;  not  because  all  citizens  are  immaculate  in  their  man-- 
ners,  but  because  the  majority  of  the  community  is  discreet  and 
orderly." — De  Tocqueville's  Democracy  bh  America, pt.  i., ch.  xv. 

Q 


202  TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

freedom ;  that  they  are  not  only  untrue  in 
themselves,  but  that  they  corrupt  our  children, 
render  them  irreligious  and  profane,  idle,  disobe- 
dient, and  vicious;  that  they  lessen  the  moral 
restraints  of  society,  prevent  our  homes  from  be- 
ing inviolate,  make  our  domestic  relations  less 
dear,  oaths  and  obhgations  less  sacred,  property 
less  valuable,  mankind  less  sympathetic  and  hu- 
mane. Now,  shall  we  visit  with  punishment 
and  disgrace  those  who  commit  crimes,  and  not 
visit  with  the  moral  reprobation  of  public  senti- 
ment those  who  are  continually  beating  up  for 
recruits  to  the  ranks  of  the  criminal  and  the  out- 
law ?  Or  does  the  prevalence  of  a  public  senti- 
ment that  prevents  men  in  some  measure  from 
becoming  atheists  and  infidels,  and  prevents  in 
a  very  considerable  degree  the  dissemination  of 
their  principles,  demand  the  regrets  of  the  en- 
lightened politician  ? — or  does  the  force  of  such  a 
sentiment  possess  any  of  the  qualities  of  a  tyran- 
nical power  ?  I  rejoice  in  it,  as  showing  that 
the  just  and  legitimate  restraints  of  a  state  of 
freedom  are,  for  wise  and  good  purposes,  more 
efficacious  even  than  the  tyranny  of  a  despotical 
control.  It  show's  that  democracies  do  not  want 
strength  where  strength  cannot  injure.  So  far 
from  being  proof  of  "  little  true  independence  of 
mind  and  freedom  of  discussion,"  it  exhibits  the 


TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY.  203 

necessary  result  of  the  most  absolute  independ- 
ence of  mind  and  the  most  unlimited  freedom 
of  discussion. 

Tiiat  public  opinion  often  signally  errs  in  its 
decrees,  and  that,  in  such  cases,  in  proportion  to 
its  force  must  be  its  injustice,  cannot  be  doubted; 
so  long,  however,  as  it  does  not  lay  hold  of  the 
arm  of  the  law,  in  the  regulation  of  matters  not 
properly  cognizable  by  law,  but  is  left  freely  in 
those  matters  to  the  natural  operation  and  regu- 
lation of  itself,  the  balance  of  the  aggregate  ac- 
count of  good  and  evil  influence  must  be  greatly 
in  its  favour,  and  its  injuries  only  accidental,  like 
those  of  any  other  great  and  powerful  agency. 

We  should  follow  with  public  odium  the  man 
who  would  openly  advocate  the  adoption  of 
monarchical  and  aristocratical  institutions.*     Is 

*  "  At  the  present  time,  the  most  absolute  monarchs  in  Eu- 
rope are  unable  to  prevent  certain  notions  which  are  opposed  to 
their  authority  from  circulating  in  secret  throughout  thei/  do- 
minions, and  even  m  their  courts.  Such  is  not  the  case  in  Amer- 
ica. *  *  *  I  know  of  no  country  in  which  there  is  so  little  true 
independence  of  mind  and  freedom  of  discussion  as  in  America. 
In  any  continental  state  in  Europe,  every  sort  of  religious  and 
political  theory  may  be  advocated  and  propagated  abroad ;  for 
there  is  no  country  of  Europe  so  subdued  by  any  single  author 
ity  as  not  to  contain  citizens  who  are  ready  to  protect  the  man 
who  raises  his  voice  in  the  cause  of  truth  from  the  consequen- 
ces of  his  hardihood.  If  he  is  unfortunate  enough  to  live  under 
an  absolute  government,  the  people  is  on  his  side  ;  if  he  inhabit 
a  free  country,  he  may  find  a  shelter  behmd  the  autnoruy  of  itie 


204  TYRANNY    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

this  a  persecution  by  the  majority  ?  If  so,  ii  is  not 
by  the  majority  constituted  by  a  political  party ;  it 
is  the  natural  and  necessary  result  from  the  ex- 
pression of  an  opinion  not  worthy  of  many  fol- 
lowers, and  worthy  of  no  good  ones.  But  would 
it  not  be  better  to  let  this  opinion  have  a  fair 
chance,  and  to  give  it  a  full  and  fair  trial  on  equal 
terms  ?  It  has  a  fair  chance,  and  it  cannot  gain 
disciples.  If  it  has  not,  it  is  not  our  fault,  nor 
the  fault  of  our  political  system ;  it  is  the  fault  of 
man.  He  is  so  made  that  his  opinions  as  to  the 
proper  scheme  of  government  interest  his  feelings 
withal.  He  rejects  their  opposites,  not  coolly,  but 
with  a  feeling  of  moral  reprobation.  He  feels 
that  certain  principles,  extensively  entertained, 
would  affect  him,  would  injure  him,  would  deprive 
him  of  freedom.  The  monarchist  and  aristocrat 
are  repelled,  therefore,  as  if  they  were  endeavour- 
ing, whether  unintentionally  or  not.  to  inflict  a 
wrong  and  injury — as  if  guilty  of  a  kind  of  trea- 
son against  the  sovereignty  of  each  free  citizen  ; 
and  it  is  not  surprising  that  this  repulsive  feeling 
should  be  as  universal  as  is  the  sovereign  citi- 

throne,  if  he  require  one.  The  aristocratic  part  of  society  sup- 
ports him  in  some  countries,  and  the  democracy  in  others.  But 
in  a  nation  where  democratic  institutions  exist,  organized  like 
those  of  the  United  States,  there  is  but  one  sole  authority,  one 
single  element  of  strength  and  of  success,  with  nothing  beyond 
it." — Democracy  in  America,  part  i.,  chap.  xv. 


TYRANNY    OF   THE    MAJORITY.  205 

zenship.  Such  men  rest  under  an  odium  which 
they  deserve ;  and  public  opinion,  in  free  coun- 
tries always  its  own  best  corrective,  does  not,  in 
this  instance,  degenerate  into  the  tyranny  of  ma- 
jorities. 

But  what  then  becomes  of  the  dominion  of 
reason,  if  we  must  acknowledge  such  a  subser- 
viency to  popular  prejudices  ?  I  answer,  we  are 
men,  and  we  act  like  men.  We  are  governed  by 
something  else  besides  the  force  of  a  mere  syllo- 
gism. We  are  not  creatures  of  pure  reasoning, 
and  we  do  not  bring  everything  to  the  test  of 
logic  ;  neither  do  we  suffer  our  convictions  to  rest 
in  our  minds  like  a  demonstrated  problem  on  a 
black  board.  We  take,  and  we  are  obliged  to 
take,  a  great  many  of  our  opinions  on  trust,  until 
we  have  time  and  ability  to  look  into  their  demon- 
stration, and  the  community  is  a  very  respectable 
source  whence  to  derive  such  opinions  :  when  we 
have  those  opinions,  we  feel  from  them,  and  we 
act  on  them  ;  and  the  public  sentiment  of  a  com- 
munity is  in  many  cases  a  very  proper  medium  in 
which  to  imbody,  and  through  which  to  enforce 
them.  This  is  not  the  tyranny  of  majorities;  it  is 
the  nature  of  man,  more  prominent  only  in  re- 
publics, because  government  has  less  force  and 
nature  more. 


206  THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION. 


CHAPTER  11. 

The  so-called  "  Right  of  Instruction." 

The  so-called  right  of  instruction  is  a  false 
pretence.  Under  our  democratic  form  of  gov- 
ernment, whatever  the  people  really  do  will, 
they  have  the  power  to  carry  into  effect.  When, 
therefore,  we  are  honoured  with  what  are  styled 
"  instructions  from  the  people  to  their  represent- 
atives"— instructions  from  a  source  whence  we 
have  a  right  to  expect  commands — we  are  cer- 
tainly justified  in  the  suspicion  that  these  do  not 
emanate  from  the  people,  but,  more  probably, 
from  bodies  of  men  who,  having  neither  the  right 
to  command  nor  the  right  to  instruct,  hope  to 
conceal  the  infirmity  of  their  title  under  the  mod- 
eration of  their  demands. 

Let  us  examine  and  see  who  they  usually  are 
who  thus  presume  to  instruct  the  people's  repre- 
sentatives, and  whether  they  are  really  "  the 
people,"  or  have  any  warrant  for  it  from  the 
people. 

And,  first,  let  us  understand  what  is  meant 


THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION.  20T 

by  "  the  people."  We  mean  the  whole  peopky 
and  nothing  short  of  the  whole  people,  or  a  ma- 
jority of  the  whole  acting  simultaneously.  It  is 
the  government  of  the  whole  that  alone  con- 
stitutes self-government — democracy.  Now  this 
paramount  democratic  sovereignty  is  never  call- 
ed directly  into  action  except  in  forming  and 
setthng  a  constitution,  the  very  object  of  which 
act  is  to  define  in  what  mode  the  will  of  the 
people  shall  ever  after  be  authoritatively  ex- 
pressed. That  done,  we  have  done  also  with 
original  or  primary  assemblies,  that  is,  assem- 
blies wherein  the  people  act  in  their  original, 
absolute,  and  sovereign  capacity.  The  people 
agree,  by  adopting  a  constitution,  that  they  will 
no  longer  act  in  an  irregular,  disconnected  man- 
ner, in  separate,  unorganized  assemblies,  and  by 
individual  plans  and  wills,  but  together  only,  and 
in  the  constituted  mode.  Town,  and  ward,  and 
mass  meetings,  therefore,  are  by  no  means,  in 
reality,  what  they  are  ordinarily  styled,  meetings 
of  the  people  in  their  primary  assemblies.  Very 
respectable  organs  of  public  opinion  they  no 
doubt  are,  which  are  entitled  to,  and  will  com- 
mand, the  respectful  deference  of  every  wise  poli- 
tician ;  but  not  organs  of  the  sovereign  will,  which 
every  representative  would  be  peremptorily  bound 


208  THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION. 

to  obey.  If  these  indiscriminate  assemblages 
are,  really,  what  they  are  so  often  called,  the  sov- 
ereign people  in  their  primary  capacity,  they  are 
certainly  omnipotent ;  they  can  make  and  un- 
make laws,  magistrates,  constitutions  j  and  if 
they  are  not,  they  are,  as  to  political  rights  or 
political  powers,  nothing.  If  they  have  not  all 
the  rights  of  the  original,  sovereign  people,  they 
have  no  right  to  instruct.  Let  us  proceed,  there- 
fore, from  these  meetings — in  which  we  do  not 
find  the  only  people  known  to  democracy  as  the 
arbiter  of  political  differences,  and  which,  when 
they  assume  to  instruct  the  people's  representa- 
tives, seem,  simply  on  the  ground  of  having  no 
authorized  place  in  the  body  politic,  to  arrogate 
the  paramount  authority — to  other  and  constitu- 
tional assemblages. 

This  pretended  right  to  instruct  is  claimed, 
and  most  frequently  exercised,  by  State  Legisla- 
tures over  representatives  in  Congress. 

But  what  right  have  State  Legislatures  to  in- 
struct? It  is  their  constitutional  prerogative  to 
elect  one  branch  of  the  national  Legislature  j 
when,  however,  this  election  has  taken  place, 
that  function  is  discharged ;  and  they  have  no  lon- 
ger any  duties  in  the  premises  until  another  va- 
cancy occurs.    When  elected,  the  representative 


THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION.  209 

is  not  their  agent.  They  are  not  his  principals 
or  his  constituents.  He  is  a  representative  of  the 
people,  and  so  are  they.  The  people  have  not 
authorized  them  to  instruct  this  representative, 
nor  placed  it  within  the  range  of  their  duties 
or  their  powers;  nay,  a  power  to  recall  him 
was  proposed,  in  the  Convention  that  framed  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  to  be  given 
them,  and  the  proposition  was  distinctly  nega- 
tived. They  have  no  more  right  to  instruct  him 
than  he  to  instruct  them.  I  have  said  they  are 
not  his  constituents.  The  whole  state  does  not 
comprise  his  constituents.  He  is  a  member  of 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  and  sworn  to 
discharge  his  duty  as  such.  The  nation  are  his 
constituents.  He  is  a  representative,  not  of  part, 
but  of  the  whole.  If  the  paramount  interests  of 
the  nation  at  large  clearly  require  the  sacrifice 
of  the  particular  interests  of  his  single  state,  he 
is  even  conscientiously  bound  to  vote  for  that 
sacrifice.  Because  the  state,  or  the  State  Legis- 
lature elected  him,  they  are  not,  as  a  necessary 
consequence,  to  control  him.  The  state  names 
the  representative ;  but  the  state  alone  could 
never  have  given  him  the  power  which  he  pos- 
sesses to  affect  the  whole  Union  ;  the  origin  of 
this  power  dates  far  back  from  the  state  election, 
R 


210  THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION. 

at  the  formation  of  the  gTand  national  compact;, 
and  the  nation  at  large  are  alone  entitled  to  be 
considered  as  his  political  creators. 

It  is  a  bad  division  of  labour,  as  well  as  an 
usurpation  of  power,  for  men  who  were  elected 
to  attend  to  state  affairs  to  assume  the  control 
of  those  of  the  nation.  Different  powers  are  re- 
quired ;  a  different  grade  of  intelligence ;  differ- 
ent means  and  opportunities  of  information  and 
judgment.  Is  it  not  enough  that  so  much  time  is 
consumed  by  Congress  in  debating  the  grounds 
of  the  different  national  parties;  but  must  the 
same  subjects  be  again  debated  and  resettled  by 
twenty-six  individual  state  assemblies,  to  the 
great  obstruction,  if  not  entire  neglect,  of  all  do- 
mestic legislation;  to  say  nothing  of  the  cost, 
which  would,  in  the  aggregate,  form  no  slight 
addition  to  national  expenditure  ?  No  advocate 
for  a  strict  construction  of  delegated  powers  can 
consistently  maintain  that,  when  the  people  have 
sent  him  to  the  State  Capitol  to  attend  only  to 
those  affairs  that  immediately  concern  the  state, 
he  has  a  right  to  usurp  the  functions  or  sit  in 
judgment  on  the  conduct  of  another  agent  of  the 
people,  despatched  to  a  different  place,  on  a  dis- 
tinct errand,  and  made  constitutionally  account- 
able only  to  the  common  master  of  both. 


THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION.  211 

But  do  elections  furnish  an  authoritative  letter 
of  instructions  from  the  people  to  the  representa- 
tive, of  which  he  is  bound  to  take  notice;  and 
is  he  bound,  by  democratic  principles,  when  a 
successor  of  different  politics  has  been  elected, 
to  vote  in  conformity  with  the  opinions  of  his  suc- 
cessor elect,  or  to  resign  ?  Elections,  it  is  true, 
are  authorities  emanating  from  the  sovereign  peo- 
ple, because  they  are  exercised  in  pursuance  of 
the  constitution  established  by  the  whole,  and  are 
therefore  authoritative  so  far  as  they  go.  But 
what  does  such  a  result  to  an  election  signify '? 
The  present  incumbent  may  have  been  elected  on 
personal  as  well  as  political  considerations,  and 
at  the  last  canvass  not  have  been  a  candidate. 
Therefore,  it  does  not  necessarily  signify  that  his 
political  measures  are  so  obnoxious  as  to  prevent 
his  being,  in  spite  of  his  political  course,  after 
all,  the  preference  of  the  people.  Perchance 
the  people,  his  immediate  constituents,  wish  for 
a  change,  but  a  change  after  his  term  shall  have 
expired,  and  he  have  had  an  opportunity  to 
bring  his  measures  in  some  degree  to  a  test,  by 
carrying  them  out  fairly  to  the  close  of  that  pe- 
riod. For  this  only  he  has  any  warrant,  that  the 
voice  of  the  people,  so  far  as  it  is  the  sovereign 
voice—the  voice  of  democracy  expressed  in  the 


212  THE    HIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION. 

constitutional  mode — signifies  in  such  an  adverse 
election — what  1  (the  election  designates  the 
man,  the  Constitution,  for  what  object) — that, 
after  he  shall  have  fulfilled  his  term,  carrying 
out  his  measures  to  the  end  of  it,  then  the  officer 
elect  shall  succeed,  not  now  immediately  super- 
sede and  supplant  him. 

But,  were  it  otherwise,  the  electors  of  the 
representative  are  but  a  part,  and  that  a  very 
small  part,  of  his  real  constituents;  and  if  the 
democratic  principle  bind  him  to  observe  the  will 
of  "  the  people,"  it  is  the  will  of  the  whole  peo- 
ple; if  the  will  of  "his  constituents,"  the  will  of 
the  whole  of  his  constituents — the  nation  at  large ; 
and  thus,  if  the  right  of  instruction  by  means  of 
elections  be  effective  at  all,  it  can  only  take  ef- 
fect, consistently  with  itself,  after  the  entire  na- 
tional majority  shall  have  been  settled ;  when  the 
result  must  be,  as  by  the  m.agic  of  an  enchanter's 
wand,  by  an  instantaneous,  complete,  and  over- 
whelming revolution,  to  expel  utterly  any  such 
thing  as  opposition,  and  suffer  the  headlong 
torrent  of  a  successful  party  to  bear  uninterrupt- 
edly away  the  entire  legislation  of  the  country. 

This  brings  us  to  the  final  \Tiew  of  this  discus- 
sion, that,  as  we  have  seen,  we  can  get  no  au- 
thoritative instructions  from  the  real  people  to 


I 


THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTIIUCTION.  213 

the  representative,  so  neither  do  the  people  choose 
to  govern  in  this  way,  by  imparting  to  their  rep- 
resentatives the  momentary  changes  and  impulses 
of  popular  opinion :  in  taking  which  view  it  is 
our  purpose  to  show  likewise,  that  the  right  of 
the  majority  to  govern  is  not,  even  according  to 
the  most  latitudinarian  democratic  theory,  by  any 
means  absolute  and  unqualified ;  and  that  the 
whole  people,  the  sovereign  people,  being  made 
up  of  a  majority  and  a  minority,  some  provision 
has  been  made  for  the  opinions  of  that  minority. 
■  The  government,  it  is  true,  is  merely  the  agent 
of  the  people,  and  appointed  to  be  the  mere  ser- 
vant of  their  will.  But  we  must  distinguish  the 
case  of  a  people  from  that  of  an  individual,  in 
the  appointment  of  an  agent.  The  public  voice 
is  made  up,  not  of  the  expression  of  a  single  will, 
but  of  that  of  a  great  multitude  of  individual 
wills,  on  which  our  own  can  have  but  little  in- 
fluence. We  cannot  but  think  it  wise,  therefore, 
to  secure  a  degree  of  permanency  in  the  public 
administration ;  and,  however  much  of  w-isdom 
and  rectitude  we  may  be  conscious  of  in  ourselves, 
and  however  little  restraint  we  may  feel  disposed 
to  put  upon  our  own  individual  wills  for  the  fu- 
ture, it  is  not  extraordinary  that  we  should  feel  a 
greater  confidence  in  putting  ourselves  in  alJ 


214  THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION. 

cases  within  the  power  of  the  majority,  a  greater 
confidence  in  that  multifarious  director,  the  public 
will,  when  placed  under  certain  wholesome  quali- 
fications to  secure  deliberation  and  discussion ;  so 
as  to  make  that  will  and  that  majority  the  off- 
spring of  the  permanent  settled  wisdom  of  the 
nation,  rather  than  of  the  hasty  effervescence  of 
popular  passions.  The  people  do  not  any  the 
less  govern,  by  thus  governing  in  a  certain  mode 
which  they  themselves  prescribe,  and  which  they 
reserve  to  themselves  the  liberty  at  any  time  to 
alter. 

In  ancient  cities,  where,  in  the  nature  of  the 
case,  it  was  almost  impossible  to  provide  such 
securities,  the  inconsistencies  of  democratic  legis- 
lation, commending  to  a  Socrates  the  hemlock 
one  day,  and  erecting  statues  to  his  memory 
the  next,  have  been  its  eternal  stigma.  This  evil 
is  remedied  through  our  representative  system, 
one  of  the  greatest  political  improvements  of 
modern  times,  by  securing  to  the  representative 
a  definite  term  of  office,  independently  of  popu- 
lar fluctuations  and  temporary  excitements.  And, 
without  this  permanency,  can  we  expect  good 
government  ?  Consistency  rises  almost  to  the 
dignity  of  the  virtues,  although  not  ranked 
among  them ;  and  it  is  even  morp  necessary  in 


THE  RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION.  215 

the  administration  of  states  than  in  the  conduct 
of  individuals.  Inconsistency  in  either  is  cer- 
tainly a  great  fault,  and  in  affairs  of  govern- 
ment it  is  one  of  the  greatest,  as  it  alone  suffi- 
ces to  make  the  best  of  laws  unjust,  and  the  best 
of  governments  tyrannical.  In  the  administra- 
tion of  the  complicated  affairs  of  government, 
experience  is  the  only  sure  guide ;  and,  if  sena- 
tors and  magistrates  are  not  permitted  to  form 
their  measures  into  consistent  plans,  and  subject 
them  to  the  test  of  continuous  experiment,  liber- 
ty may  be  safe,  but  unskilfulness  must  preside  at 
the  helm,  and  disaster  and  distress  will  be  the 
inevitable  result.  We  are  a  people  peculiarly 
impatient  in  awaiting  the  results  of  experiment, 
and  usually  form  more  conclusive  determina- 
tions, and  take  a  more  prompt  and  decided  ac- 
tion, on  the  results  of  ten  years,  than  other  peo- 
ple on  the  experience  of  a  century,  or  often  of 
many  centuries.  Hence  a  hasty,  crude,  and  im- 
perfect legislation  is  one  of  the  worst  character- 
istics of  the  working  of  our  system,  until  laws 
have  become  a  standing  part  of  our  news,  and 
the  columns  of  a  weekly  print  are  sometimes  more 
authoritative  than  a  two  years'  old  statute-book, 
printed  by  public  authority.  These  defects  would 
be  greatly  aggravated  by  abridging,  through  un- 


216  THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION. 

constitutional  though  indirect  methods,  the  tenure 
of  public  offices.  Indeed,  people  wish  to  be  saved 
the  trouble  and  excitement  of  such  frequent  elec- 
tions as  this  pretended  right  of  instruction  must 
give  rise  to,  and  the  absurdity  of  the  practice 
cannot  be  better  illustrated  than  by  the  fact  that 
there  have  often  been  two  changes  of  public 
opinion,  counteracting  one  another,  within  so 
brifcf  a  space,  that  a  representative  instructed 
out  of  office,  through  a  fancied  deference  to  the 
voice  of  the  people,  has  often  found  his  imme- 
diate constituents  again  concurring  with  him  be- 
fore the  close  of  the  terra  for  which  he  was  elect- 
ed, and  the  public  will  thus  foolishly  cheated 
by  his  successor  of  its  just  expression.  Men 
might  wish,  in  the  particular  case  of  their  polit- 
ical opponents  being  supplanted  by  their  polit- 
ical friends,  that  the  term  of  the  former  might 
be  abridged,  for  the  advantage  of  .their  own  par- 
tisans ;  but  they  would  be  as  much  displeased, 
on  the  other  hand,  at  the  reciprocal  operation  of 
the  same  rule  in  the  opposite  contingency ;  and 
they  must  see  that,  in  any  considerable  period  of 
time,  these  changes  must  about  balance  and  com- 
pensate one  another.  The  advantage,  however, 
must  be  greatly  in  favour  of  a  fixed,  constitu- 
tional period  of  office,  and  the  vigilant,  consci- 


r 


THE    RIGHT    OF   INSTRUCTION.  217 

entious,  and  uninterrupted  discharge  of  its  du- 
ties, to  an  uncertain  reliance  upon  a  capricious 
notion,  that  cannot  be  practically  enforced,  and 
can  never  receive,  at  best,  but  a  capricious,  un- 
certain, and  unequal  observance. 

The  so-called  right  of  instruction,  so  far  from 
being  in  conformity  with  the  principles  of  the 
Constitution,  seems  to  be  directly  against  them. 
The  Constitution  prescribes  a  definite  term  of 
office ;  "  the  right  of  instruction"  would  make  it 
uncertain  and  indefinite.  If  it  had  been  intended 
by  the  people  that  an  election  should  be  taken  as 
a  test  of  the  sovereign  will,  not  only  to  the  extent 
it  distinctly  imports,  but  to  the  extent  of  chan- 
ging all  immediate  representations  of  the  same 
electors,  why  did  they  not  establish  the  prac- 
tice of  voting  for  all  officers  at  the  same  time, 
and  at  every  election  1 — why  make  any  definite 
term  of  office  at  all  1 

Our  repubhc  is  composed  of  \videly-divided 
sections,  and  was  originally  constituted  by  a 
compromise  of  interests  which  were  to  some  ex- 
tent hostile  ;  the  permanency  of  our  representa- 
tion forms  a  part  of  the  compact  between  these 
conflicting  interests.  By  the  more  certain  and 
definite  tenure  of  his  office,  the  representative  is 
made  more  independent  of  local  considerations. 


218  THE    RIGHT    OF    INSTRUCTION. 

interests,  and  feelings,  and  liberalized  for  the 
general  good.  It  is  a  violation  of  that  compact 
to  require  his  conformity  to  instructions,  and 
present  the  alternative  of  his  resignation. 

Moreover,  the  case  may  involve  a  question  of 
conscientiousness  on  the  part  of  the  representa- 
tive, who  may  have  it  in  his  power,  perchance, 
to  prevent  what  he  deems  a  great  evil,  by  the 
interposition  of  a  vote  which  he  has  the  power 
to  give,  but  is  instructed  to  withhold.  His  oath 
of  office,  his  conscience,  must  determine  him ;  and 
he  who,  under  such  circumstances,  relinquishes 
his  office  or  does  violence  to  his  conscience,  is  a 
deserter  from  the  post  of  duty. 

Finally,  let  us  consider  for  a  moment  who  this 
majority  are  that  assume  to  dictate  so  peremptori- 
ly ?  It  is  not  a  body  unchangeably  constituted  of 
the  same  materials,  but  one  of  which  every  man 
sometimes  and  in  some  cases  does,  and  in  others 
does  not,  form  a  part.  The  supreme  power,  ac- 
cording to  democracy,  resides  in  the  whole.  But 
we  are  never  unanimous,  and,  as  has  already 
been  remarked,  to  act  at  all,  the  majority  must 
govern.  Let  it  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that 
this  government  of  the  majority  is  only  an  ap- 
proximation to  democracy,  though  it  is  the  near- 
est possible  approximation;  and,  with  the  actual 
constitution  of  mankind,   we  must   nores-s^nily 


THE    RIGHT    OF    IN  S  IRUCTION.  219 

take  up  with  an  approximation.  Pure  democ- 
racy, the  unanimous  government  of  the  whole, 
we  cannot  have.  Still  the  minority  are  not  to  be 
entirely  disregarded,  as  if  they  were  a  mere  ci- 
pher. They  have  some  right  in  the  administra- 
tion of  afFaiijg.  They  have  a  right  to  qualify  the 
opinions  of  the  majority,  since  the  majority  do 
not  govern  by  an  absolute  and  unqualified  right, 
but  only  as  a  matter  of  necessary  compromise, 
which  ought  to  prevail  no  farther  than  the  neces- 
sity of  the  case  imperiously  and  inevitably  de- 
mands. We  ought  to  get,  as  nearly  as  practica- 
ble, the  opinion  of  the  whole.  Now,  in  the  con- 
stitution of  the  state,  the  contingent  minority,  not 
yet  developed,  but  of  whom  you,  or  I,  or  any 
other  member  of  society  may  perchance  be  one, 
by  establishing  a  fixed  and  independent  tenure 
of  office  makes  some  provision  for  itself;  an  im- 
perfect one,  it  is  true,  but  still  the  best  that  the 
nature  of  the  case  admits.  It  thus  secures  what 
is  its  right,  in  being  enabled  to  impress  a  just  and 
proper  bias  upon  the  administration  of  affairs. 
This  compact  with  the  minority  is  violated  when 
the  majority,  not  content  with  exercising  that 
lawful  predominance  which  the  Constitution  for 
the  most  part  gives  them,  assume  to  dictate  to  the 
Constitution  itself,  as  if  they  held  not  merely  the 
preponderance  of  power,  but  a  monopoly  of  it. 


220  ARISTOCRACY  IN    AMERICA. 


CHAPTER  m. 

Aristocratic  Society  in  America. 

I  USE  the  expression  "  Aristocratic  Society  in 
America"  because  I  find  it  in  use,  while  I  en- 
tirely disapprove  of  the  term  "  aristocratic"  as 
applied  to  any  circle  in  this  country. 

We  have  an  upper  class,  properly  designated 
as  the  upper  or  fashionable  circle ;  not,  however, 
an  aristocracy.  In  the  Old  World,  those  who  are 
really  the  aristocracy,  the  few  who  govern,  are 
also  the  select  and  fashionable  in  private  life; 
but  the  term  "  aristocratic"  is  properly  a  political 
designation,  and  should  not  be  appropriated  to 
a  private  circle,  except  where  political  power 
and  social  rank  go  hand  in  hand. 

Yet  people  of  the  Old  World  talk  of  our  aris- 
tocracy. Aristocracy  is  the  government  of  the 
few.  There  are  no  few  here  who  govern.  Our 
first  class  are  simply  the  leaders  of  the  ton  j  they 
rule  in  the  empire  of  taste  and  fashion  only. 
We  may  follow  them  in  the  pattern  of  a  carriage 
or  the  cut  of  a  coat ;  we  may  determine  in  a 
great  degree  by  their  patronage,  to  what  public 


ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA.  221 

garden  or  concertj  to  what  theatre  or  ball  we 
will  resort ;  we  may  seek  their  halls  for  the  most 
brilliant  entertainments  and  the  best  company; 
but  do  all  the  prerogatives  they  thus  exercise 
create  an  aristocracy  ? 

Such  prerogatives  constitute  a  distinction,  no 
doubt,  but  a  distinction  that  the  purest  democratic 
feeling  is  far  from  repudiating.  Such  a  distinc- 
tion as  it  is,  therefore,  we  are  very  ready  to  recog- 
nise ;  for  democratic  principles  are  by  no  means 
incompatible  with  a  just  discrimination  of  ranks 
in  society,  so  long  as  that  discrimination  is  volun- 
tarily made  by  individuals,  and  has  no  political 
aim.  Democracy  has  always  borne  the  obloquy 
of  cherishing  a  levelling  spirit  and  aiming  at 
agrarian  measures;  a  reproach  that  it  is  much 
farther  from  deserving  than  every  other  species  of 
government.  There  has  been  widely  dissemina- 
ted, as  we  have  already  taken  frequent  occasion 
to  remark,  and  cannot  too  often  repeat,  a  mista- 
ken notion  as  to  the  kind  of  equality  that  a  de- 
mocracy demands,  which  is  not  an  equality  in 
the  circumstances,  but  an  equality  in  the  rights 
of  mankind.  In  utterly  repudiating  all  distinc- 
tion in  political  rights,  it  admits  freely  of  every 
other  distinction,  to  the  most  absolute  and  unqual- 
ified extent.     It  destroys  arbitrary  and  fictitious. 


222  ARISTOCRACY    IN    i»MERICA. 

to  make  room  for  real  rank.  It  annihilates  the 
distinction  of  rights  only  to  build  up  the  greatest 
\listinctions  of  men.  All  men  are  not  really  equal 
'3  all  respects;  they  are  not  equal  in  integrity, 
ot  equal  in  talent,  not  equal  in  practical  skill, 
,ot  equal  in  diligence,  not  equal  in  success;  nay, 
;  o  two  men  are  equal.  In  republics  individual 
^  left  freely  to  cope,  in  these  respects,  with  in- 
dividual, and  to  establish  these  differences  in 
their  fullest  possible  latitude.  Thus  the  charge 
so  often  alleged  against  republics,  of  bringing 
down  men  to  one  level,  is  highly  calumnious  and 
unjust.  What  shall  we  say  of  other  systems, 
which  really  do  substitute,  for  the  absurdity  of  a 
single  average  standard,  and  the  reducing  all  to 
a  medium  equality  (falsely  alleged  against  re- 
publics), the  absurdity  of  divers  arbitrary  meas- 
ures that,  w^orse  than  the  bed  of  Procrustes,  are 
used  to  stretch  the  small  to  the  dimensions  of  the 
great,  and  to  cut  down  the  great  to  the  pigmy 
stature  that  naturally  and  rationally  belongs  only 
to  the  small  ? 

Happily,  republicans  are  alike  guiltless  of  both 
these  absurdities.  They  embrace  the  division  of 
the  social  circle,  as  part  of  the  natural  and  ne- 
cessary results  of  any  system  which  leaves  men 
free,  and  do  not  look  with  envy  on  the  fashion- 


ARISTOCRACY    iN    AMERICA.  223 

able  class,  so  long  as  all  are  left  to  contend  on 
equal  terms  for  what  is,  after  all,  a  rather  trivial, 
and,  at  the  best,  a  purely  social  distinction. 

Foreigners,  according  to  their  particular  and 
individual  humours,  either  carp  at  an  organiza- 
tion of  society  which,  they  say,  leaves  us  without 
an  aristocracy,  or,  admiting  us  to  possess  one, 
sneer  at  its  composition.  The  first,  if,  when  they 
speak  of  our  being  without  an  aristocracy,  they 
use  that  word  in  its  misappropriation  to  an  up- 
per or  fashionable  circle,  distinctly  recognised 
among  us  as  such,  are  clearly  wrong  in  point  of 
fact ;  if  they  mean  the  absence  of  a  political 
aristocracy,  using  the  word  in  its  proper  sense, 
we  admit  their  allegation,  and  are  as  far  from 
regretting  the  fact  as  we  are  from  lamenting  our 
deprivation  of  any  other  species  of  degradation 
and  injustice.  The  last,  who  only  grant  us  the 
possession  of  an  aristocracy  to  overwhelm  it 
with  their  sneers,  contend  that  we  have  one 
founded  on  money,  and  that  an  aristocracy  of 
wealth  is  the  meanest  and  most  sordid  of  all 
aristocracies.  They  forget  that  our  first  class 
does  not  constitute  an  aristocracy ;  and  that  what 
doubtless  is  very  unfit  to  be  an  ingredient  in  the 
national  sovereignty,  may  be  a  very  essential 
element  and  support  of  an  order  which  professes 


224  ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA. 

simply  to  direct  taste  and  fashion,  and  aspires 
only  to  the  elegance,  refinement,  and  independ- 
ence of  private  life. 

Our  aristocracy  of  fashion  (if  it  may  be  momen- 
tarily so  called)  is  principally  founded  on  wealth, 
it  is  true;  and  on  what  other  foundation  could  it 
be  built  1  How,  otherwise,  could  it  command 
leisure,  ease,  and  elegance,  which  will  always 
be  essential  to  a  superior  rank,  so  long  as  we 
have  a  physical  nature  to  sustain,  and  five  corpo- 
real senses,  with  all  their  refined  tastes,  to  gratify  ? 

Before  too  severely  criticising  our  so-called 
aristocracy,  as  based  on  wealth,  Europeans  would 
do  well  to  analyze  the  composition  of  their  own, 
and  see  how  much  of  its  consequence  it  borrows 
exclusively  from  that  source.  Abstracted  from 
its  possessions  and  property,  it  would  about  as 
nearly  resemble  an  aristocracy  as  a  human  body 
without  breath  resembles  a  living  man ;  the 
order  would  sink  into  universal  contempt,  and 
utterly  cease  to  exist,  if  with  the  blood  and  ti- 
tles, its  members  did  not  also  inherit  the  estates 
of  their  ancestors. 

Let  them  not  sneer  at  the  deference  shown  to 
wealth  in  this  country.  By  making  it  the  meas- 
ure of  political  rights,  and  giving  it  a  preponder- 
ance in  the  management  of  the  state,  they  them- 


AniSTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA.  225 

selves  yield  to  it  a  much  greater  deference,  while 
they  commit  a  flagrant  injustice :  we,  certainly, 
may  be  pardoned  its  becoming  among  us  the  ba- 
sis of  a  purely  social  and  private  distinction,    it 
has  won  its  own  way  to  the  rank  it  enjoys  here, 
and  hence  it  must  be  held  to  have  arrived  only 
at  the  consideration  to  which  it  is  justly  entitled. 
When  we  speak  of  wealth  as  the  essential, 
we  do  not,  by  any  means,  intend  to  designate  it 
as  the  exclusive  basis  of  our  highest  circle.    On 
the  contrary,  it  is  to  be  preferred  before   any 
other  basis,  for  the  very  reason  that  it  admits  of 
the  readiest  and  most  extensive  amalgamation 
with  every  other  most  legitimate  and  most  valu- 
able ingredient.     Talent  and  education,  as  well 
as  political  distinction,  will  always  mingle  more 
largely  in  the  higher  class  of  a  democratic  than 
in  that  of  an  aristocratic  country— will  always 
more  easily  command  wealth  than  they  can  com- 
mand family  pride — of  course,  much  more  easily 
than  they  can  command  the  pride  of  wealth  and 
the  pride  of  family  united.     Indeed,  the  acquisi- 
tion of  wealth,  of  itself,  presupposes  the  exercise 
of  some  intelligence  and  many  of  the  virtues ;  as 
the  practice  of  almost  any  vice  requires  an  expen- 
sive and  prodigal  nourishment  incompatible  with 
business  success.    On  the  other  hand,  wealth  per- 
S 


226  ARISICCAACY    IN    AMERICA. 

petuated  in  aristocratic  families  by  aristocratic 
laws,  tends  to  nourish  the  bad  passions  and  de- 
prave the  heart.  In  the  one  case,  industry  is  re- 
quired for  the  success  of  the  individual ;  in  the 
other,  idleness  is  imposed  by  the  prejudices  of  so- 
ciety. A  man  who  has  spent  his  youth  in  the  fox 
hunt  or  the  horse-race  at  home,  and  in  the  hells 
and  stews  of  the  domestic,  or  the  more  promiscu- 
ous but  less  restricted  dissipations  of  a  foreign 
capital,  may  be  a  more  polished  gentleman,  but 
he  cannot  be  a  wiser  or  better  man,  or  a  more  suit- 
able head  of  society,  than  he  who  has  from  early 
youth  been  disciplined  to  patient  habits  of  indus- 
try, and  mingled  with  men  in  the  various  but  sober 
walks  of  business.  The  difference  may  be,  on  a 
comparison  of  the  upper  classes  of  society,  much 
in  favour  of  Europe,  in  externals;  but  give  me, 
notwithstanding,  the  internals  and  essentials  of 
the  upper  class  of  American  society.  Give  me  the 
Ionic  capital  of  American  society  rather  than  the 
highly-wrought  Corinthian  of  European.  It  is  to 
our  advantage  to  have  an  upper  class  that  has 
the  dross  of  democracy  about  it;  that  is  justly 
subject  to  much  criticism,  and  cannot  assume 
too  arrogant  pretensions.  It  would  be  uncon- 
genial, if  not  dangerous ;  it  would  be  the  source 
of  much  unhappinessj  if  not  of  political  disaster, 


ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA.  227 

could  we  transfer  to  our  highest  rank,  as  a  mere 
social  class,  the  claims  to  respect  and  veneration 
put  forth  by  European  aristocracy.  I  delight 
in  a  want  of  cultivation  and  refinement  that  has 
the  odour  of  freedom,  and  would  not  dispense 
with  one  jot  or  tittle  of  a  rusticity  which  con- 
tinually reminds  me  that  I  am  a  free  citizen  of  a 
free  country.  The  constitution  of  our  society, 
therefore,  seems  to  me  in  itself  the  best,  inde- 
pendently of  the  price  we  should  be  compelled 
to  pay  for  any  other. 

The  distinction  of  wealth,  so  long  as  it  confers 
no  political  privileges,  so  long  as  it  elevates  one 
in  the  circles  of  private  society  only,  is  a  pecu- 
liarly democratic  distinction ;  since  wealth  may 
be  said  to  be  almost  within  every  man's  reach ; 
at  least,  every  man  is  free  to  strive  in  an  equal 
competition  to  obtain  it.  No  criterion  by  which 
to  bestow  the  first  rank  in  society  could  possibly 
be  devised  more  appropriate  to  the  circumstan- 
ces of  a  democratic  people.  It  is  right  that  in  a 
republican  country  the  highest  class  should  not 
be  too  widely  separated  from  the  masses.  The 
two  extremes  of  society  ought  to  communicate 
by  imperceptible  degrees.  The  highest  station 
ought  not  to  be  too  high  and  ought  not  to  be  too 
secure.    The  lowest  citizen  ought  net  to  be  pre- 


228  ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA. 

eluded  from  hope  nor  the  highest  from  fear. 
Thus  society  will  be  properly  amalgamated  by 
the  force  of  reciprocal  sympathies.  It  would  be 
nauch  to  be  regretted  if  we  had  an  upper  class 
with  too  lofty  pretensions  and  too  inaccessible  a 
rank.  A  first  circle,  to  a  great  extent  formed  (;f 
those  who  are  rewarded  by  their  accession  to  it 
for  the  successful  pursuit  of  wealth,  and  are  de- 
pendant in  a  great  degree  for  their  continuance 
in  it  upon  the  caprices  of  fortune,  accomplishes 
for  us  a  very  desirable  result. 

How  could  a  higher  class  of  society  maintain 
itself  without  wealth  ?  Without  leisure,  society 
is  a  tax ;  and  without  wealth,  leisure  is  impos- 
sible. Wealth  places  within  a  man's  reach  the 
means  of  entertaining  society.  He  is  thus  pre- 
pared to  make  his  friends  comfortable  at  his 
house.  Fashionable  society  necessarily  implies 
a  degree  of  luxury.  The  wealthy  man  can  af- 
ford it.  He  can  furnish  his  halls  with  the  nicest 
specimens  of  the  mechanic  arts  to  subserve  per- 
sonal comfort ;  with  the  finest  specimens  in  every 
department  of  the  fine  arts,  for  the  gratification 
of  a  fastidious  taste ;  he  can  educate  his  family 
in  those  accomplishments  of  intellect  and  person 
which  are  in  the  best  repute  :  thus  his  house  nat- 
urally becomes  the  resort  of  the  best  company. 

To  determine  the  consideratic  n  that  v/ealtu  is 


ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA.  229 

entitled  to  in  society,  let  us  see,  for  a  moment, 
what  influence  it  really  commands,  in  these  mod- 
ern times,  in  the  affairs  of  the  world. 

And,  at  the  first  blush  of  the  subject,  we  are 
struck  with  the  fact,  that  in  modern  republican 
society,  at  least,  it  seems  to  be  the  principal  ob- 
ject of  desire  and  pursuit.  Wherefore  does  the 
student  trim  his  midnight  lamp,  the  artisan  an- 
ticipate the  morning's  dawn,  and  the  tradesman 
so  often  forego  the  dear  domestic  delights  of  fire- 
side, and  wife,  and  home,  to  assume  an  intensity 
of  care  that  eats  deeply  into  health  and  life  ? 
What  secret  spring  sets  all  the  energies  of  soci- 
ety into  such  wonderful  activity  1  What  so 
much  as  the  universal  passion  for  the  acquisition 
of  wealth  ?  It  seems  to  be  the  power  of  wealth 
that  has  wrought  a  great  majority  of  the  most 
important  political  meliorations  of  modern  times. 
What  originally  created  the  chartered  cities,  the 
first  germe  of  modern  freedom,  but  the  wealth  that 
purchased  their  franchises  of  the  needy  crusa- 
ders? What  has  introduced  the  most  important 
improvements  into  the  British  Constitution,  and 
made  it  as  liberal  as  it  is,  but  the  power  assumed 
by  the  British  Parliament  over  the  money  of  the 
nation  1  What  peopled  this  continent,  for  the 
most  part  (the  colonization  of  the  Eastern  States 


230  ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA. 

must  be  excepted),  but  the  pursuit  of  wealth? 
What  revolutionized  it  but  our  jealousy  of  the 
control  of  our  money  ?  What  prompts  to  the  dis- 
covery of  new  countries  so  much  as  the  pursuit  of 
wealth  ?  What  so  much  facilitates  the  inter- 
course of  old  countries,  or  tends  so  powerfully  to 
preserve  peaceful  relations  among  them  ?  What 
is  the  great  means  of  modern  society,  means  of 
comfort,  means  of  influence,  means  of  power, 
means  of  good  7  What  is  the  great  instrument  of 
benevolence  and  charity — the  powerful  agency 
employed  to  civilize,  enlighten,  reform,  and  Chris- 
tianize mankind  ?  To  be  able  to  subsidize  the 
most  sublime  powers  of  genius,  to  lay  under  con- 
tribution every  department  of  human  art  and  in- 
dustry, and  control,  to  an  almost  unlimited  extent, 
the  direction  of  the  lives  and  energies  of  mankind, 
seem  certainly  to  be  among  the  prerogatives  of 
wealth.  Even  great  states  are  compelled  to  bow 
to  its  omnipotence.  Questions  of  finance  seem 
to  monopolize  the  politics  of  the  country.  How 
business  shall  be  fostered,  commerce  promoted, 
taxes  levied,  and  currency  regulated,  are  the 
great  dividing  questions  of  public  policy  in  mod- 
ern times.  Great  princes  now  no  longer  draw 
their  support  from  their  own  private  domains  or 
from  conquered  provinces.     W^ar  is  no  longer 


ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA.  231 

sustained  by  the  voluntary  aid  of  imperial  citizens, 
the  personal  services  of  vassals,  or  the  plunder 
of  conquered  cities  and  the  sale  of  captive  pris- 
oners ;  government  must  be  conducted  and  war 
sustained  by  means  of  the  wealth  of  the  state. 
Without  money,  or  the  means  of  commanding  it, 
a  government  is  wholly  without  resources  ;  it  has 
no  power  to  conduct  the  operations  either  of 
peace  or  war,  and  the  arm  of  the  national  sover- 
eignty is  utterly  paralyzed. 

Money  is  thus  the  great  engine  of  modern 
times,  and  they  who  possess  large  shares  of  it 
must  be  prominent  in  modern  society.  That 
wealth,  being  the  object  of  such  universal  desire 
and  the  means  of  so  commanding  an  influence, 
should  attract  much  of  the  regard  of  mankind, 
and  the  first  place  in  society  be  generally  and 
voluntarily  accorded  to  it,  is  certainly  not  un- 
reasonable or  surprising.  Wealth,  in  this  age,  is 
power,  and  power  commands  respect.  If  we  do 
not  respect  the  possessor  for  his  intrinsic  quali- 
ties, we  respect  him  for  his  position,  in  the  same 
manner  that  we  may  respect  an  officer  for  the 
station  he  holds,  though  we  may  despise  the  man. 

Those  romantic  and  visionary  people  who  have 
exerted  themselves  so  often  to  decry  the  distinc- 
tion that  wealth  confers,  would  have  exhibited 


232  ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA. 

much  more  wisdom,  and  lived  to  mucli  bettei 
purpose,  had  they  exerted  their  wits  in  the  acqui- 
sition of  it.  I  respect  a  sentiment  so  universal 
among  mankind  as  their  great  regard  for  wealth. 
There  must  be  some  foundation  for  it.  Spite  of 
all  the  fine  things  which  have  been  said,  in  fits  ol 
philosophical  romancing,  about  indifference  to  it 
and  the  meanness  of  its  creatures,  we  still  see,  in 
point  of  fact,  a  degree  of  respectful  deference 
and  sedulous  attention  paid  to  the  rich,  by  the 
philosopher  and  the  boor  alike  (or,  perhaps,  of 
the  two,  the  philosopher  is  the  most  obsequious, 
as  he  is  usually  the  most  needy),  which  intrinsic 
merit,  unadorned  by  imposing  external  circum- 
stances, is  very  rarely  able  to  command.  Our 
present  existence  is  but  partly,  and  that  the  small- 
est part  of  it,  intellectual,  as  it  depends  much 
more  upon  physical  than  upon  intellectual  com- 
forts ;  and  within  the  more  present  and  immediate 
sphere  which  our  material  nature  prescribes  to  us, 
wealth  seems  to  domineer  almost  without  control. 
A  good  deal  of  our  poetical  prejudice  against 
it,  as  a  means  of  conferring  rank  in  society, 
comes  down  to  us  from  the  exploded  systems  of 
former  times.  All  the  social  and  intellectual  re- 
finement of  ancient  times  was  collected  in  cities — 
not  like  our  cities,  differing  only  from  the  coun- 


ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA.  233 

try  in  presenting  a  larger  aggregate  of  popula- 
tion, and  the  provisions  which  such  a  population 
naturally  makes  for  itself,  without  any  peculiar 
prerogatives — but  cities  in  the  midst  of  conquered 
and  subordinate  provinces,  like  kings  in  the  midst 
of  subjects.  Estates  were  acquired  by  spoils, 
and  tribute,  and  patronage.  To  labour  w^as  the 
business  of  slaves.  To  work  for  profit,  and  man- 
ifest a  desire  to  gain  by  thrift,  and  economy,  and 
industry,  was  a  mean  and  sordid  occupation  for 
the  free  citizen  of  an  imperial  city.  The  army 
and  the  forum  furnished  the  only  fit  places  for  a 
freeman  ;  of  course,  military  and  civic  honours, 
in  conjunction  wilh  hereditary  rank,  with  which 
they  were  commonly  connected,  furnished  the 
only  suitable  grounds  for  distinction* 

During  the  barbarous  ages  of  society  which 
succeeded,  war  was  still  the  most  honourable 
occupation.  The  same  broad  distinctions  of  sov- 
ereign and  subject  were  still  observed,  only  the 
sovereignty  was  transferred  from  the  imperial 
city  to  the  feudal  lord.  Wealth  was  to  the  feu- 
dal lord  a  thing  of  course.  The  arts  of  peace, 
the  patient  industry  of  commerce,  and  its  reward 
of  wealth,  were  still  despised ;  they  still  confer- 
red no  rank.     Wealth  had  but  limited  objects 

*  Grandeur  et  Decadence  des  Romams,  chap.  x. 


234  ARISVOCrtACY    IN    AMERICA. 

of  gratification,  and  was  of  little  use  to  its  pos- 
sessor in  lawless  times.  The  distinction  of  lord 
and  vassal  swallowed  up  every  other,  and  the 
labour  of  the  country  was  divided  between  vil- 
leins and  plebeians.  Their  occupations  were  es- 
teemed mean,  their  rank  was  fixed,  and  they 
could  not  be  ennobled  by  the  successful  achieve- 
ment of  wealth. 

The  aristocracy  of  Europe  is  a  relic  of  this 
system.  The  European  nobleman  is  still  in  pos- 
session of  the  demesnes  of  his  ancestors;  still 
prides  himself  on  his  descent ;  still  retains  politi- 
cal power;  still  takes  precedence  of  the  com- 
moner; still  affects  to  look  down  upon  the  ple- 
beian trader  and  shopkeeper;  tbough  this  dread 
of  contamination,  it  must  be  confessed,  is  often 
greatly  modified  by  the  want  of  money  which  the 
exigences  of  modern  society  have  superinduced. 

But  this  affected  and  idle  contempt  of  the  rank 
■which  is  conferred  through  wealth  on  business 
success,  springing  from  a  system  founded  on  the 
unjust  domination  of  one  man  over  another,  and 
the  unjust  plunder  of  one  man  by  another,  and 
sustained  only  by  custom  and  prejudice,  cannot 
pass  the  barrier  of  the  Atlantic.  We  have  un- 
dergone a  revolution  which  foreign  aristocracies 
must  sooner  or  later  experience.  Labour  is  no 
lonj^er  despised,  and  w^ealth  is  honourable. 


ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA.  235 

We  therefore  maintain  that  wealth  is  justly 
entitled  to  the  distinction  which  in  this  country 
it  actually  enjoys,  of  being  the  basis  of,  and  the 
most  essential  qualification  for,  the  first  or  fash- 
ionable class  of  modern  society. 

Not  that  a  man's  admission  into  the  best  circle 
should  follow  of  course  upon  his  arrival  a* 
wealth,  and  by  no  means  do  I  mean  that  his  ex- 
clusion should  follow  of  course  from  the  absence 
of  that  qualification ;  but  that  the  first  circle,  or 
fashionable  society,  must  be  mainly  sustained  by 
wealth,  and  that  the  man  of  wealth  has,  though 
not  an  irresistible,  yet  a  very  powerful  claim,  and 
one  which  it  must  require  some  very  considerable 
disqualification  to  resist.  It  is  certainly  a  grat- 
ification to  democratic  feeling — the  manner  in 
which  the  distribution  of  social  distinctions  by 
wealth  in  this  country  sports  with  the  idle  prej- 
udices imported  from  aristocratic  countries,  and 
shocks  and  overturns  the  fastidious  caprices  of 
those  who  aflfect  to  pride  themselves  on  their 
family  and  station,  as  if  they  were  unapproach- 
able by  others.  In  every  industrial  calling  the 
road  is  open  to  wealth ;  and  to  wealth,  if  not  to 
that  of  the  acquirer  himself,  yet  invariably,  if  its 
advantages  be  properly  improved,  to  wealth  in 
the  hands  of  his  children,  the  doors  of  fashiona- 


236  ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA. 

ble  society  must  open,  whether  he  be  shoemaker 
or  blacksmith,  tinker  or  tailor.     The  man  him- 
self, if  constantly  confmed  to  the  details  of  his 
trade,  the  immediate  handiwork  of  his  craft,  may 
be  uncleanly  in  his  person,  rude  in  his  manners, 
and  uninformed  by  education ;  if  so,  he  will  nat- 
urally be  excluded ;  but  if  time  and  good  for- 
tune have  enabled  him  to  get  the  better  of  these 
unpropilious  circumstances,  and  his  family  have 
improved  the  advantages  of  wealth,  by  acquiring 
polished  manners  and   cultivating  their  minds, 
you  may  boggle  at,  but  you  must  accept  them. 
Perhaps  in  no  single  respect  do  individuals  of 
our  upper  circle  appear  at  so  great  a  disadvan- 
tage as  in   entertaining  prejudices,  and  freely, 
and  almost  ostentatiously,  making  an  avowal  of 
sentiments,  that  would  put  to  shame  one  part  of 
their  own  career,  and,  if  universally  indulged, 
utterly  disgrace  probably  the  greater   part  of 
their  family,  in  the  ascending,  descending,  and 
all  its  collateral  branches.     The  just  reasons  for 
exclusion  from  any  particular  grade  of  society 
ought  to  be  as  powerful  with  the  excluded  as 
the  exclusionist ;  and,  in  judging  of  this  ques- 
tion, trade,  occupation,  family,  origin,  should  be 
considered  as  what  the  lawyers  call  only  prima 
facie  evidence,  furnishing  no  more  than  a  mere 


ARISTOCRACV    IN    AMERICA.  237 

presumption,  to  be  varied  according  to  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  particular  case.  One  may 
be  so  situated  that  his  associates  cannot  be  agree- 
able ;  he  may  be  excluded,  because  he  would 
bring  the  taint  of  his  set  with  him.  If  he  be 
agreeable  as  to  mind  and  heart,  he  may  be  rude 
and  uncouth  in  manner.  He  may  not  be  famil- 
iar with  good  society,  and  thus  alike  embarrassed 
and  embarrassing.  His  means  or  his  occupa- 
tion may  not  admit  of  a  suitable  exterior;  and 
in  large  communities,  where  every  man  cannot 
be  known,  appearances  are  not  to  be  disregard- 
ed. These  and  other  like  circumstances  are  not 
capricious,  arbitrary,  and  fanciful,  but  furnish  just 
and  solid  grounds  of  discrimination.  Still  let 
every  man  be  treated  respectfully;  let  not  his 
feelings,  or  even  his  prejudices,  be  wounded,  nor 
let  his  pretensions  be  too  slightly  regarded ;  he  is 
a  free  citizen  of  a  free  commonwealth ;  and,  as 
such,  a  candidate  for  the  highest  political  hon- 
ours, as  well  as  the  highest  private  station. 

Our  first  class  is  well  enough  as  it  is,  and  the 
criticisms  of  a  foreign  aristocracy  only  attach  us 
the  more  strongly  to  it.  What  they  allege  as  its 
very  faults  and  blemishes,  are,  in  our  view,  its 
most  unexceptionable  features.  It  is  the  better 
liked  in  proportion  as  it  is  the  more  dependant 


238  ARISTOCRACY    IN    AMERICA. 

It  is  not  so  high  and  inaccessible  as  to  be  be- 
yond the  reach  of  our  sympathies.  Its  parent 
Democracy  loves  it  the  better  for  its  being  an 
infirm  child.  It  can  only  become  ridiculous  by 
putting  forth  ridiculous  pretensions ;  by  affecting 
to  interpose  between  itself  and  the  multitude 
from  which  it  originates,  and  by  which  its  ranks 
must  be  continually  fed,  an  impassable  barrier. 
We  cannot  laugh  at  the  coach  which  conveys  it  ; 
but  we  may  be  pardoned  a  smile  at  the  livery  on 
the  box,  or  the  coat  of  arras  on  the  panel. 


IMMIGRATION.  239 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Immigration. 

When  we  look  at  the  condition  of  the  world 
and  its  inhabitants,  and  see  how  greatly  over- 
stocked some  parts  of  it  are  with  population,  and 
what  immense  resources  of  nature,  in  other  parts 
are  exhausting  their  productive  energies  upon 
the  wilderness,  we  may  well  ask,  by  what  right 
can  the  bounties  of  Providence  be  withheld  from 
the  support  of  human  life  1  When  God  has 
given  man  dominion  over  the  earth  to  cultivate 
and  subdue  it,  shall  a  portion  of  our  race  league 
with  the  wild  beast  to  resist  that  ordinance  ? 
Certainly  not.  We  have  an  undoubted  right  to 
regulate  the  prices  of  our  vast  and  uncultivated 
forests ;  we  have  an  undoubted  right  to  prescribe 
all  qualifications  necessary  for  the  preservation  of 
our  liberties  and  our  property ;  but  to  devise  any 
set  of  regulations,  the  direct  aim  of  which  is  ut- 
terly to  exclude  the  surplus  population  of  the 
Old  World  from  our  soil,  I  doubt  whether  we 
have  a  right. 

Whether  we  have  the  right  or  not,  certainly 


240  IMMIGRATION. 

nothing  could  be  more  impolitic  than  practically 
to  assume  it.  We  have  an  immense  and  unoc- 
cupied territory.  We  want  population.  Land  is 
cheap ;  labour  is  dear.  We  have  enterprise,  en- 
ergy, intelligence,  and  practical  skill;  we  want 
not  minds,  but  hands.  Immigrants  are  the  ma- 
terial exactly  suited  to  our  circumstances :  great 
physical  power,  in  want  of  capital,  direction,  and 
application.  They  compound  our  wealth  in  a 
geometrical  ratio,  by  adding  not  only  to  its  sum, 
but  still  more  to  its  means.  By  every  immigrant 
that  comes  to  this  country,  every  man  already  in 
it  is  made  somewhat  the  richer ;  the  circle  of  his 
customers  is  widened ;  the  demand  for  his  abili- 
ties, his  goods,  and  his  estate  is  increased,  and 
with  it  their  price.  It  is  a  great  error  to  sup- 
pose that  real  estate  has  been  so  rapidly  advan- 
cing, town  and  country  so  rapidly  settling,  busi- 
ness so  flourishing,  and  wealth  so  rapidly  accu- 
mulating, by  the  mere  force  of  the  internal  re- 
sources of  the  country ;  they  are  but  the  natural 
results  of  a  rapidly-increasing  population,  to 
which  foreign  immigration  has  in  no  insensible 
degree  contributed. 

Is  there  danger  that  the  same  causes  which 
have  alone  peopled  this  country,  and  brought  us 
to  our  present  height  of  prosperity,  may,  by  a 


IMMIGRATION.  241 

more  active  operation,  precipitate  us  into  a  de- 
cline 1  Shall  we  adopt  a  S}'stem  of  policy  that 
would  have  excluded  our  fathers  from  these 
shores  1  that  would  have  picked  out  and  exiled 
some  of  the  best  soldiers  of  the  Revolution  7  that 
would  have  condemned  this  country  forever  to 
the  dominion  of  savages  and  perpetual  sterility  1 

The  benefits  of  immigration  are  too  manifest 
to  bear  extensive  comment :  let  us  examine  some 
of  its  alleged  evils. 

Perchance  the  foreigner  is  a  pauper.  If  so, 
he  is  at  least  an  able-bodied  one;  the  laws 
provide  a  sufficient  security  for  that,  by  requiring 
a  pledge  from  the  man  who  brings  him  here  of 
his  present  ability  to  maintain  himself.  Granted 
that  he  is  an  able-bodied  pauper;  he  is,  even 
thus,  worth  much  to  this  country.  Is  not  an 
able-bodied  slave,  who  brings  with  him  nothing 
but  his  sinews,  yet  worth  much  to  his  master  ? 
Far  more  is  an  able-bodied,  though  destitute  im- 
migrant, as  a  free  citizen,  worth  to  this  free  coun- 
try :  by  all  the  difference  between  the  cost  and 
profit  of  the  slave ;  by  all  the  superadded  differ- 
ence between  free  and  slave  labour;  by  all  the 
overwhelming  difference  between  the  blessings 
of  freedom  and  the  inappreciable  curse  of  sla- 
very. I  should  perhaps  beg  pardon  for  using 
T 


242  IMMIGRAIIUN. 

the  comparison  :  I  only  do  it  the  more  forcibly 
to  show  that  the  immigrant  who  brings  nothing 
but  a  sound  body,  patient  of  fatigue  and  capable 
of  labour — the  foreign  pauper  if  you  please  (he 
is  no  longer  a  pauper  when  he  arrives  here), 
still  brings  to  this  country  a  great  accession  of 
value,  capable,  even  to  a  certain  extent,  of  a 
specific  pecuniary  estimation. 

The  difficulty  which  prevents  our  thus  consid- 
ering the  subject  is,  in  part,  that  we  only  view  the 
foreigner  landed  and  lodged  in  poverty  at  our 
great  cities  on  the  seaboard,  where  he  arrives, 
and  where,  under  such  circumstances,  his  pres- 
ence often,  unfortunately,  is  an  evil.  These  cities 
are  like  an  old  country  overstocked  with  popula- 
tion, where  there  are  already  more  hands  than  can 
find  employment.  Here,  therefore,  the  presence 
of  the  immigrant  is  much  felt  withal,  in  an  in- 
creased extent  of  public  pauperism  and  an  in- 
creased amount  of  taxation;  a  burden,  by-the- 
bye,  which,  owing  as  it  is  to  accidental  position, 
and  sustained  for  the  common  benefit,  ought  to  be 
distributed  and  borne  by  the  state  at  large,  by 
which  means  it  would  be  made  light,  instead  of 
operating,  as  now,  oppressively.  This  evil  is 
however  a  temporary  one,  and  even  light,  in 
comparison  with  the  immense,  permanent,  and 


IMMIGRATION.  243 

universal  benefits  which  accrue  from  the  same 
source.  Much  enlarged  upon  by  our  principal 
newspapers,  which,  it  so  happens,  are  published 
in  places  where  its  weight  is  most  oppressively 
felt,  it  has  met  with  a  far  more  indulgent  and 
sympathetic  consideration  in  prejudicing  the  pub- 
lic mind  a2;ainst  the  cause  of  immigration  gener- 
ally,  than  from  its  real  comparative  magnitude  it 
is  justly  entitled  to.  Take  the  pauperism  account 
on  the  one  side,  and  a  single  item  which  may  be 
mentioned  on  the  other — that  is  to  say,  the  great- 
er feasibility  and  diminished  cost  of  our  extensive 
public  works — and  I  doubt  not  that  this  compari- 
son alone  would  show"  an  immense  balance  in  fa- 
vour of  immigration. 

There  remain  two  other  objections  to  the  im- 
migration of  foreio;ners,  which  have  been  urged 
with  much  apparent  plausibility,  and  largely  in- 
ducted into  public  favour  :  the  pretended  appre- 
hension of  danger  to  our  liberties,  and  of  the" 
spread  of  an  erroneous  religious  faith. 

It  is  one  of  the  curses  of  bad  government,  that 
it  makes  the  evils  it  occasions  an  apology  for  the 
power  it  usurps  and  the  tyranny  it  exercises. 
It  first,  by  its  general  and  indirect  operation,  re- 
duces the  masses  of  its  people  to  ignorance,  de- 
prives them  of  the  proprietorship  of  the  soil  and 


244  IMMlGliATlON. 

a  large  share  of  their  rights,  and  then  displays 
the  phenomena  which  a  people  under  such  cir- 
cumstances exhibit,  as  proof  of  their  incapacity 
for  government.  Give  men  their  rights,  make 
•education  accessible  and  property  attainable, 
and  you  make  a  different  people  of  them.  They 
become  orderly  and  friendly  to  government,  be- 
cause they  are  a  part  of  the  sovereignty ;  they 
respect  the  right  of  property,  because  they  are 
proprietors  themselves ;  and,  to  be  qualified  for 
the  exercise  of  the  prerogatives  which  property 
and  self-sovereignty  confer,  they  zealously  apply 
themselves  to  the  lights  of  education,  and  make 
every  exertion  to  secure  its  benefits  to  their  fami- 
lies. They  become  respectable  men,  because 
they  are  free  citizens.  So  much  are  we  the  crea- 
tures of  circumstances,  that  the  same  rule  of  con- 
duct presents  very  different  motives  to  a  man  as  a 
freeholder,  and  the  same  man,  with  the  same  mor- 
al characteristics,  in  the  character  and  condition 
of  an  outlaw.  Hence,  accordingly,  it  has  been 
found,  that  in  proportion  as  Ireland,  whence  the 
largest  number  of  immigrants  come,  has  been  en- 
franchised, to  the  same  extent  has  it  been  redu- 
ced to  order  and  good  government.  We  have  no 
reason  to  fear  the  influx  of  foreigners;  the  very 
operation  of  our  government  transmutes  them  into 


immiguaTion.  245 

good  citizens.  Have  we  forgotten  that  even  rob- 
bers and  outlaws  originally  founded  and  peopled 
Rome,  republican  Rome  itself,  where  yet  justice, 
and  frugality,  and  all  the  severe  virtues  once  flour- 
ished, in  ancient  times,  in  their  greatest  lustre  1 

To  little  purpose  do  we  claim  the  essential  ca- 
pacity of  man,  under  all  circumstances,  for  self- 
government,  if  we  still  view  the  influx  of  a  foreign 
population  as  dangerous  to  our  liberties — as  if 
those  liberties  must  not  become  their  liberties  also. 
And  it  is  singular  that  we,  who  have  been  built 
up  from  the  foundation  by  this  very  means,  should 
quake  at  the  accession  of  foreigners,  when  we  are 
ourselves  foreigners  of  but  one  or  two  generations 
old  ;  as  if  we  were  the  original  population  of  the 
soil,  and,  what  the  ancient  Athenians  arrogantly 
claimed  to  be,  autochthones,  that  is,  sprung  from 
the  earth  we  inhabit. 

But  a  large  proportion  of  these  immigrants  are 
Catholics,  and  Catholicism  has  from  of  old  been 
assailed  as  unfriendly  to  freedom. 

Bigotry  and  persecution  have  never  been 
without  plausible  argument ;  and  the  main  dif- 
ference between  Protestantism  and  Catholicism, 
in  these  respects,  has  been,  not  that  one  has  been 
guilty  of  proscribing  by  law  whole  classes  of 
men  on  account  of  religious  opinions,  and  th* 
X2 


246 


IMMIGRATION. 


other  not,  but  that  the  degree  of  punishment  has 
been  different,  and  the  -pretext  different.  The 
principle  of  persecution  is  a  common  property 
which  history  has  assigned  to  both. 

It  is  not  for  me  to  recapitulate  the  pros  and 
C071S  on  the  question  of  religious  toleration,  espe- 
cially in  a  country  where  a  state  settled  by  Cath- 
olics, under  Catholic  auspices,  set  the  first  noble 
example  of  absolute  and  universal  immunity 
from  all  punishment  or  disqualification  whatever 
for  religious  opinions.  The  principle  may  be 
supposed  to  have  been  long  since  sufficiently  set- 
tled, that  so  long  as  a  citizen  is  practically  a 
good  citizen,  he  should  not  suffer  on  account  of 
any  inference  which  we  may  deduce,  but  he  does 
not,  from  his  speculative  opinions.  I  speak  of  the 
settlement  of  the  question  of  religious  toleration, 
because  that  embraces  the  other  question,  whether 
we  have  anything  to  dread  politically  from  the 
influx  of  Catholics.  If  they  are  really  hostile  to 
our  liberties,  they  may  justly  be  proscribed  as 
enemies  ;  and  if  we  have  reason  to  dread  them 
as  such,  we  ought  not  to  tolerate  them.  I  refer, 
therefore,  those  who  are  so  spasmodically  patriotic 
and  fearful  on  this  particular  question,  to  those  old 
discussions  of  the  right  of  religious  toleration, 
with  which  their  opinions  on  this  subject  show 


IMMIGRATION.  217 

them  to  be  not  familiar.  They  will  there  find 
urged,  among  other  things,  what  history  proves  to 
be  true,  that  Catholics  are  as  good  citizens  as  any 
other  religionists;  that  toleration  and  political 
freedom  of  conscience  are  not  the  gift  of  a  par- 
ticular religion  so  much  as  of  modern  times ; 
that,  on  the  other  hand,  bigotry  and  persecution 
are  not  the  qualities  of  any  particular  faith,  but 
the  natural  result  of  an  exclusive  or  too  great 
preponderance  of  a  single  sect.  If  Protest- 
antism has  been  more  liberal  than  Catholicism, 
it  has  been  owing  to  its  circumstances;  it  has 
been  because  it  had  a  later  birth.  It  happened 
to  be  the  last ;  another  religion  had  the  exclusive 
possession ;  it  had  to  turn  assailant.  Hence  its 
character  as  being  favourable  to  freedom ;  one 
to  which  it  has  great,  but  not  by  any  means  ex- 
clusive claims ;  a  character,  however,  often 
brought  forward,  in  these  times,  to  assail  the  very 
cause  in  whose  service  it  was  acquired. 

To  urge  the  influx  of  Catholics  as  an  evil,  in 
a  religious  point  of  view,  is  a  flagrant  error. 
The  Protestant  Christian,  as  such,  ought  to  know 
no  particular  country.  The  soul  across  the  At- 
lantic ought  to  be  as  dear  to  him  as  that  of  a  na- 
tive-born American.  He  ought  therefore  to  re- 
joice at  an  event  which  places  the  Catholic  with- 


248  IMMIGRATION. 

in  his  reach,  within  his  means  of  influence  and 
conversion — at  a  change  to  a  place  where  that 
(in  his  view)  erroneous  faith  is  more  accessi- 
ble, and  truth  is  re-enforced  by  the  strong  auxil- 
iary power  of  majorities.  The  religious  Protest- 
ant oucrht  to  regard  with  great  satisfaction  an 
event  which  brings  Catholics  to  his  own  door, 
to  have  their  belief  rectified  if  it  be  not  ortho- 
dox, and  thus  converts  every  Protestant  neigh- 
bour into  a  Protestant  missionary.  He  ough' 
not  to  fear  for  the- cause  of  truth  in  an  equai 
competition  with  error,  but  rather  to  invite  such 
competition.  The  rivalry  among  religious  sects 
has  already  redounded  much  to  our  secular  ad- 
vantage, and  has  actually,  I  believe,  made  us  a 
more  enlightened  people.  It  may  well  be  doubt- 
ed whether,  had  the  population  rapidly  settling 
at  the  West  been  all  Protestant,  the  same  strenu- 
ous efforts  would  have  been  put  forth  there  in 
the  cause  of  education,  or  so  zealously  sustained. 
We  have,  therefore,  everything  to  hope  and  to 
gain  from  the  immigration  of  foreigners,  while 
there  is  nothing  to  be  endangered  or  lost  by  it. 
The  question  stands  in  the  same  relation  to  us  that 
it  bore  to  our  revolutionary  fathers,  who  made  it 
one  of  the  causes  of  complaint  against  the  king  of 
Great  Britain,  that  he  "  had  endeavoured  to  pre 


IMMIGRATION.  249 

vent  the  population  of  these  states,  for  that  pur- 
pose obstructing  the  laws  for  the  naturalization 
of  foreigners,  and  refusing  to  pass  others  to  en- 
courage their  migration  hither."      * 

We  ought,  therefore,  to  aim  at  regulation,  not 
restriction.  Immigrants  come  here  to  seek  a 
refuge  in  the  bountiful  bosom  of  Nature  froA  the 
desolating  dominion  of  man.  They  come  on  the 
same  mission  that  our  forefathers  came,  and  to 
be,  in  common  with  us,  progenitors  of  a  great 
nation.  They  are  sent  by  Providence  to  equal- 
ize the  burden  of  the  earth,  and  improve  the 
condition  of  the  human  family.  Let  us  not  be 
appalled  at  their  numbers.  They  do  not  come 
too  rapidly  to  amalgamate  with  us.  We  should 
interpose  no  capricious  barriers  to  their  amalga- 
mation. The  greater  their  numbers,  the  more 
sensibly  do  they  add  to  our  individual  and  na- 
tional prosperity. 


THE    END. 


,y."OUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIRRARY  FACILITY 


AA    000  951  550    3 


